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Abstract 
 
This dissertation wonders what non-human animals can illuminate about media 
in the visible contact zones where they meet. It treats these zones as rich field sites from 
which to excavate neglected material-discursive-semiotic relationships between animals 
and media. What these encounters demonstrate is that animals are historically and 
theoretically implicated in the imagination and materialization of media and their 
attendant processes of communication.  
Chapter 1 addresses how animals have been excluded from the cultural 
production of knowledge as a result of an anthropocentric perspective that renders them 
invisible or reduces them to ciphers for human meanings. It combines ethology and 
cinematic realism to craft a reparative, non-anthropocentric way of looking that is able 
to accommodate the plenitude of animals and their traces, and grant them the 
ontological heft required to exert productive traction in the visual field.  
 Chapter 2 identifies an octopus’s encounter with a digital camera and its chance 
cinematic inscription as part of a larger phenomenon of “accidental animal videos.”  
Because non-humans are the catalysts for their production, these videos offer welcome 
realist counterpoints to traditional wildlife imagery, and affirm cinema’s ability to 
intercede non-anthropocentrically between humans and the world. Realism is essential 
to cinematic communication, and that realism is ultimately an achievement of non-
human intervention.  
Chapter 3 investigates how an Internet hoax about a non-human ape playing with 
an iPad in a zoo led to the development of “Apps for Apes,” a real life enrichment project 
that pairs captive orangutans with iPads.  It contextualizes and criticizes this project’s 
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discursive underpinnings but argues that the contingencies that transpire at the 
touchscreen interface shift our understanding of communication away from sharing 
minds and toward respecting immanence and accommodating difference. 
Finally, Chapter 4 examines a publicity stunt wherein a digital data-carrying 
homing pigeon races against the Internet to meet a computer. Rather than a 
competition, this is a continuation of a longstanding collaboration between the carrier 
pigeon and the infrastructure of modern communications. The carrier pigeon is not 
external but rather endemic to our understanding of communication as a material 
process that requires movement and coordination to make connections.  
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Introduction 
 
Setting the Scene:  
The Animal-Media Event in the Visual Field 
 
the intermedia network of cinema, television, radio, magazines, books, and 
newspapers is our environment, a service environment that carries the 
messages of the social organism. It establishes meaning in life, creates 
mediating channels between man and man, man and society.  
–Gene Youngblood, from “The Intermedia Network as 
Nature” in Expanded Cinema (54). 
 
Should we not learn the lesson that, for example, the woods, which poets 
praise as the human being’s loveliest abode, is hardly grasped in its true 
meaning if we relate it only to ourselves? […] The meaning of the forest is 
multiplied a thousandfold if one does not limit oneself to its relations to 
human subjects but also includes animals.  
–Jakob von Uexküll, from “A Theory of Meaning” in  
A Foray Into the Worlds of Animals and Humans (142). 
 
 
I. A Squirrel on the Internet 
Andrew Blum was unable to get on the Internet one day, because a squirrel was 
already on it. In the backyard of his New York apartment, the troublesome rodent was 
intermittently chewing on the cable that brought the Internet into his home, disrupting 
his Internet service. Up until that moment, the journalist confesses, the Internet as a 
thing, “a ‘thing’ that squirrels can nibble at,” had escaped him (2). All this time he had 
taken it for granted as a nebulous space he accessed solely through his digital devices. It 
was seemingly separate from his immediate physical surroundings, as if the screen 
before him was opaque, and demarcated a “solid border between dimensions…the 
virtual world and the physical world, cyberspace and real places, and never the two shall 
meet” (Blum 4). The incident made such an indelible impression on Blum that it served 
as the catalyst for a more extensive investigation of the network’s physical 
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infrastructure, which he documented in his book, Tubes: A Journey to the Center of the 
Internet.  
The squirrel’s tiny, anarchic gesture was, then, more than a mere annoyance; it 
was revelatory. The squirrel’s touch awaked Blum to the existence of a whole other part 
of the Internet. As Blum describes it, it was as though the squirrel nudged open “the 
door to a previously invisible realm behind the screen” (4). This realm constituted a 
different kind of digital domain, one where coaxial and fiber optic cables stretch across 
the sky, tunnel underground, and span the ocean floor, meet up in droning data centres, 
and convene in the dry heat of server farms. The animal encouraged Blum to 
acknowledge, for the first time, the expansive infrastructure and inextricable materiality 
of the world’s largest communication network. Blum, newly attuned to the Internet’s 
real conditions of existence, learned that the Internet—where it is, what it is, what it 
looks like, and how it both connects and constitutes worlds—exists beyond his own 
familiar human phenomenal experience of it.  
As this little anecdote suggests, our understandings of media are informed by our 
experiences, and these experiences are limited. The phenomenology and consciousness 
of the individual human subject only grant partial access to what media are, what they 
do, and how and why they matter. Media exceed our grasp: they exist in excess of how 
we sense, perceive, and use them. This pronounced gap in our threshold, rather than an 
impediment, presents a challenging and exciting opportunity to explore the foreign 
territory of the media landscape, beyond its familiar façade. It is also an occasion to 
experiment with alternative methods for producing knowledge beyond the 
circumscribed humanist paradigm. It offers a chance to explore neglected connections 
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and fashion fresh insights about media and their world-binding processes of mediation 
and communication.  
To effectively take up such a gauntlet, however, requires an experienced and 
available guide. Though not immediately obvious, these guides are easy to find—Andrew 
Blum unexpectedly found his as close as his own backyard. At the meeting point of 
technology, animals not only gesture toward the secret worlds of technology, they also 
reveal those worlds to be deeply entangled with their own. After all, the concealed, 
intricately wired world of the Internet was not the only thing the rodent allowed Blum to 
glimpse on that fateful winter’s day. It offered him a peek into the online world of the 
squirrel. Sure, the Internet is part of Blum’s everyday life: integrated into his living 
environment, it provides near-seamless functional support for his day-to-day activities. 
But it is equally a part of the squirrel’s everyday life, a fixture of varying degrees of 
importance in its surroundings.  
It is presumably a major thoroughfare across which it scurries from one end of 
the yard to the other. It offers the rodent an advantageous overhead view of its territory 
so that it may ensure the protection of its food caches and keep an eye on emerging 
predators. It is also a prime location from which it can make warning calls to its 
neighbours when it senses danger. Finally, it is an opportune means for it to clean and 
trim its teeth. Blum and the squirrel get on the Internet every day; it may not look like 
the same Internet, but it is. Human and rodent merely prioritize different qualities of 
that Internet, based on their unique perceptual capacities and their respective needs and 
inclinations. As a result, the Internet’s form and function come to mean different things 
to them, and the medium itself manifests to them in diverging but equally legitimate 
ways.  
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Animals, because of their particular non-human capacities for perception and 
action, then, can direct our attention to neglected aspects of media. The most important 
lesson they impart is that media technologies—whether it be their hardware or software, 
interfaces or infrastructures—though ostensibly made by and for humans, are 
nonetheless worldly phenomena, existing in and constitutive of many more-than-human 
worlds. They can contain and carry meaning, introduce environmental possibilities, and 
create new living conditions for non-human beings as much as human ones. Humans 
are not the only creatures to make their selves at home in the world; non-human 
animals do as well. They tinker with their environment. They probe its potentials and its 
limits in order to make it, albeit provisionally, something else: a place of temporary 
accommodation for their possible lives.  
If we follow animals with some measure of trust and careful attention, we can 
find ourselves confronted with surprisingly significant vistas of knowledge heretofore 
unexplored. Not only about other techniques of being, knowing, and world making, but 
also about the material, relational, and conceptual aspects of media that are typically 
veiled by the human subjective blind spot. These aspects can, in turn, recalibrate our 
understanding of media and the process of communication. 
 
II. The Question Concerning Technology, With Animals  
Because the essence of technology is nothing technological, essential 
reflection upon technology and decisive confrontation with it must happen 
in a realm that is, on the one hand, akin to the essence of technology and, 
on the other, fundamentally different from it.  
—Martin Heidegger, from “The Question Concerning 
Technology” (35). 
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Studying media technologies at the sites of their encounters with animals is a 
relatively novel approach, but not entirely unprecedented. After all, it was the “chance 
juxtaposition” of a nuclear reactor and a California Gray Whale that comprised the 
unseemly vista that catalyzed and crystallized Langdon Winner’s now seminal 
philosophical meditation on modern technology. In the concluding chapter of The 
Whale and the Reactor, Winner confesses that it was the shock of seeing them together 
in the Diablo Canyon on that day, that set astir a powerful Manichean fascination he 
could not ignore. The whale and the reactor, 
were two tangible symbols of the power of nature and of human artifice: 
one an enormous creature swimming gracefully in a timeless ecosystem, 
the other a gigantic piece of apparatus linked by sheer determination to 
the complicated mechanisms of the technological society. The first offered 
an image of things as they had always been, the other an image of things as 
they were rapidly coming to be. (168) 
 
Here, Winner’s juxtaposition of animals and technology becomes a productive way to 
address the deeper relationship between nature and technology, a relationship that was 
for Martin Heidegger, fundamental and formative to our understanding of and 
engagement with the world.  
This dissertation’s decision to focus on animal-media encounters is inspired 
largely by Heidegger. Technology’s encounter with nature provides the very fulcrum of 
his influential essay, “The Question Concerning Technology,” where he argues that the 
conditions and consequences of nature’s encounter with culture must be addressed if we 
are to truly appreciate technology’s existential significance. Technology, he persistently 
implores, is implicated in how the world discloses itself to us, while also creating the 
very conditions by which our being encounters that world. For him, technology is not 
some separate phenomenon added to the experience of the world, but a constitutive 
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process of the world’s coming into being. It creates the very vectors of possibility for the 
world’s becoming, the consequences of which invariably come to bear on human being, 
doing, and knowing. 
Understanding technology is of utmost importance, Heidegger claims, not only 
because of its rapidly increasing ubiquity, but also because of the ease at which it is 
assimilated into everyday life. He was responding to the acceleration of technological 
change in the 20th century and the resulting accumulation of technologies in the lived 
environment. These technologies were significantly and rapidly transforming our 
experience and understanding of the world. He feared, just as Winner worried decades 
later, that we were becoming “technological somnambulists wandering through an 
extended dream” (169). That is, that we were taking these changes for granted, allowing 
them to transpire, unchecked.   
At issue for Heidegger is not simply the pervasiveness of technology, then, but the 
way it conceals itself and its operations from us, while we become captivated by its 
accessibility, convenience, and functionality. Whether openly celebrated or indifferently 
integrated, technology disappears while it is in use; it becomes, as he describes in Being 
and Time, “ready-at-hand.” It is only when technology breaks, or impedes an activity 
that it becomes conspicuous, or “present-at-hand.” Because of this, it is not possible to 
truly grasp technology by examining it in the technical or anthropological contexts in 
which it is used. 
Indeed, human beings design and manufacture technologies for humans in order 
to achieve human goals.  No doubt there is much to be gleaned from studying 
technologies, their use, and how they facilitate particular tasks and provide the means to 
satisfy human designs. But in limiting our studies to these aspects alone, we come to 
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accept that technology is no more than an application of human knowledge, a feat of 
human ingenuity that extends our capacities and will onto the world. To hold fast to this 
assumption is not just shortsighted, Heidegger maintains, but deleterious. The problem, 
as he sees it, is that this way of understanding technology—as a neutral tool that carries 
out a human agenda—actively obscures the subtle and more substantial ways that it 
frames the world and its value to us, and how it situates us in relation to that world. 
For technology is, in its original sense, not simply a set of tools that enable 
human activities; instead, it is a way of knowing through making. And making, 
Heidegger explains in his analysis of fourfold causality, is a complex and concatenated 
process that involves more than creating something from nothing (1977: 6). Technology, 
he reminds, originates in the Greek technē, meaning to make, or to craft. The Greeks 
aligned technē with poiesis: artfulness. In Heidegger’s interpretation, then, the essence 
of technology is creative. And this creativity is aligned with alētheia, the disclosure or 
revelation of truth.  What technology creates are the conditions of possibility for the 
authentic world to disclose itself.  
Therefore, technology is ultimately an art, an art of contingency: it reveals 
“whatever does not bring itself forth and does not yet lie here before us, whatever can 
look and turn out now one way and now another” (1977: 13). Neither a material thing, 
nor a means to an end, technology sets in motion the process of world disclosure, where 
reality reveals its possibilities and its limits to us. This process becomes formative to our 
worldview.  
While technē is a mode of world disclosure that is artful and illuminating, 
capacious and open, modern technology, he argues, is artless and concealing. It denies 
the incommensurability of the world, and reduces it by rendering it into calculable raw 
 8 
material for human endeavours. The danger of modern technology is that it makes the 
world appear in advance. It sabotages technology’s perennially essential role as the art 
of possibility, and turns it into a highly contrived way of disclosing the world, what 
Heidegger calls enframing. Rather than gesturing toward the world’s infinite richness, 
modern technology organizes the world, and orders it according to what has value for 
humans and what does not.  
Heidegger recognized this process of enframing as the supreme danger of 
modern technology, a danger that can only be addressed by holding onto technology’s 
roots in poiesis. For it is in this poetic kernel that Heidegger finds technology’s saving 
power: its purchase on contingency. Technology is a way of revealing the world that 
accommodates emergent possibilities. As such there is always an opportunity for the 
world to appear otherwise. This bond with contingency is essential to technology, and 
significantly, and essential to this study, it is borne of technology’s non-humanness and 
its connection to the more-than-human world.  As much as technology is a way of 
knowing cultivated through making, it is significantly not a human way of doing so. 
Heidegger is explicit about this: technology’s process of revelation “is never a human 
handiwork” (1977: 18). Likewise, the essence of technology is not technical nor is it 
human (1977: 4).  
To reiterate, instrumental and anthropological interpretations of technology 
would have us believe that causation—the way something is made, brought into and 
becomes with the world—is something that begins in the human imagination. But 
causation is a far more complex and dynamic process that involves a coalescence of 
forces and materials. Again, the limits, possibilities, consequences, significance, and 
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ultimately the essence of technology cannot be sufficiently explored by examining its use 
by and value for humans.  
Rather, Heidegger contends, it must be probed in a domain akin to technology 
and yet fundamentally different from it. While he suggests that art is one such realm, I 
propose that animals comprise another even more alluring field of possibility in which 
to explore technology. Moving from art to animals may seem like a strange maneuver, 
but it is worth noting that our experiences with animals are similar to those we have 
with art, insofar as they are always initially aesthetic. Burt himself asserts: “The animal 
has the potential to do the work of art before it is ever an object for art; is always an 
inhabitant within the domain of aesthetics” (2008: 5).  
Animal interventions are aesthetic ones, and aesthetic interventions are 
meaningful in that they can significantly reshape what Jacques Rancière has called “the 
distribution of the sensible” (2006). Aesthetic practices, Rancière holds, can destabilize 
the predictable coherent world that presents itself to our senses. They are “operations 
that produce a discrepancy, a dissemblance” between worldly things as they are and how 
we apprehend them (2009: 7). This encourages a reassessment of things, and a 
reorganization of the world in order to account for unacknowledged valences. This 
aesthetic confrontation at the surface of encounter—as well as animals—held little 
interest for Heidegger, something I will return to a little later, but is serves as this work’s 
primary concern.  
Suffice to say, thinking about technology and its relationship with animals offers 
an invaluable occasion to truly consider technology beyond its anthropological and 
instrumental value, something Heidegger ultimately failed to do. He was concerned with 
recalibrating our understanding of technology by illuminating the essential but 
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forgotten linkage between technē and poiesis. But he neglected an even larger rift: that 
between technē and physis, between culture and nature. By drawing a distinction 
between the worlds that we make, and the world as it is, he left in place a dangerous 
anthropocentric scaffolding that ended up supporting a hierarchy of value. A structure 
that compromised his inability to resist the violent, devaluing logics of modern 
technology.  
Though he was resolutely anti-humanist, rejecting the tenets of humanism and 
the belief in the superiority of human consciousness, he still insisted that human being, 
what he calls Dasein, is fundamentally different from, and more meaningful than, non-
human animal being. Concomitant with this assumption, was his reaffirmation of the 
Aristotelian distinction between technē and physis. Technē and poiesis may be mutually 
implicated, but they are still fundamentally different from nature, and belong 
exclusively to the human estate. Artfulness is, then, something he recognizes in 
technology, but not in nature.  
This is because, for Heidegger, art and artfulness are related to language which is 
uniquely human. Language is the primal artifice that estranges, differentiates, and 
elevates humans from nature. It follows that since animals do not have language, they 
are doomed to the domain of aesthetics, condemned to live on the meaningless surface 
of the world, while humans get to forge deeper and more meaningful relationships with 
it. This is what ultimately leads him to his now famous adage: “the stone is worldless, 
the animal is poor in the world, man is world forming” (1995: 176). Surfaces are 
meaningless, unless there is language to give them meaning. Animals are “poor in the 
world” because without language, they cannot think, question, or make meaning (1995: 
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176). The surface is void, in Heidegger’s estimation—but only because he treats it as an 
inert thing that requires language to animate it.  
By privileging language over aesthetics, he was not able to fully jettison humanist 
trappings. As such, his philosophy is weighed down by what Matthew Calarco calls 
“metaphysical anthropocentricism” (2008). Heidegger begins to open up thinking, but 
his insistence on the existence of an essential chain of being that places humans at the 
top, and animals at the bottom, shuts down other epistemological possibilities. It is for 
this reason that Heidegger is both a productive point of reference and a necessary point 
of departure for thinking about technology. 
To work toward a non-anthropocentric perspective that is capacious enough to 
genuinely entertain animals and technology together, it is necessary to unmake 
language as the ground zero of difference. This means shifting our attention away from 
content, depth, and interpretation and returning our attention to aesthetics, to surfaces,  
forms ,and more importantly, to the processes that actualize them.  For Heidegger, it 
was not the aesthetic encounter itself that provides the space for revealing the essence of 
technology. Rather it is the kind of thinking and questioning an encounter generates 
that actually leads us toward the “truth” of technology. Heidegger is, thus, interested in 
what lies beyond the surface of an aesthetic experience.  In fact, he ends his technology 
essay with a barb at “our sheer aesthetic-mindedness,” suggesting that taking up with 
aesthetics makes us immune to the nascent possibilities of “the coming to presence of 
art” (1977: 35). He ultimately proposes a disregard of aesthetics in favour of thinking 
and questioning—in short, by privileging language above all else.   
Heidegger felt that an aesthetic approach contributes to a sense of naïve mastery 
over the world, where totalities seem to be fully available to the senses. An aesthetic 
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approach he contends, encourages the subject to fully objectify the world she 
encounters, and see it as a vision that materializes just for her. In “Age of the World 
Picture” for example, he associates the aesthetic approach with subjectivism and the 
dreaded logic of enframing: a reduction of the immeasurable entirety of the world into a 
picture, rendering it as a calculable surface. No doubt, these are dangerous tendencies; 
however, the aesthetic approach in and of itself is not the problem. Rather it is 
Heidegger’s underlying anthropocentricism, coupled with his refusal to address 
aesthetics that are the central issues here. 
Against Heidegger, I take encounters between animals and media as indicative 
that technology also frames, qualifies, and makes possible animal becoming and world 
disclosure as well. Investigating how media intervene in and potentially transform how 
non-human animals experience and negotiate with their environments can be 
generative. However, it is only productive insofar as we acknowledge both the aesthetic 
coordinates and ontological weight of animal being. Certainly animal-media encounters 
can deepen our understanding of non-human animals and their relationship with their 
surroundings. But it is also an ideal occasion to defamiliarize technology, consider it 
anew, and extend our appreciation for the myriad of ways media technologies are 
involved in more-than human worlds, and the production of reality more generally.  
Questioning technology begins at the level of aesthetics. Surfaces, pace 
Heidegger, are not mere facades that veil deeper meaning. They are not so much things 
as they are outcomes. They are not in themselves totalities, but they bear traces of more 
complex processes of production. They are partialities that contain multitudes. They are 
valuable insofar as we consider how they come to appear, with full acknowledgement of 
their ontological linkages with the world. As Ron Broglio explains in Surface 
 13 
Encounters: Thinking with Animals and Art, surfaces might appear to offer limited 
access to animals, but we would do well to remember that animals are always already 
inaccessible to us. But just because their interiority is unavailable, that does not mean it 
is not there. Instead, the surface offers an opportune sensible and tangible zone that can 
allude to interiority, and provide space for speculation and negotiation (2011: xix).  
Staying on the surface works to keep our discussions of animals and their 
interactions with media in tune with material reality while avoiding the tendency to slip 
into abstract conceptualizations and generalizations—into which animals and media 
both get trapped in.  Animals and technological media are wily and mutable; though 
imbricated in an array of practices, relations, gestures, affects, forms and forces, they 
cannot be reduced to them. They are more than how they appear. Their appearances do 
not fully represent them, but they nonetheless bear meaningful traces of what they are 
and the processes by which they came to appear. Therefore, the surface, in all its 
partialities, is still able to allude to a relational richness, a situatedness of being in the 
world.  
 
III. Turning Toward Non-Human Animals  
The project’s turn toward animals is, then, not entirely unexpected; non-human 
animals have long been provocative starting points for contemplation and speculation. 
They compel us to confront the inadequacies of language, explore the limits of our 
senses, perceptions, and understandings, and entertain alien ways of being in and 
getting on the world. The encounters we have with animals are not unlike those we have 
with art, or more importantly to this discussion, media technologies. That is, they both 
create and carry with them conditions of possibility for sensing, perceiving, and 
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imagining otherwise. As a result of this resonance, animals and media make for well-
matched playmates.  
Considering them together is also an effective way of sidestepping our tendency 
toward anthropocentricism. This presumption that the human is the most unique and 
important being in existence, that the world exists mainly to accommodate it, and that 
all knowledge is only valuable insofar as it concerns the human, has significantly limited 
our worldview. And yet, our methods for the production of knowledge are founded upon 
the unquestioned assumptions of human centrality and exceptionality.  
As a result, even when we study non-human animals, we run the risk of using 
them to ask questions about ourselves. We might begin with animals, but we have 
trouble keeping up with them. Much like Narcissus, who was waylaid while chasing deer 
by the allure of his own reflection, our interest in animals is frequently subdued by a 
stronger curiosity about ourselves. In the end, animals are reduced to a heuristic for 
interrogating the nature of human being and becoming. We are Homo sapiens after all; 
our pursuit of self-knowledge is perpetuated in our very species name.  
 This project’s orientation aligns itself with the non-human turn. “To turn toward 
the nonhuman is not only to confront the nonhuman,” Richard Grusin writes, “but to 
lose the traditional way of the human, to move aside so that other nonhumans—animate 
and less animate—can make their way, turn toward movement themselves” (Grusin xx-
xxi). In addition to studying the non-human, as Grusin suggests, this turn is also 
committed to tempering human centrality by moving conscientiously aside, creating a 
space through which the non-human can pass. However, this is not a turn away from the 
human nor is it meant to be a devaluation of the human.  
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Rather, the non-human turn is goaded by the proposition—to paraphrase Bruno 
Latour—that we are not, nor have we ever been, human. It is energized by Michel 
Foucault’s suggestion that the human is a recent invention, an idealized construction, 
perhaps nearing its end (2009 [1966]: 422). Before it separated itself off from and 
lorded itself over other beings, the human always coevolved, coexisted, or collaborated 
with the non-human (Grusin ix). Examining animals and media together, by forcing the 
human to the periphery, is a failsafe against our deeply rooted tendencies for 
anthropocentricism. It asks not what animals and their involvement with media can 
illuminate about us, but what they can clarify about media and communication. While 
these materials and processes are certainly part of the human estate, they are not 
exclusive to it; rather they are constitutive, to varying intensities, of the crucible that is 
reality.  
 
IV. Non-Human Animals Turning Toward Media 
This study is not just about turning toward non-human animals, it is equally 
about animals turning toward media, independent of human will, desire, or design. 
Putting them together is not a thought exercise, a human inclination; it is an extension 
of their actual, physical mutual implication. Even in those human-orchestrated 
meetings between animals and media, what transpires is to an important extent, beyond 
human expectation and control. Examining the peculiar dynamics that unfold when 
non-humans themselves turn away from the human and toward one another, promises 
to create new ground from which to cultivate fresh insights about media. It offers ways 
of re-examining media operations and their infrastructures, and the material, 
conceptual, and discursive elements that animate them and more importantly, their 
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involvement in the world making and binding processes of communication beyond the 
human.  
I address these eventful animal turns toward media in the case studies that make 
up the bulk of the dissertation. These case studies are built around three vignettes 
scavenged from the Internet. Each scene zooms in on a strange, singular, and seemingly 
marginal event, only to zoom out to reveal a much more substantial and previously 
neglected material-semiotic and historical entanglement between animals and media. 
By moving between these present day encounters and their secret histories, it attempts 
to get at a richer more capacious understanding of media and communication. 
Ultimately, the seemingly cursory collusion of media and animals in the present 
moment is not a recent or isolated phenomenon. It is rather, a perennial one that is 
suggestive of a more significant mutual involvement at conceptual and pragmatic levels. 
In the first scene, a giant pacific octopus seizes a digital camera, and accidentally 
makes a movie. This altercation provides an occasion to explore the popular 
phenomenon of animals stealing cameras in mid-record and to consider more closely 
the relationship between animals and cameras. It investigates the linkages between the 
aesthetics of animal imagery and the material realities of its production in order to 
segue into a larger meditation on cinematic representation more generally. This 
encounter provides an occasion to revisit and re-affirm cinema’s ontological realism. At 
the same time, it also illuminates the importance of the non-human to secure this 
realism. Cinema is ultimately a process of communication between worlds, and the non-
human is integral to the translation of details from one world to another, and enabling 
us to move with and through those worlds.  
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The second scene depicts a non-human ape playing with a touchscreen tablet in a 
zoo, and explores how the image was a catalyst for the development of “Apps for Apes” 
an actual enrichment initiative for orangutans in zoos. It considers this project’s 
discursive aspirations and the ways in which the orangutans impose material limitations 
on these desires. It also attempts to situate the project within the larger historical and 
discursive legacy of non-human ape communication projects. It examines the way non-
human apes are casualties of a particularly modern notion of communication, which 
attempts to bypass shared exteriority in favour of accessing interiority, and the 
idealization of communication as a meeting of minds. Orangutans offer a counterpoint 
here: by inviting our attention away from their mysterious interiors, they recondition 
this impoverished and uncharitable conceptualization of communication and promote 
something far richer and more hospitable.  
In the third and final scene, a digital data-carrying homing pigeon races against 
the Internet to meet a computer in the rural UK. This publicity stunt meant to 
emphasize poor broadband speeds, is an occasion to interrogate the persistent cultural 
predilection for mobilizing the carrier pigeon as a primitive medium. It revisits why the 
bird has been neglected, attempts to make space for and craft a provisional account of 
the carrier pigeon in the history of communication. This historical revision illuminates 
that despite its lowly status, the carrier pigeon has in fact been a persistent part of 
imagining and materializing modern communication. It also affirms that materiality 
and movement are always required for even our most important symbolic 
communications. 
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V. Mise-en-scène: Actors, Props, and Framing  
The choice to focus on octopuses, orangutans, and pigeons is not so much 
strategic as it is organic, developing out of my own travels through the Internet and 
what I found there. Nonetheless, each of these case studies auspiciously focuses on a 
particular species that carries an enduring cultural reputation in relation to which this 
project seeks to both work with and against. I acknowledge that their characterizations 
are the result of human imaginings, but they are also sometimes the outcome of the 
animal’s comportment and its own participation in its self-representation.  
I acknowledge that the homogenizing term “animal” can never fully approximate 
the diverse multiplicity of singularities of the living beings to which it refers. Jacques 
Derrida (2008) offers an important corrective to this with the term, “animots”: a 
homynym for the French, animaux that simultaneously draws attention to its 
multiplicity and its status as a word (mot). “We have to envisage the existence of ‘living 
creatures,’” Derrida argues, “whose plurality cannot be assembled within the single 
figure of an animality that is simply opposed to humanity” (47). This is an impossible 
task, but nonetheless my analyses aspire to be generous toward the ontological 
authenticity of these animals by leveraging the realities and specificities of their species-
being against their symbolic status.  
Species is not an essential category by any means, and often obscures the 
individual particularities of animals and creates inaccurate generalizations. However, 
until we develop other ways to address animals, it is also a provisional and generative 
means to begin designating the multitudes of more-than-human ways of being in the 
world. The animals I focus on in each of the following case studies provide effective 
human foils, offering occasions to confront and challenge human tendencies to 
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anthropomorphize or alienate animals, and reveal and rectify the poverties of human 
thinking.  
Octopuses, for example, are objects of both fear and fascination for humans. As 
cold-blooded, marine invertebrates with distributed intelligence they occupy a 
promising position of alien alterity. This outsider status allows them to exist in radical 
contrast to and distance from the human. They present a wholly different way of being 
in the world, and effectively elude anthropomorphic identification. Orangutans, 
meanwhile, are equally fascinating but for different reasons. They are exotic, 
charismatic mega fauna that, in addition to being endangered, also share an uncanny 
physiological similitude to humans. As such they are prone to too much attention, and 
not enough distance from humans. They are trapped and consistently undermined by 
our anthropomorphic tendencies to identify with them. Thus orangutans can benefit 
from being dislodged from this all-too familiar trap of association by similitude. 
Pigeons, by contrast, are a ubiquitous near-banality of the everyday urban landscape. 
They are practically rendered invisible by our indifference, while at other times they are 
framed as pests, and made unfavourably visible by our disgust. Singling out the carrier 
pigeon in particular, is a way to make the magnitude of the pigeon’s underestimation all 
the more surprising and forceful.  
This study does not examine these animals through direct observation. Rather 
the animals under analysis here constitute technologically mediated representations. In 
direct opposition to much of the writing on animals, this project does not dismiss 
animal representation in favour of direct, physical encounters with real animals. Even 
the appearance of live animals is always already mediated by human optics and human 
thinking. Rather than avoiding the question of mediation, or denigrating the very 
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process of mediation, this project seeks the recovery of the authenticity of the animals’ 
presence in mediated representations. One way I try to do this is to acknowledge that 
animal representations, no matter how seemingly contrived, always presume—to 
varying degrees—real animals encountering techniques and technologies of mediation.  
As much as this study wishes to separate animals from media in order to see what the 
former brings to bear on the latter, the two form an impossible Gordian knot. Thus 
tracking their traces, and exploring the complex ways in which animals and media are 
imbricated, is productively done with a media archeological lens.  Media archeology, as 
Wolfgang Ernst explains, is both a method and an aesthetics of analyzing media. It is 
carried out, in the spirit of Foucault, in a process “freed from the anthropological theme” 
(Ernst 239; Foucault [1966] 2009: 17).  It resists producing and organizing knowledge 
through traditional conventions like teleology and human hierarchies of value. As such 
it is well suited for exploring the tangled material-discursive mesh of animal-media 
relations.   
Media archeology is not to be confused with traditional archeology, which 
constitutes the unearthing of the old and the forgotten materiality of the past in order to 
create a coherent narrative of history. Instead, media archeology is a means to consider 
the material, historical, and theoretical implications of media by tending to those 
instances when “media themselves, not exclusively human anymore, become active 
‘archeologists’ of knowledge” (Ernst 239). This project treats the Internet not only as an 
archeological field site of animal-media relations, but also as an unlikely archeologist of 
those relations.  
Media archeology is less concerned with chronology and teleology; it is an 
approach more interested in the material-discursive configurations that underlie and 
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animate the topography of the present. Traces of animal-media encounters are not 
valuable insofar as they are indices of past encounters but rather because they prompt 
questions about how and why these traces exist in the first place. At issue is not the 
veracity or authenticity of these leavings, but the material-semiotic-discursive 
relationships between animals and media, nature and technology, reality and 
representation.  
 
VI. What This Study is Not  
This is a study of animal-media encounters, but as will become clear, animals and 
media actually matter to one another in a number of different ways. Assessing the 
relationships between animals and media can take any number of circuitous routes. As 
such, it is worth taking a moment to establish what this study is not. Though it delves 
into questions of animal representation, it is not a study of how media represent 
animals, and how those representations in turn, reveal and construct human attitudes 
about animals. While animals have a very rich symbolic history in human culture, this 
study is not interested in how animals are merely signs that point back to the human. It 
aims, instead, to restore realism to animal appearances, to return to them their own 
ontological plenitude. It aspires to consider these non-human beings as living 
sovereigns who make their own meaningful ways in the world and also participate in 
their own representation.  
Though it is curious about animal-media interactions, this project is not about 
how media can be used to help us communicate with animals.  On the contrary, it is 
highly critical and suspicious of such ventures since they are often self-interested and 
borne of impoverished conceptualizations of communication. Nor is this a roundabout 
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way of proving that animals are intelligent and emotionally complex beings with rich 
social lives—in short, just like humans—and therefore should be afforded rights. This 
project is nonetheless interested in questions of ethics and responsibilities but it is 
playing a much longer game.   
While not explicitly addressed, what undergirds this study is the belief that if we 
are ever to make the world better for animals—and for people—it begins with turning 
over the ground onto which animals and humans are figured, and where their value is 
calculated and perceived. This ground is currently cultivated by what Giorgio Agamben 
calls “the anthropological machine,” a mechanism that keeps animals and humans at a 
safe distance from one another (2002:26). The very same mechanism that separates 
them however, is also capable of putting them in dangerous proximity, making it 
possible to both humanize animals and animalize humans. These processes are often 
devastating for all parties involved. Though the anthropological machine favours the 
human, because the human is only a concept, it is mutable, and prone to arbitrarily 
changing the terms of eligibility for inclusion and exclusion, with distressing 
consequences.  
In this way, it aligns itself with the project of posthumanism. As Cary Wolfe 
(2010) argues, posthumanism is not a state of being or becoming beyond the human. 
Rather, posthumanism presumes that the human has always already been inseparably 
entangled with the non-human. This is why posthumanism should not be confused with 
the futuristic iteration of transhumanism, which celebrates the blurring of boundaries 
between human, animal, and technology.  This is what Wolfe calls “bad posthumanism” 
because it is not so much about decentering the human as it is about enhancing the 
human. The human still occupies the principal node in the cybernetic triangle. That is, 
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animals and technology are incorporated into the human as though they are 
supplements, mere equipment to support and augment human being and becoming. 
This kind of posthumanism risks developing into another expansionist teleology of the 
human, but it also highlights the influence of humanism, and the way it continues to 
reproduce itself even in our most exploratory and speculative epistemological ventures.   
 Posthumanism is, then, less a state of being, and more so a process of working 
through and moving on from humanism. It names a critical awareness of how 
humanism has been, and continues to be the formative paradigm for the production of 
all knowledge. It is not enough to simply turn away from or decentre the human. 
Instead, it is necessary to acknowledge the ways in which our models and methods are 
shaped and informed by humanism, before we set out to create new models and 
methods. Rooted in the ground of humanism, our tree of knowledge will always produce 
the same fruit. It is tempting to come up with a new metaphor, but before replacing it 
with another—like a Deleuzian rhizome—it is important to till the ground first, examine 
the composition of the soil, and consider the conditions that make growth possible in 
the first place.   
This project attempts to do just that, not just by questioning the centrality of the 
human but by playing with its attendant binaries, using the tensions that it sustains 
between animals and humans, and nature and culture to create traction and move 
beyond them. It inverts what Dominic Pettman terms, “the cybernetic triangle”—that 
unholy trinity of human, animal, and machine, by displacing the human at the apogee, 
and prioritizing instead the relationships, negotiations, and lateral movements that 
materialize between animals and technology (5). In this new arrangement, animals and 
media are no longer mere supports for human being and becoming, but autonomous, 
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worldly phenomena operating under the direction of unpredictable, non-human 
designs. When animals and media meet, they create strange contact zones, where the 
human is momentarily peripheral, and new opportunities emerge to learn about 
animals, about media, and the movements and materialities that enliven 
communication.    
 
VII. Media Travels and Feral Ecologies  
Media become strange in their encounters with animals. This interest in 
considering familiar, everyday phenomena in new ways is inspired by the work of the 
Estonian ethologist, Jakob von Uexküll (1864-1944). While Uexküll tended mostly to 
outwardly natural phenomena and environments, his approach is capacious enough to 
be generative in the ostensibly unnatural elsewhere of media studies. Uexküll argues 
that every organism is bound to its own customized dwelling world, which he calls 
umwelt. In his estimation, the umwelt is a subjective sphere of significance that is 
analogous to a soap bubble that fits around each organism.  
This surrounding world complements the organism’s particular physiological 
needs, perceptual abilities, and capacities for action. It is made manifest by the senses; 
bodies conjure their world into their own vistas of understanding. All subjects are 
inclined to see the world as only for them. It follows, then, that humans see the world 
anthropocentrically; squirrels, squirrel-centrically.  If we were to imagine what it is like 
to look out onto the world from inside any given bubble, we would see our world, 
transformed. Many familiar phenomenal qualities would be amplified, while others 
would vanish entirely, and new ones would appear (Uexküll 43).  
Therefore, as Uexküll sees it, there is not one unified objective world but many 
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subjective worlds existing in tandem. These micro-worlds co-exist. Their outer 
membranes press against each other but never burst. As Dominic Pettman describes it, 
they only offer a glint of “a limit that threatens to disappear but constantly reasserts 
itself” (97). He is skeptical of any ontological overlaps between umwelten, insisting that 
in Uexküll’s system “any communication between species occurs through elaborate, 
ultimately solipsistic mistranslations” (Pettman 211).  
These worlds may indeed be largely incommunicative: Uexküll maintains that, 
“every animal, no matter how free in its movements, is bound to a certain dwelling-
world” (139). But these worlds are not completely out of touch. He also dictates that it is 
the task of the ecologist to research the limits of that world, to see where one ends and 
another begins. And these limits become manifest when a phenomenon figures in 
multiple environments simultaneously, such as an oak tree, in Uexküll’s most extensive 
example (126-132). They create tangents where umwelten touch and threaten to 
overlap. Such contact zones may have been ancillary to Uexküll’s discussion, but this 
dissertation takes them as its primary concern.  
When looking at the oak tree, a forester will see nothing more than a source of 
lumber. A whimsical little girl, by contrast, will imagine a strange face in the pattern of 
the tree’s bark, and see a terrifying demon. A fox and an owl will see the tree as a shelter. 
However, for the fox living underneath, the tree will be perceived mostly by the qualities 
of its roots. At the same time, the owl up above will focus on the sturdy high-reaching 
branch on which it perches. In addition, a squirrel will look at the tree and see a network 
of climbable branches. An ant and a bark beetle will primarily focus on the tree’s bark. 
However, the ant will tend mostly to the surface of the bark and the food that might be 
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there. The beetle, meanwhile, will be concerned only with the thickness of the bark as it 
eats its way through it.  
In each one of these environments, Uexküll explains, the oak tree “plays an ever-
changing role as object, sometimes with some parts, sometimes with others” (132). The 
meaning of the tree is not just relative to its context. Rather, the tree is all of these 
things: it is a quantity of lumber; it does bear the face of a demon; it has a tangle of 
roots; a network of branches; and a blanket of bark. Nothing about the tree itself 
changes from one umwelt to another. Certain salutary qualities simply get accentuated 
in one constellation, while others are omitted. No one quality has a priori significance 
over another.  The lumber is no more essential to the tree than its bark.  
Again, this is not evidence of a crude perspectivism; what Uexküll is trying to 
relate is less the sheer variety of meanings phenomena can have, and more that their 
meaning is implicated in “the tissue of relationships among environments” (143). At the 
same time, he also emphasizes that all perceiving subjects are equally valuable 
participants in the disclosure of an object’s meaning. The tree’s manifold meaning, 
produced in the revelation of its various qualities and uses, is beholden equally to the 
human forester as it is the bark beetle. One umwelt and its particular configuration have 
no privilege over another. 
This dissertation is, then, a travelogue, in the spirit of Uexküll’s A Foray into the 
Worlds of Animals and Humans. Like his peripatetic adventures into strange worlds, 
the project is less about traveling to unfamiliar locales and more about seeing familiar 
places and their fixtures, anew.  It is a journey that attempts to skirt beyond the 
boundary of where our mind meets the world. It is equally a journey that flits back and 
forth between representation and reality, aesthetics and ontology. In this way it is also 
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motivated by the centrifugal, world-rendering moves of cinematic realism, as identified 
by film critic André Bazin.  
Cinematic realism is a method of understanding representation as much as it is a 
style of representation. It is a way of addressing the relationships between worlds, lived 
or imagined, and moving between them. Though Bazin never mentioned Uexküll, his 
ideas about realism can be expressed well in Uexküllian terms. For Bazin, realism is an 
ethical mode of representing and looking at the world. It tends to the complex processes 
by which the real is transformed into representation. It is less concerned with 
representational verisimilitude, and more interested in the way representation is faithful 
to the ontological richness of the world it transforms, a relationship that is essential if 
we are to ever take representations seriously, and be moved by them.  Realism allows us 
to move between representation and the real, in intellectually, emotionally, and ethically 
productive ways.  
Bazin was interested in the conditions of this movement between the world as we 
already see it, the world the camera shows us, and the world as we cannot ever real see 
it. Cinema offered a confluence of all of these various persepectives, which can be 
described in uexküllian terms the relationships between the human umwelt, the 
camera’s umwelt, and often the umwelten of animals, respectively. Bazin, much like 
Uexküll, maintains that the struggle to represent different worlds, and the work of 
exploring and speculating about them is essential to our acknowledgement and 
appreciation of reality’s incommensurable richness. This dissertation puts this ethos of 
outward wandering additionally to task as it dips into the ocean and into the strange 
world of a Giant Pacific octopus, over the land and into the sequestered environments of 
captive Sumatran orangutans, and up to the sky to the quasi-captive domain of carrier 
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pigeons. It starts from a place of wilderness, continues into the terrain of captivity, and 
end up in a hybrid place somewhere in between.  
It is also about media travels: their transition into the realm of the so-called 
natural ecologies of animals. What these migrations divulge is that the relationships 
between nature and culture are much more promiscuous than we like to admit. Media 
ecologies are not simply analogous to or distinctive from natural ecologies, but 
inseparable from them. This association suggests that ecologies are much more 
appropriately thought as feral, and not exclusively natural or cultural. Feral ecologies 
are hybrids that trouble the distinction between the natural ecologies of animals and 
artificial ecologies of media. They are the muddle produced by our continued insistence 
on the separation of the domains of nature and culture, the very mess Latour insists we 
make in our efforts to purify and create order (1993).  
Feral, from the Latin fera, means wild. However, it specifically designates a state 
of wildness after an escape from captivity or domestication. It is more commonly a 
passage from culture and civilization back to nature. Feral blurs and threatens to 
destroy boundaries; therefore, this prodigal return to nature is not without contention.  
The feral signals a primordial reversion, a slippage into a primitive state, and a menace 
to the concept of human civilization. Feral animals, for example, those domesticated 
species that have relapsed to the wild, are treated as pests. They trouble natural 
ecosystems, and threaten indigenous species. Feral homes, those human houses that 
have been abandoned and demolished by neglect, are treated as un-homely.1 They are 
derelict buildings that nature has reclaimed. Feral children, those raised without human 
                                                 
1 See for example James Griffoen’s haunting photographic project, “Feral Houses” (2012). 
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contact, language, and culture are even more unsettling. They are considered nature’s 
captives, forever exiled from human society and culture, banished to an island of 
incommunicability.  
It is worth noting that feral is also related to the Latin feralis, which means 
belonging to the dead. When what once belonged to the human becomes feral, it signals 
a symbolic death. It marks a forfeiture of human holdings, an undoing of all the energies 
it has used to separate itself from Nature, and generate mastery over it. But this 
symbolic death is also an instance for transformation and creation. When media become 
feral, their estrangement presents an opportunity to see them and relate to them, in new 
ways.   
The feral remains unsettling as long as the boundary between nature and culture 
remains intact. Acknowledging the existence of the feral makes it untenable to maintain 
this separation.  It encourages us to open up, and make space for new possibilities of 
seeing and knowing the world. Perhaps to see that everything that exists is nature, and 
that nature, as Frederick Turner proclaims, “is the process of everything interfering 
with—touching—everything else” (330). Examining those sites where touch takes 
place—these are feral matters. They prompt us to abandon questions of who and what 
belong where, and inquire instead about the world that is, the world we become 
awakened to in our acknowledgement that is richer than the one we made with our 
minds and our hands. 
The project also travels across disciplines and subject areas, from still and 
moving images and cinema, to touchscreens and game design, primatology and 
cybernetics, to military history, to infrastructures of transportation and communication. 
In the end, these disparate areas work together to produce variations on the theme of 
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communication as a sprawling process that is infinitely more than the elite transaction 
of symbolic exchange between two human minds.  Each case study offers ways of 
thinking about communication as an abundant assemblage involving environmental 
exploration, interaction, and negotiation, as well as physical attunement and 
accommodation. It may be at times an immaterial, intangible process, but it is also in 
the end anchored to materiality and conditional upon movement.  
 
VIII. Media, Where Umwelten Converge 
Of course, it makes sense to wonder what an oak tree might be for a fox or an owl. 
Both belong comfortably in the domain of nature. To consider what the Internet might 
be for a squirrel is a much stranger line of questioning since it must extend across the 
chasm that separates culture from nature. Though it might appear unseemly, it is by no 
means unreasonable. Uexküll maintains, after all, that any phenomenon can exist for an 
animal, as long as there is evidence that it perceives it. An object exists for an animal if it 
appears in its perceptual threshold. And it only appears in its perceptual threshold if it is 
meaningful and relevant to the animal; irrelevant objects are ignored. Therefore, so long 
as an object seems to exist for an animal, it follows that there must be a meaningful 
relationship there.  
Thus, a thing only manifests to an animal if it carries meaning for it, that is, if it 
complements the animal’s sensory comportment in some way. Animals, Uexküll 
concludes, are never objective observers; they do not enter into a relationship with a 
neutral or abstract object (140). At the moment of encounter, the object ceases to be an 
object in general and becomes an object in particular, situated in a series of significant 
relations. The very existence of animal-media encounters provides evidence that 
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animals can perceive ostensibly human-world objects, forge relationships with them, 
make meaning from them, and actively integrate them into their environments.  
 An Uexküllian approach is particularly generative for considering technological 
media anew, because unlike oak trees, they are far too comfortably considered 
phenomena exclusively bound to the human umwelt. This is problematic because 
though technology is, as Heidegger reminds, constitutive of the human umwelt, it is not 
human. Rather, it is a non-human agent that intervenes in and modulates the gap 
between us and the world. Furthermore, it is not just an object, but a process, an often 
powerfully creative and reflexive process that binds us in formative relationships to the 
world. Media technologies are not only multi-umwelten objects, they are portals that 
provision fugitive moments where we can steal glimpses of otherwise inaccessible, non-
human worlds.   
When animals meet media, media become sites where umwelten almost overlap. 
However, the very nature of the umwelt, is that it is a subjective world. We cannot 
venture outside our umwelt on our own.  Uexküll’s method for exploring other 
umwelten involved observation of the organism’s behavior, and modest speculation 
informed by the organism’s unique physiology, sensory capacities, and its biological 
needs. More importantly, it also involved visual analysis, and the mobilization of non-
human technics of visualization. Technics of visualization were integral to the 
intelligibility and the very conceivability of Uexküll’s theory of umwelt.  
The theory itself was developed in tandem with emerging apparatuses, such as 
telescopes, microscopes, and cameras. As Inga Polllman argues, specifically because 
these devices provided images of worlds not produced solely by the human sensorium 
they made it plausible for Uexküll to imagine the possibility of the existence of non-
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human worlds.  Cinema especially, she ascertains, established a non-human umwelt in 
the human umwelt, providing a productive opening (2013: 780). These novel technics of 
visualization offered a kind of realism of perspective that could, at the level of aesthetics, 
disclose something of what it is like to be a non-human being in its world. Media, then, 
allow for a kind of transfer or translation of worldly detail from one umwelt to another. 
Even the text of A Foray into the Worlds of Animals and Humans is a distinctly visual 
one replete with imaginative illustrations by Georg Kriszat. These images are further 
evidence that Uexküll’s theorization of umwelt is itself a technique of visual speculation 
and approximation. It is a technique that gestures toward worlds that elude 
representation, but must be gestured toward and imagined all the same.  
 The contact zones where the umwelten of humans, animals, and technologies 
overlap are sites of productive diffraction. This dissertation focuses on particular 
animal-media encounters and uses them to confront unexpected connections between 
animals and media, tease out their neglected material-semiotic relationships, and 
expand upon them in the hopes of enriching our understandings of media and 
communication. 
 
IX. The Limits of the Human Umwelt  
 
Thinking media and communication as inclusive and constitutive of both human 
and non-human worlds, trespassing the domains of culture and nature creates a much 
richer and more comprehensive vista for analysis. And yet the continued insistence on 
these ontological distinctions makes it difficult for this horizon to even appear. Animals 
and technological media have a long history of shared appearances. Yet actual contact 
between them remains mostly unacknowledged. It remains obscured by an inattentional 
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blindness that sets in when we reach the edges of our umwelt. That we fail to see these 
encounters is suggestive of how our thinking often forestalls and determines reality’s 
appearance. That we are inclined to see the world subjectively is not a uniquely human 
hindrance; however, that we actively insist it is the best and only way to see the world, 
is—especially when we have the capacity to sense and imagine otherwise.   
No doubt, that pesky squirrel was loitering around Blum’s Internet long before he 
took notice. Other squirrels were too, in other backyards, in other cities. And not only 
squirrels: sharks have been known to nibble on undersea telecommunications 
infrastructure, a problem Google has recently rectified with the addition of a new Kevlar 
coating to its trans-Pacific underwater cables (Lewis 1987; Oremus 2014). Other marine 
dwellers also congregate around these cables, especially where they traverse soft 
sediment. They provide a hard substrate onto which sea anemones and other sedentary 
creatures can attach. Other fish are in turn attracted to these sites, not only because of 
the presence of other life, but also because of the localized turbulence produced by 
currents as they flow over the cables (Carter 31). To say nothing of the eagles and their 
excrement that caused flashovers, and managed to bring down the southern California 
power grid in the 1920s (Benson 2015). The phenomenon of animals traipsing around 
telecommunications is so common it is unremarkable. Songbirds perched on overhead 
wires has become a banal visual cliché that recedes into the background of quotidian 
life—until it erupts out of dormancy for particular reasons. 
Encounters between animals and media consistently happen, sometimes outside 
our perceptual threshold, but also often within it, unfolding openly in the visual field. 
They remain unacknowledged, either ignored outright, or automatically dismissed as 
meaningless and extraneous. At other times, however, these encounters are actively 
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disavowed, vigilantly policed, or anxiously thwarted. The coming together of animals 
and media creates a cathexis: a forbidden or contentious contact zone between nature 
(physis) and technology (technē). For example, the two-shot of whale and reactor that 
so unsettles Langdon Winner is an unwelcome reminder of modern technology’s 
irrepressible incursion into nature.  Technology “always goes where it has never been,” 
he writes (174).  It “proceeds steadily from what it has already transformed and used up 
toward that which is still untouched” (174, emphasis mine). Technology’s intrusion 
cannot help but spoil nature, suggesting that the two are oppositional and ultimately 
irreconcilable.  
This project encourages a protracted confrontation of these promiscuous 
interactions to tell a different story: one that is far more interesting than the one where 
technology encroaches on nature and nature simply concedes. As the creaturely 
contretemps between squirrel and Internet suggests, the relationship is far more 
complicated. Nature too, is prone to go where it has never been, thus bringing into relief 
the variability and dubious nature of the ontological divide that separates them.  
When animals and media come together, animals appear to negotiate with media 
as though they were any other element in their environment. This testifies to the mutual 
entanglement of media technologies and animal worlds. Rather than symbolizing some 
ancient, mythic drama, animals and media together physically enact and make visible 
the hybridity of reality, and emphasize that this reality is a work of cross-species 
sociality. Nature and culture can be antagonists; but a closer consideration of and 
genuine attunement to the particulars of their mutual involvement demonstrates that 
this perceived incompatibility is not essential. It is in fact more conceptual than actual. 
For the modern cosmopolitan squirrel there is no outward ontological value distinction 
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between an oak tree and its branches, and a utility pole and its wires. For modern 
humans, however, there is.  
Media have their specificity and their contextual singularities. At the same time, 
they are just one aspect of a shared creaturely artfulness that includes the corporeal 
knowledges and techniques that species engage in to make their worlds more 
accommodating and hospitable. Animal encounters with media reflexively engage with 
and produce the more-than-human conditions of life and restore the essential social 
dimension to media technologies. The relation between bodies and their environments 
can be broadly understood as a technological one. For to dwell in the world is to actively 
make oneself at home in it using whatever means are available and possible. In short, 
Physis is techne.  
 
X. Forthcoming Chapters  
Setting out to clarify media and consider communication in new and 
unanticipated ways with animals, requires a genuine acknowledgement of the presence 
of animals in the visual field. In Chapter 1, I illustrate how animals are persistently 
effaced by an anthropocentric perspective. When the human occupies the point of 
reference for all being, animals are reduced to mute objects who remain meaningless 
until human subjects ascribe meaning to them. By privileging language, denigrating 
aesthetics, and valuing idealism over realism, this perspective also inhibits the 
conditions of possibility for animals to appear otherwise. Circumscribed to the separate 
ontological domain of nature, even if animals appear in culture, their presence is 
considered unseemly or disavowed outright.  
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The chapter identifies Jakob von Uexküll’s ethology, and André Bazin’s cinematic 
realism as two interrelated non-anthropocentric ways of looking that promise to 
unmoor the animal from the human mind, and situate them in the field of sensibility. 
More than just the animals themselves, this aesthetic approach acknowledges animals in 
meaningful relation to the textured worlds in which they appear. By foregrounding 
animal appearances less as outcomes of human designs and more so of non-human 
worldly operations, this approach is capacious enough to accommodate the dynamism 
of animal-media encounters.  
In Chapter 2, I use an impromptu encounter between a giant pacific octopus and 
an underwater digital camera, and its inadvertent cinematic inscription to examine in 
greater detail the phenomenon of “accidental animal videos.” That is, videos uploaded 
by humans but made unintentionally as a result of animals stealing cameras in mid-
record. Not entirely unprovoked, these videos suggest something about the increasing 
ubiquity of cameras in the worlds of non-human animals at the present moment. 
As amateur wildlife filmmaking gone wrong, these creaturely compositions bring 
much needed attention to the often concealed antagonism that exists between the 
aesthetics of animal imagery and the material realities of its production. As such they 
are valuable rejoinders to the anti-realist tradition of wildlife imagery, a tradition that 
seeks to fix animals to the domain of untouched nature divorced from culture. 
Addressing the materiality of these videos, then, means acknowledging the irrevocable 
entanglement not only of animals and cameras, and nature and culture, but of reality 
and representation more generally.  
These skirmishes between animals and cameras also function more broadly as 
occasions where a fugitive reality meets the camera’s mechanical insistence on capturing 
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it. In this way they are documents of the process of cinematic representation itself. As 
instances where nature quite literally “imitates the artist” they are the medium’s 
ontological realism made manifest, as defined by André Bazin (2005a: 15). For Bazin, 
realism is not simply a style, but a way to put film aesthetics to work in the service of the 
reality in which they are made, and at the same time, in the service of the medium that 
makes them possible. These little representational failures are able to achieve cinematic 
realism, I argue, specifically because they accede to non-human beings and forces, 
letting them become the catalysts for representation. In this way, they merely amplify 
the fundamental non-subjective dimension of cinema that has been there all along. 
When the camera is not mobilized as an extension of the human, it can provision 
generative openings in our insular subjective worlds.  
Media slipping out of human hands, however, is not always a guarantee for 
productive estrangement.  In Chapter 3, I investigate the trend of strategically placing 
media into the hands of non-human apes. This second case study opens on a scene 
where a gorilla plays a videogame on a touchscreen tablet in zoo. The scenario, as it 
turns out, was an April Fool’s Day hoax. However, it effectively tapped into a potent and 
deeply seated fantastical drama. That is, one where non-human apes play pre-
subjective, pre-cultural humans who bear within them secrets about human origins that 
simply require the right technologies and techniques to make them accessible. So 
powerful is this fantasy, it provoked a very real enrichment initiative for captive apes 
called “Apps for Apes.”  
“Apps for Apes” seeks to pair orangutans in particular with donated iPads in zoos 
for enrichment purposes, for public education about orangutan endangerment, and to 
marshal economic support for conservation efforts. Though carried out with the best 
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intentions, the project and the many actors who give meaning to it are not immune from 
epistemological temptations. The promises of transcending the limits of 
communicability across species difference, species extinction, and the enclosure of the 
zoo are too powerful to resist. Further, with its haptic screen interface and network 
capabilities, the iPad promises to offer a solution, or at least a diversion, to the problem 
of contact.   
But coordinating encounters between non-human apes and communication 
technology is inevitably a risky venture, especially given the historically and discursively 
entrenched legacy of putting the two together. The chapter delves into this history, with 
special attention the way post-war Western primatology, in tandem with cybernetics, 
has framed non-human apes as our potential interlocutors. Thanks to this legacy non-
human apes are persistently treated as mysterious but kindred subjects that need only 
to be activated and made accessible and communicative.  
In this way, I argue, our encounters with non-human apes are always framed as 
communicative ones. However, these encounters are impoverished by their 
commitment to what John Durham Peters (1999) has outlined as “the dream of perfect 
communication.” This dream holds communication to the impossible ideal of minds, 
meeting. To achieve such a feat presumes that interiority can be made accessible, and 
that all variegated interiorities can be made equivalent to one another, so that 
information and ideas may be freely exchanged. This ideal of communication 
instrumentalizes our engagements with and relationships to others, and sees difference 
as a hurdle that must be dismantled. There is, however, no such thing as free and 
unencumbered communication; it is always shaped by those who set the terms of its 
unfolding.    
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I am critical of the “Apps for Apes” project; however, there are flickers of 
potential for more creative and tactful encounters with non-human apes. While the 
orangutans have been cast in this drama, they nevertheless improvise their own effects 
by resisting human attempts to direct them in particular ways. In addition, the project 
has also generated moves toward applications designed for orangutans. This may not 
repair the more troubling issues of captivity, exhibition, and conservation, but 
considering apes as users makes their stimulation, pleasure, and enjoyment matter. In 
this valuation is a nascent gesture away from questions about human access and the 
expansion of human consciousness, and more about hospitality, accommodation, and 
making provisionally livable worlds together. These small offerings are welcome: for 
endangered orangutans, livable worlds are vanishing at alarming rates. 
In Chapter 4, I continue on this theme of accommodation, by considering the 
physical supports of communication. It opens with a race between carrier pigeons and 
the Internet. The birds take digital data to meet a computer as a publicity stunt, one that 
uses the carrier pigeon’s lowly status as a primitive medium to demonstrate poor 
broadband speeds. Though summoned here as a spectacular anachronism, I contend 
that there is nothing anomalous about the carrier pigeon’s reappearance in modernity. I 
wager that the carrier pigeon has long been a perennial participant in the material and 
imaginative possibilities of communication.  
The chapter touches on pre-modern carrier pigeons, but devotes most of its 
attention to their work in the 19th century onward where they are most legible as a node 
in the expanding network of transportation and communication.  In examining the 
intimate entanglements of carrier pigeons and technology during key points in 
modernity, it becomes clear that new technologies and techniques have and continue to 
 40 
modulate and accentuate the carrier pigeon’s operations. At the same time, the pigeon 
supplements and improves upon the functionalities of the existing technological 
infrastructure. Not just as an alternative during times of technological failure, carrier 
pigeons are a default stopgap when our technological aspirations exceed their material 
realities.  
And yet, the carrier pigeon has been omitted from the history of communication, 
and has been denied occasion to bring anything to bear on how we theorize 
communication. I posit that it has been ignored not just because it is animal, but 
because it is more comfortably considered a form of movement. Deemed a throwback to 
a time before communication was supposedly separated from transportation, it has been 
underestimated as an auspicious effect of the bird’s mysterious homing instinct. I 
illuminate instead that to communicate by carrier pigeon involves the considerable 
organization and complex coordination of a sprawling processual assemblage of 
animals, humans, technologies, materials, and techniques.  
Therefore, pitting the old-fashioned pigeon against the new-fangled Internet 
misses the point: they are not rivals but allies, progeny of a longstanding relationship 
between communication and transportation, and animals and infrastructure. The 
carrier pigeon ultimately illuminates something fundamental about communication: 
that it is first and foremost a material process, and movement and coordination are 
always required to make these material connections.  
The dissertation concludes by reiterating that while animal-media encounters are 
common in the current visual culture, they are but continuations of a much more 
longstanding relationship. Animals are, in the end, significantly implicated in the 
material and imaginative possibilities of media and communication. Recognizing this is 
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a way to make media material, and in that materiality media become an unlikely but 
common ground where strangers meet and make worlds, together 
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Chapter 1 
  
Sights Unseen: 
Solving the Strange Case of the Disappearing Animal 
 
Animals are fast disappearing… 
—Paul Eipper, from Animals Looking at You (2). 
 
Everywhere animals disappear. 
—John Berger, from “Why Look at Animals?” in About 
Looking (24).  
 
… everywhere one looks one is surrounded by the absence of 
animals. 
—Akira Lippit, from Electric Animal (1).   
 
I. Animal Traces in the Public Domain 
During a trip to Sulawesi, Indonesia in 2011, British photographer David Slater 
set up his camera in a wildlife reserve to take photos of Celebes crested macaque 
monkeys. One bold macaque in particular commandeered the camera and turned it 
around on itself, repeatedly hitting the shutter-release button. By the time Slater 
regained control of the device, the monkey had produced a whole series of self-portraits, 
some of which are now widely available online (See Fig. 1.1). When the images showed 
up on Wikipedia in 2014 as part of the Wikimedia Commons, Slater requested they be 
removed, arguing that they were his copyrighted images. Wikipedia refused, however, 
insisting that because the images were produced by a non-human animal, and non-
human animals cannot own intellectual property, the images ultimately belong to the 
public domain. Courts in both the US and the UK eventually agreed with Wikipedia: the 
photos did not belong to Slater, or the monkey (Gibbs 2014).2  
                                                 
2 In 2015, PETA (People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals) filed a lawsuit on behalf of the monkey, 
now identified as Naruto, for copyright to the images. They sought a court order to administer the 
proceeds of the images to Naruto’s wildlife reserve, a lawsuit that was later dismissed (“PETA Sues to Give 
Copyright” 2015; “Monkey Selfie Case” 2016). 
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 Certainly, this case raises some very compelling questions regarding non-human 
authorship. But by drawing attention to the ambiguities around the responsibility for 
the production of images, it also inadvertently acknowledges that it is, to certain extent, 
always a distributed process. The monkey “selfies” cannot be legally copyrighted to the 
monkey; nonetheless they testify to the animal’s involvement in the processes of its own 
representation. Whether intentional or not does not matter: the extent of its 
involvement and how to characterize that involvement are beside the point. What 
matters is simply that the animal was part of the process at all. While the monkey’s 
“selfies” provide an exceptional example of works made by a non-human, they also 
effectively foreground what normally remains in the background of animal imagery: the 
participation of animals.  In this way, they are an exaggerated dramatization of the fact 
that animals are implicated in the processes by which they come to appear. They may 
not be involved as directly as this, but it is still a matter of degree, not of yes or no.  
 
 
 
     
 
 
Fig. 1.1 “Monkey 
Selfies”: Self-portraits 
of a female Celebes 
crested black 
macaque monkey who 
picked up 
photographer David 
Slater's camera and 
photographed itself 
on the Indonesian 
island of Sulawesi. 
Photo by: Naruto 
(pictured)/David 
Slater (2011). Source: 
Wikipedia. 
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 The following discussion would like to keep this series of monkey selfies as a 
dramatic counterexample to the traditional ways animal imagery is understood and 
characterized by the scholars writing about them. Images of animals might abound in 
modern visual culture, but in the literature about them, these rendered animals are not 
considered real. As this survey will clarify, there is a pervasive disavowal of animal 
presence in the visual field. Animals that appear in culture are treated either as signs 
and symbols of human meanings, or they are reduced to vacuous specters that are 
stripped of any meaning at all.  
Despite the proliferation of animals and animal imagery in the modern visual 
field, John Berger wistfully but insistently laments in his influential essay, “Why Look at 
Animals?” that “everywhere animals disappear” (24). Berger not only dismisses images 
of animals, he also repudiates animals living in cities or on farms, in sanctuaries or zoos, 
or in human houses. These are merely animals in name, not in substance. The question 
posed in the title of Berger’s essay is rhetorical: why bother to even look at animals all, 
he wonders, when the ones we see are no longer really there?  
This dirge continues to echo throughout discussions of animals in the visual field 
and has become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Animals in modernity are both everywhere 
and nowhere. We can see them wherever we look: in our homes, on the street, in zoos, in 
art galleries, or on screens, but what we see are merely animal-like forms, inauthentic, 
artificial, void, and meaningless. 
Either these representational animals are presumed to have no ontological 
relationship to real animals, or alternatively, they are criticized for undermining real 
animals and any possibility for us to have genuine relationships with them. As a case in 
point, Randy Malamud’s term for animals in visual culture is “simulacrum-animals.” 
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These are the animals “on parade” and “in disguise” that “proliferate ad infinitum, ad 
absurdum” in the visual field. These pseudo-animals, he argues, “usurp much of the 
space we might have allocated in our minds to the consciousness of real, living animals” 
(2012: 74). Likewise, Berger argues that these cultural animals are additionally 
problematic because they cannot look back at us from their natural, creaturely distance, 
and as such we are no longer able to see ourselves reflected in and affirmed by their 
gaze.  
While it is often motivated by care and concern for animals, this perspective ends 
up being inhospitable toward them instead. In his pity for the plight of modern animals, 
wrenched from the cradle of nature, Berger ends up overemphasizing the victimization 
and marginalization of animals by humans. This only undermines the vitality and 
ontological plenitude of animals even further at the same time reaffirming, albeit 
negatively, the power of the human over animals, its centrality and cosmic 
exceptionality.  
By favouring a particular concept of animals as proxies of nature that must be 
protected from the corrupting influence of culture, this perspective ends up reinforcing 
the nature-culture divide. This is the same divide that exiles animals from culture and 
prevents them from not only being held in common regard, but also from bringing 
anything to bear on the production of knowledge. In addition, by setting up ontological 
oppositions between real animals and their representations, it betrays a stubborn and 
unproductive cynicism. This cynicism is fueled by a distrust of images, surfaces, and 
aesthetics more generally. It is linked instead to a commitment to language and depth, 
and idealism over realism, which only serve to elevate the human and marginalize 
animals even further.   
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These issues are a consequence of anthropocentricism which ultimately guides 
our approaches to and methods for studying animals. Thus, this chapter argues that if 
we are to truly entertain what non-human epistemology has to offer the study of media, 
communication, and culture, we must entertain non-human animal ontologies as well, 
wherever and however they manifest to us. Animal images are more than human 
artifacts; they are places where we can acknowledge animals, and let them be and 
become consequential beyond human terms.  
 
II. On the Need for Ontological Heft in Representation 
A wheel turns because of its encounter with the surface of the road; 
spinning in the air it goes nowhere. Rubbing two sticks together produces 
heat and light; one stick alone is just a stick. As a metaphorical image, 
friction reminds us that heterogeneous and unequal encounters can lead to 
new arrangements of culture and power. 
—Anna Tsing, from Friction: An Ethnography 
of Global Connection (5). 
 
Surface encounters between animals and media can generate friction. There is 
traction when exteriors touch and grapple with the forces, shapes, textures, and 
substances of their mutual materiality. Whether side-by-side or top-down, they can 
produce conditions for movement and transformation. That being said, in order make 
such travel possible, animals must carry some ontological sway. Unfortunately, animals 
in modernity are allotted only a spectral presence, and as such do not have sufficient 
weight needed to create traction. This dissertation relies on the provocative power of its 
juxtapositions, and thus the operational autonomy and ontological integrity of animals 
must be secured before continuing any further. 
If we are to make new knowledge about media and communication with animals, 
it is absolutely necessary to first restore the disappearing animal to a state of visibility. 
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Not only that, we must also find a way to grant animal imagery the proper autonomy, 
dynamism, dimensionality, and ontological heft needed for it to create a more forceful 
impact. This means not only identifying animal traces, but also making way for the 
fullness of animal being in those traces. As Etienne Benson notes, studying animals 
requires a reliance on non-traditional methods and documents. He writes, it “depends 
on tracks, trails, or traces—those material-semiotic remnants of whatever the pursuer 
hopes to catch, those often unintentional indexes of a now-absent presence” (3). The 
traces animals leave behind, directly or indirectly, are often all that we have to go on. 
They may appear marginal and meaningless, but they must be treated as central and 
significant.  
 To study animals is to study inaccessible and furtive subjects and what they leave 
behind. We may want more from them than what they are able to give, but we must 
make do with what remains. It is possible, Benson argues, in the absence of actual, living 
co-present animals, to cultivate real, authentic, meaningful relationships with their 
remnants. This cultivation begins by emphasizing the animals’ involvement in the 
making of these leavings. It requires returning our attention to the aesthetics of animal 
imagery and the processes by which that imagery materialized. To proceed also involves 
taking a non-anthropocentric perspective that allows images to be something more than 
complementary fittings to human vision.  
While the discussion that follows is about the ontological status of animal images, 
it is also necessarily about ways of looking at animals and animal images. The animal 
question has been and continues to be a visual one: looking is the very mechanism by 
which human beings produce and affirm species difference. Looking at animals is an 
incredibly vexed enterprise that has not served animals well. The human gaze, as 
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Giorgio Agamben argues, is fixed by what he calls, “the anthropological machine.” As 
such, human looking is always already prefigured by an anthropocentric frame that 
reduces the animal to an object, figuratively or literally, for the human subject. In light 
of these human limitations, what is required is not, as some have suggested, to denigrate 
animal imagery, nor is the solution a matter of looking away. Rather, what is necessary 
is a new means of engagement: a supplement to our human technics of vision. This 
technics of vision is a non-anthropological machine, a technique of looking informed 
partly by Jakob von Uexküll’s ethology, and André Bazin’s cinematic realism.  
Though working in different fields (ecology and film, respectively) at different 
periods in Europe, both Uexküll and Bazin studied strange worlds, using aesthetic 
acknowledgements to segue into grander ontological explorations. In so doing, they 
both developed methods that provisionally delivered to the observer glimmers of 
otherwise inaccessible worlds. These richly textured worlds in turn emerged in 
productive juxtaposition with our own familiar world. They transformed our 
perceptions, broadened horizons of meaning, and solicited new ways of connecting, 
responding, and being.     
 
III. Jettisoning the Desire for Interiority and Settling for the Surface 
Aesthetic acknowledgement is at the crux of this discussion; a way to deal with 
animals by getting back to the surface, and away from concerns about depth and 
interiority (or lack thereof). Animals do not use human language. This perceived lack 
has long presented itself as a foreclosure to meaningful understandings of animals. 
Without language, animals are “silent.” They cannot communicate their interiority, and 
are thus unable to transform, bring meaning or value to their lives and their 
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environments. For Heidegger, this speechlessness dooms animals to perpetual 
meaninglessness. However, it is unfair to judge animals against a uniquely human 
quality, and perceive this difference as a paucity. Speechlessness need not be taken as a 
lack, nor must it be confused with absence of meaning. Taking language, a priori, as a 
benchmark of sophistication and value is ultimately self-serving. It guarantees the 
perpetual exclusion of animals from the domain of significance.  To punish animals for 
not speaking with us is to punish them for not complying with the terms of 
communication we have outlined, to penalize them for not making their interiority 
available to us, and for not being more like us.  
The desire to access animal interiority is a longstanding one, though it was most 
famously addressed by Thomas Nagel (1974) in his essay, “What is It Like to Be a Bat?” 
While Nagel insisted that there is a particular “something” of which it is like to be a bat, 
we cannot ever know it.  Because we are not bats living with bat bodies, we do not 
experience the world the way they do. That is, primarily through echolocation; the most 
we can think is what is it like for us to be a bat. Animal interiority may present an 
alluring mystery, but it is one that we will never solve.  
The preoccupation with interiority is, however, a more systemic problem. As 
John Durham Peters proposes in Speaking into the Air: A History of the Idea of 
Communication (1999) our fixation on interiority is the ultimate pathology of modern 
communication. Communication in modernity is mobilized as a problem of access 
between the self and the other. Dramas of communication are innervated by nightmares 
of solipsism and failures to communicate, or by fantasies of telepathy and the unlimited 
possibilities of communication. In Peters’ estimation, we must surrender this desire for 
mental communion, acknowledge the hard work of relating to others, and settle for what 
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is available to us on the surface. Consciousness, human or otherwise, is always out of 
reach. Our energies should be directed toward more productive forms of engagement. 
We must acknowledge what inaccessible others do make available through display: their 
exteriority. 
Settling on the surface requires restraint, a resistance to the desire to plumb 
animals for some semblance of subjectivity and consciousness. Probing animal 
exteriority entails recognizing difference but also the playful negotiations that happen at 
the very surface of encounter.  Such details can help us call attention to the significant 
ways animals participate in the textures and dynamics of the visual field. Focusing on 
the surface of animals does not mean that animals do not have interior depths, just that 
those depths are inaccessible to our apprehension.  
What are available to us are animal appearances, comportments, operations, and 
interactions. Thus we cannot grasp animals as they truly are, we can only access animals 
at the level of aesthetic encounter. But directing our gaze toward animals is not 
necessarily a guarantee for seeing them—not because the surface deceives us, or veils 
the more complex reality of animal life. Rather, because we tend to let our ideas about 
animals and our motivations for looking at them determine what materializes before us, 
eclipsing real animals from view. Claude Lévi-Strauss deemed animals as “good to 
think” (1963: 89)—and the growing literature on animals in the humanities especially 
illustrates that this is the case.3  
                                                 
3 The books published since 2007 under the auspices of the University of Minnesota Press’ 
“Posthumanities Series” are a particular case in point, and for this reason figure largely in this literature 
review. Edited by Cary Wolfe, prominent scholar of posthumanism, the series has produced over 30 works 
that engage with animals, media and culture to varying degrees. 
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Animals may be rich “tools” to think with, but as Kari Weil advises, it is even 
better to “unthink” animals (2012: xvi-xvii). To make the most of what animals have to 
offer requires more generosity on our part: surrendering our preconceived notions 
about them, tempering our human claims of precedence and exceptionalism, and 
granting them an existence that is not limited to our ability to imagine it.  In short, it 
means making a clearing for actual animal presence in the visual field, to provide the 
necessary space for animal meaning that is not reducible to human rationalization.  
If there are any philosophical stakes in the study of animals, as Matthew Calarco 
reiterates in his introduction to Zoographies: The Question of the Animal from 
Heidegger to Derrida, they lie “in the clearing of the space for the event of what we call 
animals” (4, emphasis in the original). In order to genuinely consider animals, he 
suggests, it is necessary to appreciate them less as thing that are, and more as things 
that happen. Animals are situated and entangled in space-time, enacting emplaced 
trajectories, capable of unexpected action that can extend outside human 
understandings of causality.  
Acknowledging animals in this way creates the conditions for ambiguous, 
itinerant connections, and generative transformations. More than reinterpreting the 
animal figure, then, what is required is a structural renovation of the very ground on 
which the animal is perceived. John Mullarkey likewise contends that the very idea of 
philosophy itself “must also be reshaped in order to say anything significant about the 
animal” (12).  Any intellectual inquiry into the animal must actively work against 
anthropocentricism. Only a decentering of the human will provision space for the event 
of the animal. Looking at animals, then, requires a reorganization of priorities, and a 
fundamental recalibration of looking.  
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IV. Approaching Animals: A Question of Distance  
Distance is the first point of issue when approaching animals: either there is not 
enough distance, and animals are anthropomorphized, or there is too much, and 
animals are alienated. Anthropomorphism refers to the attribution of human traits to 
animals wherein animals end up being obscured by the thoughts, feelings, and 
motivations we impose upon them. This becomes a kind of narcissistic projection, an 
overly simplistic interpretation of animals that denies them any autonomy. 
Anthropomorphism makes animals meaningful only for humans, and not meaningful 
for the animals in and of themselves. Alienating animals, meanwhile, leads to their 
irrevocable estrangement from humans. Such an orientation operates under the 
assumption that there is an impossible communicative chasm between us. Unable to 
communicate on our terms, animals are understood to be wholly mysterious. Their 
behavior is reduced to a purely mechanistic functionality and dismissed as void.  
Though anthropomorphism and alienation appear to be two extremes, they are 
both effects of anthropocentricism, which seriously underestimates the complexity of 
non-human being. We may have a natural inclination to be anthropocentric, but in 
ensuring that the human is the only kind of being worth knowing about, we are greatly 
reducing our ability think outside ourselves, to consider other modes of being in the 
world. Dominic Pettman (2011) terms such thinking the “human error”: a mistake we 
have never learned from and are destined to repeat until we acknowledge the magnitude 
of its omissions, and find new models and methods with which to think.  
The solution however is not necessarily to do away with our selves; we cannot 
ever permanently escape our subjectivities, and it is not something to which we should 
aspire. However, as ecological critic Timothy Morton suggests, “hanging out in the 
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distance may be the surest way of relating to the nonhuman” (2007: 205). There is a 
need to occupy a place between anthropomorphism and alienation, what Weil calls 
“critical anthropomorphism.” In her book Thinking Animal: Why Animal Studies Now? 
Weil suggests, regardless of its dangers, anthropomorphism nevertheless cultivates 
attention toward animals based on a shared corporeality. The use of the modifier 
“critical” here is meant to ensure we are wary of our proclivity to favour our own 
position. It is a way to avoid presumption and over-identification with animals, and 
foster instead a way of relating that makes space for difference.   
Such an approach Weil borrows in part from trauma scholar Jill Bennett’s 
“critical empathy,” which combines affect and critical awareness to foster an empathy 
“grounded not in affinity…but on a feeling for another that entails an encounter with 
something irreducible and different, often inaccessible” (qtd. in Weil 20, emphasis in 
original). It is a respectful response toward difference that does not involve enforcing 
similarities and equivalencies. In the spirit of remedying the human error, it lets 
animals “both be and become according to their own sense of time and place” (Pettman 
199).  
Though Weil does not mention him here, the concept of critical 
anthropomorphism was actually first introduced by comparative psychologist Gordon 
M. Burghardt (1985). Burghardt developed it as a provisional heuristic for approaching 
animals and their behavior. It was informed by integrating a variety of sources: an 
organism’s scientific and natural history, its unique physiology and sensory abilities, its 
perceptual processing capacities, and its local ecology to hypothesize what it might be 
like to be a particular animal in a given situation (Burghardt 2007: 137). But as 
Burghardt has himself suggested, the concept was significantly influenced by the work 
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of Uexküll, who helped found the modern field of ethology.  
Ethology is the study of animal behavior that entails observation, measurement, 
quantification, and documentation of animals interacting with their environment. It 
produces knowledge based on these observations in conjunction with careful 
speculation informed by a familiarity with the organism’s own specific physiology and 
biology. Uexküll’s concept of umwelt has been highly influential, not only in the 
sciences, but in philosophy and media studies as well. It promotes a particularly non-
anthropocentric, pluralist ontology of reality that not only makes room for non-humans 
but also for the possibility of their autonomy and ability to have meaningful 
relationships with their worlds. The notion of a subjective world was proposed as a 
counterpoint to Charles Darwin’s concept of “milieu,” which Uexküll felt emphasized far 
too much the power of external forces on animals (Pollmann 2013: 779). For Uexküll, 
organisms did not merely react to their surroundings they engaged with them, and 
actively shaped them. That is, animals communicated with them, suggesting that 
communication is not a process that happens between minds, but between bodies and 
worlds. 
Critical anthropomorphism is, then, an ethologically inspired perspective that 
requires an attentive kind of looking. It attempts to be aware of its framings and 
limitations, and rests most comfortably on the surfaces of animals as they encounter 
things in their environments. However, it also acknowledges the polysemic nature of 
such surfaces, and encourages care and modesty in its interpretations. This realism of 
perspective, predicated on looking at phenomena as situated in elaborate worlds, from a 
place of curious unfamiliarity, is provocatively cinematic.  
André Bazin considers realism to be fundamental to cinema. Realism, for Bazin is 
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less about achieving verisimilitude and more about cultivating faith in the world, 
something I will unpack in further detail later. Suffice to say, he maintains that cinema’s 
essential realism is made possible expressly by the camera’s non-human point of view. 
Uexküll’s concerns about anthropomorphism parallel Bazin’s: he was equally troubled 
by the risks of narcissistic projection onto worlds. His essays on realism valued 
filmmaking strategies that protected the unfamiliar world unfolding inside the filmic 
frame from being supplanted by an all too familiar human one. By emphasizing 
cinema’s importance as a primary mode of worldly encounter, the essays also suggest 
something of what it is like to be an engaged spectator, sensitive to the conditions of 
filmmaking, the processes by which images appeared, and what they brought to bear on 
both the cinematic image and our understanding of the world.  
This conceptual overlap between Uexküll and Bazin is unsurprising given that as 
aforementioned the camera figured significantly in Uexküll’s ethology. As Pollman 
argues, Uexküll recognized that the camera may not be able to show an animal’s true 
umwelt, but it could suggest glimmers of it as the animal comports itself within the non-
human umwelt of the camera. In doing so, cinema helped establish a space for the 
animal, and provided a vector of communication along which Uexküll could travel 
between worlds.  
Uexküll’s scientific work thus indicates that studies of animals are irrevocably 
tied to media. Animals become topics for discussion in tandem with their visualization. 
Knowledge about them relies on their visibility, but that visibility in turn depends on 
their interaction with technologies that render them visible in the first place. When it 
comes to seeing animals, animal-media relations are almost always implicitly at stake. 
Yet these relations remain unacknowledged thanks to our perceptual blind spots, aided 
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by the modern insistence on human centrality and on the nature-culture divide. The 
following section will explore the histories of animal representation alongside the 
human desires and the technological affordances that motivate them. It will identify 
some of the troubling patterns in the ways animal representations have been understood 
and mobilized. Finally, it will attempt to restore the ontological plenitude of the animal 
image by proposing a cinematic, realist technique of looking.   
 
V. Animals and/in/of/for/as Media  
Animals matter to media in a multitude of ways. As the indelible Lascaux Cave 
paintings of Paleolithic bison indicate, animals were early subjects of what is understood 
within art history as the very first medium. That seems only just, given that animals also 
likely provided the blood to make the paint (Berger 5). From the very beginning, then, 
animals have been imaginatively, aesthetically, and materially implicated in media and 
culture—to such an extent that they are difficult to disentangle. Animals are at once the 
inspiration for media, the subject of media, and also the very substance of media. Media 
were integral to thinking about animals, and animals were also implicated in imagining 
media, and making media operations intelligible.  
Animal images inevitably moved beyond caves to other canvasses, but as the 
history of painting suggests, animals remained popular and perennial subjects. 
Visualizing animals, even for strictly aesthetic purposes, cultivated desires and 
techniques to know more about them. In seeking to depict animals as accurately as 
possible, artists had to observe animals carefully and employ processes of contemplation 
and interpretation. As art historians and curators Louise Lippincott and Andreas Blühm 
suggest in their book, Fierce Friends: Artists and Animals 1750 -1900, French Baroque 
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painter Jean-Baptiste Oudry—well-known for his images of animals—not only had to 
document the strange bodily comportments of animals, but also had to figure out how to 
characterize and interpret their movements (34). In this instance, a concern about 
animal aesthetics invariably leads to epistemological and ontological considerations.   
But epistemological and ontological explorations also lead toward animals. As the 
industrial revolution was well underway, modernity was changing the human experience 
of space and time to such an extent that life was at times incomprehensible.  Animals 
appeared in part to make these changes intelligible and natural. At the close of the 19th 
century, for example, animals were appearing in symbolic forms at unprecedented rates. 
Akira Lippit identifies these appearances as hauntings, correlating their appearance 
with that of technology: “animals appeared to merge with the new technological bodies 
replacing them” (187). Thanks to the ascendance of the steam engine, horse-drawn 
carriages were being phased out. And yet, “plaster horses were mounted on tramcar 
fronts in an effort to simulate continuity with the older, animal-driven vehicles” 
(Lippincott and Blühm 187). In fact, early vehicles were even called “horse-less 
carriages” as if these new machines were lacking their essential animal component 
(Lippincott and Blühm 150). That the power of automobile engines is still measured in 
units of “horsepower” acts is a reminder of this residual animality.  
New technologies ostensibly made animals obsolete. While animals disappeared 
from everyday life, Lippit argues, they reappeared in symbolic forms to haunt the 
physical spaces they once occupied. This is Lippit’s central argument in Electric Animal: 
Toward a Rhetoric of Wildlife (2000): all technologies bear the traces of “an 
incorporated animality” (187). He suggests that technological innovations were inspired 
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by animals, and eventually became substitutes for them. Animals became redundant; 
with nowhere to go, they simply haunted the cultural landscape.  
Horses, for example, guided inventors like James Watt as he fine-tuned his steam 
engine, and Henry Ford when he built the Model-T (187). Other scholars affirm this 
move: elephants and other animals facilitated inventor Thomas Edison’s cinematic 
experiments with electricity (Shukin 140). As Avital Ronell has suggested, Alexander 
Graham Bell’s experience with sheep breeding sparked his desire to connect to 
significant incommunicable others, which in turn inspired his invention of the telephone 
(337). Animator Walt Disney used real live animals as models for his early animations, 
while a cat was central to physicist Erwin Schrödinger’s famous thought experiment 
(Lippit 187). Muybridge’s Zoopraxiscope (literally “animal action viewer”) was crafted in 
the service of capturing animal locomotion. These animal inspirations are not tertiary to 
but rather elemental to these technologies of transportation, communication, and 
representation. In the end, Lippit believes animals have infused these technologies with 
their spirits; as such, media technologies serve as archives for lost animal presence. 
To be sure, Lippit’s thesis holds some sway. Animals did inspire modern 
representational technologies such as photography and motion pictures. In Animals in 
Film, Jonathan Burt argues that early developments in still and moving picture 
technology provided answers to questions provoked by animal movement (2002). The 
cultural fascination with horses offers a particular case in point. Because the strength 
and speed of their bodies were vital to land transportation, governments, merchants, 
and racehorse owners were preoccupied with the analysis of horse motion. Meanwhile, 
“artists were given the impossible task of representing actions that occurred too fast for 
the unaided eye to see” (Lippincott and Blühm 132). That is, until Eadweard Muybridge 
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met Sallie Gardner, Leland Stanford’s horse, and with her gallop they set astir a proto-
cinema that became the bedrock for modern visual culture.  
The interest in recording the movement of animals was synonymous with the 
desire to make movement visible and comprehensible. It transpired at a time when 
rationalizing and controlling movement itself was becoming a pressing concern for 
governing populations and facilitating capitalism. For Uexküll, for example, the camera 
made visible the “coordinates” and “amplitudes” of animal movement which helped him 
to conceptualize his theory of movement as “an organized reaction to stimuli” (Pollmann 
2013: 791). Meanwhile for Muybridge and Étienne-Jules Marey, recording animal 
locomotion demonstrated that movement was reducible to its unfolding in space and 
time: it was therefore a phenomenon that could be captured and rationalized.  
The imperceptibility of animal motion created a demand for more efficient 
cameras and faster film speeds that could capture what the human eye could not. 
Animals encouraged film to adapt, and film in turn reinforced “the animal’s own 
potential for novelty and its power to fascinate” (Burt 2002: 85). Animals’ contribution 
to still and moving photography is further reified by the fact that gelatin made from the 
bones, skins and tendons of horses and cows were also fundamental to the processing of 
film stock (Shukin 104).4 The animal materiality of film stock was essential to the film 
image, but that materiality was hardly passive and inert. As Shukin recounts, during 
“the great emulsion debacle of 1882” a number of Eastman plates were ruined thanks to 
impurities in the gelatin, which eventually led to more consistent manufacturing 
                                                 
4 And not just the animals themselves, but what they ate and how they lived. As Hollis Frampton playfully 
points out, the Eastman Kodak Company insisted, “the very best photographic gelatin is made from 
selected ear and cheek clippings of Argentinean beef cattle that are fed on mustard greens” (2004: 9). 
Shukin affirms this: cattle fed mustard seed produced gelatin that could yield better film speeds, and as 
such mustard became an important part of the film emulsion formula (109).  
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standards (108-9). Animal dynamism and contingencies not only gave form to cinema, 
and helped make movement intelligible, they also literally gave it substance.     
Media may have a long history of representing and incorporating animals, but 
animals also represent and incorporate media effects. More specifically animals 
“monstrate,” or show the possibilities and limits of media. 5 Topsy, the unruly 
pachyderm, for example, disclosed the dangers of alternating current in Thomas 
Edison’s Electrocuting an Elephant (1903). Nipper, the Jack Russell terrier, in listening 
to recordings of his dead master’s voice over a phonograph, illustrated the device’s 
impressive technical fidelity. Animals did not just show media, they made its productive 
affects and sensations intelligible.  
This mimetic power also meant that animals literally became media themselves, 
storing and transmitting otherwise inaccessible information. The canary in the coalmine 
is the most notable example of this. Canaries were commonly used in coal mining 
practices as early detectors of carbon monoxide in the atmosphere. While they have 
since been replaced with technical sensors, animals remain significant sentinels for 
human and environmental health. The supra-human perceptual acuity of many animals 
is essential in laboratories, pollution zones, and even on city sidewalks as guide dogs act 
as perceptual proxies for the visually impaired.  
Thus Lippit is not wrong: as this brief and tangled history suggests, animals 
matter to media, technology, and culture in a myriad of ways. But Lippit sees animals as 
far too easily incorporated into media technologies, when the relationship is more 
                                                 
5 As André Gaudreault (1990) has posited, “monstration” is a pre-narrative layer of cinema onto which 
more complex narratives are built. For example, while the early cinema of attractions does not “tell” 
stories as such, they nevertheless “show” something at the very least. Nicole Shukin (2009) has since 
likened animals’ capacity to show the possibilities and limits of technology to the way cinema itself 
monstrates.     
 61 
complicated and nuanced than that. What Lippit’s position fails to grasp are animals 
themselves as living, breathing, irreducible beings that did not merely disappear and 
become obsolete with the emergence of technological modernity. For Lippit animals 
exist only in correlation with the human imagination, and do not exist beyond it. As 
such, animals are only ever as they are imagined. This is not just Lippit’s problem, but a 
systemic problem underlying much of the literature on animals in culture: it is informed 
by an insidious anti-realist paradigm that reduces the possibilities for making sense of 
animals, and of non-humans more generally.   
 
VI. “Animetaphors:” Animals in Concept Spaces 
Animals may be a perennial topic in the literature of the social sciences and 
humanities but they are hardly present there. Much of the literature, Cary Wolfe 
remarks, treats “the animal as primarily a theme, a trope, metaphor, analogy, 
representation, or sociological datum” (2009: 567). That is, animals are positioned as 
matrices where “relations of class, or race, or gender get played out and negotiated 
through the symbolic currency of animality and species difference” (Wolfe 2009: 567). 
“Western thought,” poet and playwright Jean-Christophe Bailly concurs, has armed 
itself, “less by erecting self-enclosing walls than by confining animals in vast concept-
spaces from which they are not supposed to be able to exit” (4).  
Inside such “concept-spaces” animals are reduced to exemplary forms, and 
denied their own spatial and temporal destiny. Mullarkey calls this treatment, 
“philosomorphism,” whereby animals are used merely as means to the ends of human 
thought. As Silver Rattasepp has so succinctly put it:  whenever animals are mentioned 
it is rarely “as living representatives of nonhuman modes of being, of alterity, of a life 
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that is not human” (29). What he means is that there is a paucity of real animals in the 
writings about them. Animals may figure at central or peripheral points of discussion 
but they tend to remain exactly that: figures. From Wittgenstein’s lion to Schrödinger’s 
cat to Deleuze and Guattari’s “becoming-animal,” the animal is arbitrarily invested with 
meaning, cut to the measure of a philosopher’s scheme.6    
The metaphorical or figural animal is positively primeval. As John Berger has 
speculated, animals were the first metaphor. Because their lives are separate from 
humans, but unfold in parallel, “the essential relation between man and animal was 
metaphoric” (5). Thus animals have long been an ideal proxy for human beings. Lippit 
certainly agrees: animals were once “considered a metonymy of nature,” a kind of 
shorthand for the natural world as a whole. But now, he explains, animals have come to 
be seen as emblems of the new industrial environment,” symbols of the decidedly 
unnatural (187, emphasis mine). They became a crucial (though clearly a flexible) 
metaphor for articulating whatever with which they have been tasked. 
So useful are animal metaphors that Lippit posits that animals are inherently 
metaphoric. He replaces the term “metaphor” with “animetaphor” because the animal is 
“already a metaphor, the metaphor an animal. Together they transport to language, 
breathe into language, the vitality of another life, another expression: animal and 
                                                 
6 In Erwin Schrödinger’s famous thought experiment, the cat hidden inside the box is denied any sense of 
reality. It is paradoxically dead and alive at the same time. While we know it can be one or the other, the 
only sure way to know the cat’s fate is to actually open the box, to see it and in turn establish its 
relationship to the world. Meanwhile, Deleuze and Guattari’s clarion call for “becoming-animal,” Donna 
Haraway complains, is marked by their “profound absence of curiosity about or respect for and with 
actual animals” (2008: 27). Instead they reduce animals to “relentless otherness knotted into never fully 
bounded or fully self-referential entities” (2008: 27). They encourage humans to use the energy of the 
protean animal pack, but in doing so they end up privileging the fantasy of a “pure” animal. Their disdain 
for the family pet by contrast for being so oedipalized and diminished, completely elides the presence of 
real animals and shuts down any possibility of really seeing animals in their singularity and autonomy 
(2008: 28). 
 63 
metaphor, a metaphor made flesh” (Lippit 165). Lippit’s proclamation illustrates quite 
effectively why the metaphoric animal is so persistent: its inexhaustible mutability 
means it is a selfless receiver of whatever meanings we need it to bear. A dog, for 
example, can be “man’s best friend,” a symbol of faithfulness and companionship, but if 
a place has “gone to the dogs” the dog becomes a sign of deterioration. “Every dog has 
its day” places dogs as carriers of good fortune, and yet a “dog’s life” is one that is sad 
and unlucky. Meanwhile “A dog eat dog world” implies one of vicious competition. 
Though it may be a convenient cipher, the dog itself is hardly there, and it becomes 
increasingly meaningless with every iteration.  
Animals may be appealing and generative philosophical figures, but only at the 
expense of their ontological specificity and plenitude. Animals might be missing in the 
writings about them, but this absence is not a direct result of something endemic to 
writing as mode of expression. Rather it is a result of a worldview that is deeply 
anthropocentric and correlationist.7 An approach that not only presumes human 
exceptionality, but also presumes that being and human thinking are inextricable from 
one another. Appreciating animals as singular, more-than-human beings with unique 
capacities for action and meaning-making can help foster new ways of perceiving reality 
and produce new vistas of knowledge. In order to begin this process however, it is 
necessary to look at animals and acknowledge their presence in the visual field--for it 
here that it is persistently thwarted.  
 
                                                 
7 Correlationism, as Quentin Meillassoux defines it, is “the idea according to which we only ever 
have access to the correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term considered 
apart from the other” (5).  
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VII. Everywhere Animals (Dis)Appear  
 “Everywhere animals disappear,” proclaims Lippit in the haunting opener of 
Electric Animal (1).  The line is rendered all the more powerful by the fact that it is a 
reiteration of John Berger’s very same decree published nearly three decades earlier. 
This echo is indicative of the extent of Berger’s influence on discussions of animal 
presence—or rather, lack thereof— in the visual culture of modernity. This relentless 
preoccupation with animal disappearance is a symptom of a series of much larger 
problems: the overall devaluation of animal images, the denial that the aesthetics of 
animal images have anything to do with the conditions of their creation, and finally the 
diminishment of real animals outside of their material or symbolic use value for 
humans.  
It is also, as Burt suggests, demonstrative of the ways in which other scholars in 
the field have uncritically taken up Berger’s work. This recurring preoccupation with 
absent animals has prompted Burt to observe that the history of the appearance of 
animals in culture is equally a history of their disappearance (2001: 203). For him, there 
are two ways of understanding this vanishing: the first is the actual extinction of species 
due to habitat destruction and overhunting. The other is a discursive or rhetorical 
effacement whereby real animals and their cultural traces are eclipsed by signs and 
metaphors, reduced to unresponsive sites for the inscription of human characteristics or 
meanings (Burt 2001: 204).  
To be fair, animals are in fact disappearing. Millions of livestock animals die 
every day, animals deemed as pests are exterminated, while others are wiped out by 
legal and illegal hunting practices, and disruptive industrial processes such as 
deforestation, pollution, and climate change. Currently, biodiversity is under threat, and 
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a number of species are critically endangered, while swathes of others have become 
extinct.  This precarity suggests that animals and technology are caught up in a 
combative pas-de-deux, where technology inevitably leads the dance. “It is a cliché of 
modernity,” Lippit remarks, that “human advancement always coincides with a 
recession of nature and its figures” (1). The late 19th and early 20th centuries, with their 
accelerated processes of industrialization, urbanization, and transportation, are largely 
understood as leading a large-scale destruction and marginalization of animals, and 
nature more generally. And as real animals began to disappear, both Berger and Lippit 
argue, they reappeared as the subjects of representational media.  
There is, then, the reasoning goes, a negative correlation between the appearance 
of animals in visual representations and the actual disappearance of real animals under 
capitalism. Berger remarks, “zoos, realistic animal toys and the widespread commercial 
diffusion of animal imagery, all began as animals started to be withdrawn from daily 
life” (24). Thus, animal appearances in modernity came to “constitute the living 
monument to their own disappearance” (Berger 24). Lippit restates this point. 
Remarking on the popularity of animals as subjects of technological content in the 20th 
century, he surmises that technologies served as “virtual shelters for displaced animals,” 
and came to be mausoleums for animal being (187). Real animals disappear only to 
reappear in images; in this process of transfer however, the animals have lost their 
ontological plenitude.  
For both Berger and Lippit, images can only ever mean death, emptiness, and 
loss. It is a decidedly Baudrillardian maneuver: images of animals are not just poor 
substitutes, but “murderous”: their very existence effectively diminishes and replaces 
real animals. Even those animals that remain, whether as pets in human homes, captive 
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animals in zoos, or feral urban creatures like pigeons, raccoons, and squirrels, are 
nothing but empty simulacra. While they may look like real animals, they are not. As 
Berger insists, “nowhere in a zoo can a stranger encounter the look of an animal. At the 
most, the animal’s gaze flickers and passes on. They look sideways. They look blindly 
beyond. They scan mechanically” (26). The animal has been so marginalized by 
modernity that it no longer imposes any kind of presence. More importantly it cannot 
return our gaze, reaffirm our existence, and as such has become null and void. 
The point of contention here is not that animals are disappearing—indeed they 
are—it is the denial of the animals that are, despite everything, appearing. Animals may 
indeed be marginalized by modernity, but the scholars writing about these animals are 
only marginalizing them further by disavowing their continued appearances. To insist 
that animals are disappearing, or to deny that the animals that appear are not really 
there, is to misunderstand animal imagery, the processes in which it is made, and its 
relationship to animal ontology. It is to abandon the aesthetic reality of the image in 
favour of the psychological desire for the human meaning beyond the image. What 
Berger and Lippit deliver is a decidedly anti-visual and anthropocentric position. The 
aesthetic is the mode of first encounter by which animals become available to the senses, 
where animal being is presented to us. It is imperative to understand where this 
iconophobia comes from, and make allowances for a more meaningful aesthetic 
appreciation of animal imagery. 
 
 
 
 67 
VIII. Iconophobia, or Melancholy and the Infinite Sadness of the Animal 
Image  
The sense of foreboding that accompanies discussions of animals in modernity, 
Burt observes, is “marked by the arrival of the image itself” (2002: 27). Loss, pessimism, 
and austerity may mar the animal image, but it is by virtue of its very status as an image.  
The assumption that the enhanced visibility of animals is a portentous sign of their 
disappearance, Burt reads as Berger’s legacy (2005: 213). But this anti-visual position 
runs even deeper than Berger. It is partly inherited from the larger “iconophobia” that 
Martin Jay (1993) identified in 20th century continental theory. This anti-visual current 
manifests as a general distrust of images because of their alliance with uneven relations 
of power, discourse, and ideology.  
Such skepticism of appearances, for example, runs throughout the work of Michel 
Foucault who insisted that, “visibility is a trap” (1995: 200). For Foucault, looking 
always presumes a skewed power dynamic, wherein only the one looking is the one in 
control. To be looked at is to be disciplined, to be wholly captured by an administrative 
gaze. Laura Mulvey identified this dynamic in cinema especially. In “Narrative and 
Visual Pleasure” she describes how cinematic apparatus inherently functions like the 
unconscious of patriarchal society. Women are therefore powerless and passive 
materials worked on by the penetrative power of the male gaze. While this anti-visual 
attitude has fallen out of favour in recent years, it clearly remains popular in discussions 
of animals in visual culture. Unequal relations of power have stratified the visualization 
of animals where humans are believed to be in full control of the processes of looking 
and image making. Meanwhile, animals are reduced to docile objects, pacified by 
rhetorical strategies of power located beyond the image. The image itself, its aesthetic 
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qualities, and the animals’ own participation in their creation, are neglected and often 
altogether disavowed.  
However, this anti-visual position with regards to animal imagery might more 
accurately be understood as a discomfort with the technological mediation of nature 
more generally. Animal images, owing to their means of production, inevitably signal an 
encounter between animals and media and as such manifest an uncomfortable mingling 
of two perceived distinct ontological zones: non-human nature and human culture. As 
Bruno Latour suggests, modernity itself is constituted by the relentless struggle to distill 
the world into these zones, and maintain their separation. The austere attitudes toward 
animal images can be read as a function of this modern process of purification. Animal 
images are understood as signs of wrongful—read:s too intimate—relations between 
nature and culture.    
Discussions of animals in visual culture do have a tendency to privilege 
unmediated encounters. As Randy Malamud argues, “media supplant a simple, direct, 
meaningful engagement with the natural world and its creatures” (2010: 6). But it is not 
just technological mediation that seems to be at issue, but techniques of display more 
generally. In his critique of modern zoos, for example, Ralph Acampora argues that 
animals are erased by their visibility, in a process he calls “extinction by exhibition” 
(1998). The very act of framing animals is thus perceived as having a diminishing effect.  
In some cases, the human gaze itself is understood as a particular kind of 
technique, and is thus denigrated. Malamud insists that the human gaze is profoundly 
and irreparably exploitive, so much so that the only way to protect animals from it is for 
us to look away (2012: 114). For Malamud and Acampora, animal images are evidence of 
animals having been torn from nature and re-inserted into the more artificial context of 
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culture. This tearing is unequivocally violent, because in the service of separating nature 
and culture they have to be understood as oppositional. Nature is perceived as 
disinterested in relation to human culture, and therefore any engagement with it is 
presumably performed without its consent. Not only are discussions of animals anti-
visual, they are also prominently anti-realist, set on keeping nature and culture safely 
apart.  
Cinematic realism emerges as a salve for this anti-visual idealism: it can draw 
attention to hybridity, heterogeneity, and moments of overlap between nature and 
culture, animals and media. Rather than looking away from unseemly juxtapositions, it 
is necessary to attend to interactions between nature and culture as incidents of lateral 
creation rather than top-down destruction. In order to think what we would not 
otherwise think, we must see what we would not otherwise see. The continued 
abstraction of animals by identifying them as an innocent standing reserve for human 
visual expression over-emphasizes their passivity and amenability to human 
instrumentality and rationalization.  
Animals are not fully determined by the position they are placed in by humans. 
The example of the macaque monkey who opened this chapter certainly testifies to this.  
As Burt suggests, animals do participate in their own representation (2002: 30). This 
participation is not something projected onto the imagery, but can be apprehended at 
the level of the imagery itself. As an example, Burt offers up a scene of Lassie climbing 
out of a river. Lassie has not been merely coerced into acting a certain way; rather  
Lassie is in fact doing all sorts of things: responding to his training; utilizing his 
understanding of the context in which he is placed… filmmaking of this kind 
using animals is only possible because the mutual gaze between human and 
animal is at some level comprehensible for both parties. (Burt 2002: 32)   
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No matter the distribution of power, an animal is not fully absorbed by human will, but 
bears some kind of autonomy that cannot be fully subsumed. What needs to be 
recovered in animal imagery is the animal’s contribution to the production of the image.  
What is required is to get away from the purely textual, representational, and 
metaphorical animal. If an image’s meaning is only ever outside the image, images are 
denied specificity, connectivity, and reflexivity, and can take on any number of 
meanings. As a result, Burt warns, the animal in animal imagery runs the risk of 
perpetually becoming “an overly free-floating signifier” (2002: 27). Topsy, the elephant 
featured in Electrocuting an Elephant, has, for example signified for Edison, the 
destructiveness of alternating current, and the novelty and success of his own 
cinematographic technology. Meanwhile for Lippit the elephant symbolizes the 
incorporated animality that continues to haunt cinema (187). For Shukin, Topsy 
represents the animal affect that energizes and naturalizes industrial capitalism. Topsy 
has also come to mean elsewhere a combined affirmation of human cruelty, the 
vulnerability of nature, the shock of modernity, the state of post-colonial racial politics, 
the affective immediacy of technological communication, and the concession of animal 
life to technological systematization (see Doane 2002: 152; Shukin 141, 154; Lippit 197). 
In these cases, the specificity of Topsy is entirely eclipsed by the animal’s psychological, 
discursive, or ideological functions.  
Conceptualizing the animal in animal images as a passive, pitiful victim, as “an 
object without resistance,” constitutes a disengagement from the animal itself, Burt 
writes (2002: 29). Furthermore, “its reduction to pure sign, reinforces at a conceptual 
level the effacement of the animal that is perceived to have taken place in reality even 
whilst criticizing that process” (Burt 2002: 29, emphasis in original). So while many 
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scholars writing about visual animals are staunch critics of the ways in which animals 
are exploited and undermined by humans, they end up reinforcing this effacement by 
disavowing the actual presence and agency of animals in animal imagery.  
This contradiction makes for a circular logic. It enforces a kind of Foucauldian 
“repressive hypothesis”: when the animal is subjected to visualization technologies, the 
animal is diminished. The resulting image is therefore lacking in ontological plenitude 
but that in turn enables it to become an inexhaustible wellspring for a myriad of 
discourses about animal victimization and human aggression. Moreover, in an added 
twist, visualization is not just the symptom and the cause of animal oppression; it is also 
its solution. Burt is quick to point out, for example, that despite Berger’s disavowal of 
images, his essay makes ample use of them. He has elsewhere noted, as have Richard 
Grove and Hilda Kean, that wildlife conservation and animal welfare movements have 
long been indebted to the mobilization of animal images in print, photography, and film 
(Burt 2001; 2002; 2005; Grove 1995; Kean 1998). What this suggests is that no matter 
how much animals in the visual field are denigrated, they are not something we can 
really ignore. Animals must be confronted and addressed, but this is not without its 
problems. Too often we look at animals in the hopes that we will see them look back at 
us.  
 
IX. Human-Animal Gaze: From the Cradle to the Grave of Human 
Thinking 
The look between an animal and a human excites a complex geometry of 
sightlines. If one were to map it out, it might look like the pattern of a cat’s cradle. In 
this game of looking, gazes are like threads, reaching outwards, circling back, and 
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yoking the players together with the pull of their mutual entanglements. “That look 
between animal and man,” Berger writes, “played a crucial role in the development of 
human society” (26). Berger bemoans that industrial capitalism and technological 
modernity have “extinguished” that formative look. They have marginalized animals to 
such an extent that “nothing can any more occupy a central place in their attention” 
(Berger 26, emphasis in original). He means of course that humans can no longer 
occupy a central place in their attention.  
Berger supposes that we look at animals because “the animal has secrets which, 
unlike the secrets of caves, mountains, seas are specifically addressed to man” (3). Man 
became aware of such secrets, he alleges, “as soon as he intercepted an animal’s look” 
(4). Though he writes from a place of concern for animals and their exploitation under 
capitalism, this concern is revealed to be a self-interested one. As Burt critiques, Berger 
is not mourning the loss of animals so much as he is the loss of his own inability to 
receive external affirmation of his being in the world (2005: 208). It is not the fate of 
animals in and of themselves that Berger cares about; rather it is what their fate will 
come to mean for him, and human beings more generally. If animals mark the point at 
which we differentiate and validate ourselves as human, then without animals, we must 
struggle to find a new mirror onto which to cast our reflection. Animals serve all kinds of 
purposes for humans, but the most powerful is their psychological and existential 
purpose.  
After all it is not the actual death and maltreatment of animals that Berger 
grieves, but their conceptual death, them not being there in the ways we want them to 
be. Thanks to their visualization in photography, film, television, advertising, zoos, and 
even as pets in human homes, Berger insists that it is no longer possible for humans to 
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experience direct, unmediated encounters with animals. However, what Berger fails to 
realize is that human vision is itself a technic of visualization. It always mediates the 
human-animal encounter—and as Berger inadvertently shows—to anthropocentric 
effect. Human optics is rigged and not even the most careful deconstructionist can resist 
its pull.      
Jacques Derrida, following from Berger, also takes the human-animal gaze as 
constitutive of human being. He argues in The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to 
Follow), that these tautly entwined lines of sight form a sturdy, protective cradle that 
not only supports thought, but also acts as its very origin. For him, the mutual gaze 
between an animal and a human is the very primal scene of thinking (Berger and 
Segarra 7). Derrida’s realization, unlike Berger’s however, is inspired by an actual 
physical encounter with a live animal: his feline companion, Logos.  
As Derrida asserts, “the cat I am talking about is a real cat, truly, believe me, a 
little cat. It isn’t the figure of a cat. It doesn’t silently enter the bedroom as an allegory 
for all the cats on the earth, the felines that traverse our myths and religions, literature 
and fables” (6, emphasis in original). One morning while standing naked in his 
bathroom, Derrida inadvertently meets the cat’s gaze. Not only does he see the cat, he 
also sees the cat seeing him. In turn, he imagines himself as seen by her. “The animal 
looks at us,” Derrida writes, “and we are naked before it” (29). When we look at an 
animal, he suggests, we not only awaken to the existence of another, animal mode of 
being: we also awaken to ourselves. The animal sees us naked, sees our very essence, our 
vulnerability and mortality, regardless of our pretensions otherwise. In this moment of 
encounter and mutual recognition, both the animal and the human are called into being, 
to and for one another.  
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 While Berger longs wistfully for this look of affirmation, for Derrida the 
experience is much more unsettling. Being seen naked by his cat he confesses, “I hasten 
to cover the obscenity of the event, in short, to cover myself. One thought alone keeps 
me spellbound: dress myself, even a little, or, which amounts to the same thing, run 
away” (10). He equates the shame of his own nudity with Adam’s mythic shame, the 
moment of self-consciousness when he realized he was finite and imperfect. The cat sees 
Derrida as he is; it is indifferent to his knowledge, his self-consciousness, and his 
perceived superiority.  This shakes the very foundations of difference upon which 
Derrida’s (and human) subjectivity is built.  
His encounter in the visual field presents an exciting opportunity to follow a real 
animal, elsewhere.  It demonstrates the value inherent in looking at real animals, and 
allows for the possibility of their ontological plenitude despite their perceived lack of 
language. For Derrida there is a possibility of thinking the absence of language as 
“something other than a privation” (Derrida 48). Animals suggest other modalities of 
being in the world and that thinking may not be solely the province of an articulable 
human subject. In their introduction to Demenageries: Thinking (of) Animals After 
Derrida, Anne-Emmanuelle Berger and Marta Segarra emphasize that it is the cat that 
is granted the initiative of the look, and the process of thinking. They note that Derrida 
 
uses an impersonal phrase: thinking begins there. Which could mean two 
things at once: 1) that the cat herself may begin to think there as well as 
the human, 2) that ‘thinking,’ contrary to what Descartes and most of the 
philosophers think, does not necessarily or uniquely involve a thinking “I.” 
(7)   
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Derrida also recognizes that though the cat’s interiority is not accessible to him, the very 
event of her gaze guarantees its existence. The gaze is the consequence of a play of 
motivating forces that acts outside language, and exists with or without the human.   
Derrida starts out toward new terrain outside the limits of human knowing when 
he follows the animal. However, he ends up circling back toward himself. As Burt 
remarks, Derrida’s journey may begin with the enigma of the animal but it ends with 
human subjectivity (2001: 205).  Though his encounter has a deflationary effect on the 
human, the episode is still mobilized within a larger discussion at which human being 
occupies the centre. Haraway reproaches Derrida for not considering how to return the 
look because, “somehow in all this worrying and longing, the cat was never heard from 
again.” (2008: 20). He stopped short of  
 
the risky project of asking what this cat on this morning cared about, what these 
bodily postures and visual entanglements might mean and might invite, as well as 
reading what people who study cats have to say and delving into the developing 
knowledges of both cat-cat and cat-human behavioural semiotics when species 
meet. (Haraway 2008: 22) 
  
Though he attempts to acknowledge the real, living, breathing, fully dimensional cat 
before him, as Shukin reiterates, the animal “is transubstantiated…into one figure in a 
line of suspenseful figures emptied of historical substance and summoned to 
deconstruct ontotheological ‘signs of presence’” (37).  The cat in particular is 
transformed into an animal mode of being, in general. By situating her as a provisional 
placeholder for significant otherness, the complexity and distinctiveness of her presence 
is reduced and lost to Derrida’s analysis.  
While this cat’s cradle of gazes may generate and support the mobility and 
velocity of thinking, it also acts as a trap. It ensures that all lines of inquiry are circular, 
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tethered to and reinforced by a human-animal binary, one that invariably returns to the 
human. This return is, as Agamben notes, endemic to human being itself. When Carolus 
Linnaeus coined “Homo Sapiens,” Agamben remarks in The Open: Man and Animal, he 
offered it as a tacit category meant to anchor the human as the fundamental point of 
reference for species difference. This is evidenced by the fact that he did not provide any 
identifying characteristics of species for humans, as he did with all the others. What he 
did include is the now famous adage, “know thyself” (2004: 25). Agamben takes this as 
an indication that Homo sapiens does not designate so much as it creates: it is a 
machine “for producing the recognition of the human” (2004: 26). Man, he concludes, 
“has no specific identity other than the ability to recognize himself” (Agamben 2004: 
26, emphasis in the original).  
This mechanism of self-recognition he calls “the anthropological machine.” He 
notes elsewhere that the term “species” is derived from the Latin specere meaning “to 
look, to see.” Therefore, the concept was “first defined as that which makes visible and 
only later became the principle of classification and equivalence” (Agamben 2007: 58). 
The very origin of species as a concept marked at the same time the moment when 
aesthetics became implicated in ontology. The constantly shifting mobile boundary 
between the human and the animal demonstrates not only the fluidity of aesthetics, but 
also its significance, and its stakes.  
The anthropological machine is, then, an optical machine, made up of mirrors to 
ensure that a human being “sees his own image always already deformed in the features 
of an ape” (Agamben 2004: 26-7). In order to belong to the human, to belong to the 
category of Homo sapiens, one must first recognize herself in a nonhuman (Agamben 
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2004: 27). Therefore, human vision is fixed to favour self-recognition and self-
distinction. Berger succumbed to it, and not even Derrida could elide it.  
While Agamben sees this self-involvement as inherently human, all beings bear 
this tendency for self-centeredness, as Uexküll suggests. Because of the intimate 
relationship between subjects and their environments, human beings are inclined to see 
the world anthropocentrically. It is the native logic of all living things. Yet, it is not the 
only possible logic of looking. Temple Grandin, for example, claims that her autism 
grants her a pheonomenological ability to experience the world as animals do, because 
like many animals, she processes sensory information in pictures and not with 
language.8 This relationship to animal phenomenology makes her especially suited to 
design animal enclosures and slaughterhouses in more humane ways, i.e., ways that 
ensure spaces are less distressing and more inviting to animals. She relates an instance 
early in her book Thinking in Pictures where using a camera and sequential 
photography is also part of her process: 
 
I used a camera to help give me the animals’ perspective as they walked through 
the chute for their veterinary treatment. I would kneel down and take pictures 
through the chute from the cow’s eye level. Using the photos, I was able to figure 
out which things scared the cattle, such as shadows and bright spots of sunlight. 
(4)  
 
The presence of the camera here is suggestive of the possibility of the camera’s non-
human visual technics to provide new horizons of understanding, and what they can 
suggest at the limits of the human umwelt.  
                                                 
8 John Mullarkey argues, film itself is “animal thinking…the force of cinema simply is the power of the 
animal that we (always) are when we think in images, or when images think immanently within us” (12). 
That cinema addresses us as the animals that we always already are. Mullarkey insists, then, that to think 
in moving images is to think as animal, not in a linguistic register but first, from the place of aesthetics.  
 
 78 
X. Cinema as a Non-Anthropological Machine 
All of the arts are based on the presence of man, only photography derives 
an advantage from his absence.  
—André Bazin, from “The Ontology of the Photographic 
Image” in What is Cinema? Vol. 1 (13). 
 
Human vision brings the human umwelt into view; and the world in our sights is 
beholden to the human perceptual system. Photographic media by contrast can bring 
other umwelten to our attention, through and with the umwelt of the camera, which 
offers glimmers of other worlds that are not made manifest by the human body. This 
non-human remove of the camera was what made cinema so important to Uexküll’s 
notion of umwelt. The possibility of a non-anthropocentric orientation was essential to 
his ethological renderings of animal worlds. Uexküll describes his A Foray Into the 
Worlds of Animals and Humans as a travelogue; cinema contributed to his ability to 
move through strange worlds. 
Even Uexküll’s description of the umwelt specifically conjures the cinematic 
experience: the reader is asked to imagine a flowering meadow full of insects and 
butterflies and then make 
a bubble around each of the animals living in the meadow. The bubble 
represents each animal’s environment and contains all the features 
accessible to the subject. As soon as we enter into one such bubble, the 
previous surroundings of the subject are completely reconfigured. Many 
qualities of the colorful meadow vanish completely, others lose their 
coherence with one another, and new connections are created. A new 
world arises in each bubble. (43) 
  
As Pollman remarks, what Uexküll is relating is a uniquely cinematic scene, one akin to 
the spectator’s experience in the movie theatre. This is hardly a coincidence: cinema 
provided the material and imaginative possibilities for his very concept of umwelt. After 
training with Étienne Jules-Marey for several months Uexküll, she explains, went on to 
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use still and moving chronophotography to bridge the “theoretical impasse between 
external determination and internal subjective autonomy” (Pollman 2013: 780). 
Photography was auspicious because of its unique, automatic mechanism. It not only 
“restricted its information to the surface, the externally visible, with hardly any 
interpretive work…it also supposedly depicted its object independent of human 
perception” (Pollman 2013: 788). The camera’s automatism, brought an autonomous 
world into view.  
Owing to this automatism, the camera was able to intervene in the human 
umwelt and offer diffracted glimpses of other worlds, nested within our own. This 
created new opportunities to perceive, communicate, and establish relationships with 
worlds we would not have known existed otherwise.  While cinema was very influential 
to the development of Uexküll’s ideas, Pollman argues, his ideas in turn offered a 
dynamic theory of worlds and world-making that was equally influential to film studies.  
For the umwelt, she writes, 
goes beyond the conditioning aspects of the relationship between 
organism and environment and encompasses the effects on perception of 
specific bodily comportments, the translation of stimuli into signs, and the 
capacity to inhabit new umwelten. (2013: 783) 
 
The concept helped to articulate more effectively cinema’s status as a significant 
component of the modern environment. The dynamic relationship between organism 
and umwelt provided a productive analogy for the similarly dynamic relationship 
between spectator and screen. Because umwelt assumes that the organism actively 
engages with, makes meaning from, and transforms its environment, it was possible to 
assume that the spectator could confront cinematic worlds onscreen and interact with 
them in similarly meaningful ways.  
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Umwelt created an opportunity to imagine cinema’s grander potential as a 
medium for sensory recalibration, engagement, and transformation. Though Uexküll is 
never explicitly cited by scholars writing about cinema, his impact is still legible there. 
Pollman identifies and traces Uexküll’s influence in the writings of Walter Benjamin, 
particularly in his notion of the camera’s “unconscious optics.” As Benjamin writes in 
his mechanical reproduction essay, “a different nature opens itself to the camera than 
opens to the naked eye—if only because an unconsciously penetrated space is 
substituted for a space consciously explore by man” (236-7). Benjamin’s idea that the 
world of the camera emerges in juxtaposition with our own familiar world is evocatively 
uexküllian.  
There is also a resonance between his work and that of Siegfried Kracauer, 
Stanley Cavell, and most importantly for this discussion, André Bazin. While not directly 
influenced by Uexküll, these writers all value cinema as a world-viewing and world-
disclosing medium, a value that is conditional upon the camera’s automatism. For 
Kracauer this mechanism is what facilitated cinema’s redemption of physical reality, 
Meanwhile, for Cavell, by offering “successions of automatic world projections,” cinema 
is able to show the world itself, unburdening us from the burden and limitations of 
having to imagine it ourselves (101-5). For Bazin in particular cinema’s unique ability to 
bring worlds in communication with one another stems from its nature as this non-
human technic. The cinema can inquire into the limits of human sensory space, enable 
the expansion of vision and experience, and also affirm the ontological value of the 
worlds it brings into being because of its distinctive mechanical remove.  
The material architecture of the cinematic apparatus, though often sympathetic 
to the capacities of the human sensorium, is non-human. Its operations exceed human 
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capacities. The human might engage the camera, but it is the negotiations that transpire 
between the camera and the world that ultimately produce cinematic images. As much 
as it is mobilized for human ends, the camera’s slippage from human control is so 
fundamental to filmmaking, that it makes cinema at its base a non-anthropomorphic 
medium. This in turn, grants it the possibility to glean a non-anthropocentric 
perspective. This is ultimately what makes cinema a realist medium, as Bazin famously 
insists. For Bazin, realism is not so much a style as it is an outcome made possible by the 
filmmaker’s respect for camera’s internal, centrifugal dynamic, its “movement toward 
the real” (Bazin 1973: 85). His writings on cinema indicate that it is the medium’s 
unique non-anthropomorphic framing that makes the trajectory toward the real 
possible.  
Its disinterestedness in the human is what allows cinema to bring unexpected 
phenomena and “the reciprocal interplay of seemingly incompatible elements” to our 
attention (Bazin 2005a: 130). As he describes in his discussion of Robert Bresson’s Les 
Dames du Bois de Boulogne, “The rain, the murmur of a waterfall, the sound of earth 
pouring from a broken pot, the hooves of a horse on the cobblestones,” are not there to 
serve as a contrast to the more artificial aspects of the film. Rather, they are there 
because they were invited in “as foreign bodies, like a grain of sand that gets into and 
seizes up a piece of machinery” (2005a: 131). He describes these non-human elements 
as neutrals. They do not so much exist as offer a counterpoint to the human, as they 
provide elements that grant a solidity to the cinematic world, like “lines drawn across an 
image to affirm its transparency” (2005a: 131).  
Bazin was especially interested in these interlopers, foreign objects, forces, and 
bodies: especially when they were non-human animals. Animals in particular testified to 
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cinema’s openness to contingencies, otherness, and to the world. Animals were, for 
Bazin, significant guarantors of the real, making manifest the ontological realism of the 
cinematic image. His description of the inclusion of these non-human foreign bodies as 
grains of sand that seize up “a piece of machinery” though inadvertent, provides a 
provocative suggestion that they also function as saboteurs of Agamben’s 
anthropological machine. 
 
XI. The Ontological Richness of the Cinematic Animal  
That the most nuanced, provocative writing on animal imagery is located in the 
annals of cinema studies is no coincidence. Cinema has been dealing with the 
ontological status of representations, animals or otherwise, and their relationships to 
the real since medium’s inception. It has been dealing with differences in perspective, 
and distinctions not just between photographic reproductions and other kinds of 
imagery, but also between still and moving photographic representations. Roland 
Barthes (1977) identified the power of the cinematic image in what he called its “third 
meaning.”   
The first order of meaning is informational, the second order is symbolic and 
obvious, but the third meaning Barthes describes as “obtuse.” It is “discontinuous, 
indifferent to the story and to the obvious meaning” (61).  This third meaning, which 
cannot be articulated, is auratic and belongs only to cinema (66). It is a meaning that 
exceeds our ability to contain it, and thus compels us into persistent attention: it opens 
the “field of meaning totally, that is infinitely” (Barthes 55). Barthes argues this extra 
meaning is what makes a film still less a sample of film and more of quotation: a 
distilled and amplified selection that gestures toward and also carries with it an 
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inexhaustible meaning in itself (67). If the cinematic image already bears an excess of 
meaning, the cinematic animal image is all the more excessive.  
Cinema is particularly equipped to entertain animals; they have been implicated 
in cinema since its very beginning. Cinema was born, as Paul Sheehan reminds, “with 
the movement of animals—a horse jumping, a seagull in flight, some fish swimming in a 
tank, a cat licking its paws and drinking from a bowl” (119). Cinema’s own success and 
novelty as a medium was significantly entwined with the contingencies and 
indeterminacies of animals and animal life. The animal in cinema made the more-than-
human aspects of reality visible, movement especially. 
As Barthes suggests, cinema’s movement is not always so specific or literal, but a 
means of representing, or attempting to represent, imperceptible changes: movement is 
a “framework of a permutational unfolding” in and out of the frame (67). As Marey’s and 
Muybridge’s experiments indicate, as well as the long tradition of capturing animal 
death onscreen, cinema is just as much interested in arresting movement as it is 
facilitating it. In capturing movement, blocking it, or synthesizing it, cinema enables an 
intervention in this “permutational unfolding.” Animal images work with cinema’s 
ability to make such contingencies visible, further amplifying and confounding the 
meaning of the image.  
The animal, then, brings to the fore cinema’s elemental affinity for contingency. 
Filmmaking, Sheehan observes, is “founded on the expulsion of chance, accident and 
error from the image” (121). But at the same time, it wants to assure its spectators “of an 
immense and unexpected field of action” (Benjamin 1968: 236). Though it revels in 
controlling movement, cinema is still lured by the “aleatory, stochastic, contingent” 
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(Doane 2002: 140-1). The animal, Sheehan contends, has been and still is one of the 
central vehicles for bringing this into appearance (121).  
Animals put cinema on display, and its elements of contingency, dynamism, and 
movement. Cinema, in turn, put animals on display, but not just in live action but 
animation. Though animated animals can be read as metaphorical displacements of real 
animals, to draw animals nevertheless involves drawing attention to them. It takes time 
and a keen attentiveness to assess how to depict an animal figure in relation to its 
ground. As Sean Cubitt contends, there are two moves when we draw animals: when we 
draw ourselves into the animal, and when we draw the animal into ourselves (35).9 
Animation may involve mastering or mimicking animal movement, but it emerges from 
an impulse to understand the way an animal comports itself in relation to its world. 
Contemplating how an elephant might sneeze while it is bathing in a pool of water in 
Walt Disney’s Dumbo (1947) for example may seem insignificant, but it is still a means 
of imagining the elephant body as dynamically implicated in a world.  
While a drawn animal may bear a certain onscreen potency, a live action animal 
exceeds it many times over. Animals onscreen, as Burt has suggested, offer a “rupture in 
the field of representation” (2002: 11). Whether they appear in fiction or non-fiction 
films, animals, because they do not “act” in the conventional sense, enjoy an alluring 
ambiguity of authenticity (Burt 2008: 10). All cinematic images do to a certain degree 
enact this tension between real and representation, figural and actual. But the live 
                                                 
9 Most animal animations are currently computer generated, and thus humans are no longer the sole 
artists of animals. The practice of digital compositing has presented all kinds of questions for cinema. One 
question that has yet to be explored is what it means that datasets and algorithms must now grapple with 
the animal and how it moves.  
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action animal image does even more so, as is evidenced by the ethical questions about 
animal welfare that are raised by the very presence of the animal onscreen.  
The “No animals were harmed” disclaimer at the end of American films featuring 
animals certainly substantiates this ethical concern. As Bailly confesses, images of 
animals often lead to intense feelings that in turn, “give rise to a sort of embarrassment, 
rather as though one has inadvertently crossed a line and gotten mixed up in something 
untoward, or even obscene” (Bailly 4). Such intense feelings can explain, for example, 
how in the aftermath of Free Willy (Simon Wincer, 1993) audiences started out on a 
campaign to release Keiko, the orca whale who played Willy in the film.10 This excess of 
affect is why animals onscreen have had such a powerful effect on human-animal 
relations in modernity (Burt 2002: 196). As Burt argues, film’s visualization of animals 
played a pivotal role in how animals were treated and integrated (or not) into everyday 
life. 
Animals are immanent to cinematic representation—not only entangled with its 
development, but also in how it wields and gives form its affective power. Because of this 
unique relationship, when animals appear in cinema they infuse the filmic image with 
greater intensity. They enact a Manichean juxtaposition within the frame, soliciting an 
awareness of dynamic relations and possible transformations, but also in the tension 
between on screen and off screen space. They dramatize and make manifest cinema’s 
own essential juxtaposition of reality and representation. This is what Serge Daney 
means when he claims, summarizing Bazin, that cinema is ultimately a story about 
animals (32).  
                                                 
10 See www.keiko.com 
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For Daney, Bazin's fundamental law of cinematic realism is that "whenever it is possible 
to enclose two heterogeneous objects in the same frame, editing is prohibited" (32).  
Daney insists that Bazin’s designation of "heterogeneous objects" is a euphemism 
for a "violent incompatibility" (33). The best example of this is the scene from The 
Circus (Charlie Chaplin, 1928) where Charlie Chaplin and the lion are positioned 
together in the same frame provides a good example of this. Or, his fixation on the 
juxtaposition of toreador and bill in his reading of La course des taureaux (Bullfight, 
Pierre Braunberger, 1951). However, these examples might be more broadly understood 
as an iteration of Bazin’s fondness for juxtapositions more generally. Sometimes they 
became hostile, but it was not the violence he valued. Rather it was the radical co-
existence of different entities, and cinema’s ability to maintain that heterogeneity, and at 
some point depict the process whereby one being or force concedes to another.  
Bazin disliked montage, for example, not wholeheartedly, but only when it 
compromised the disclosure that an encounter promises to offer. Editing harvests the 
scene before it can be fully cultivated.  It cuts away the evidence of the essential 
negotiations between quintessentially different entities and their worlds, abandoning 
them on the editing room floor.  Cinema’s value—unlike theatre, which Bazin saw as a 
strictly human dramaturgy—dramatizes the world. Bazin’s alignment of cinematic 
ontology with non-subjective worldly disclosure makes it possible to cast animals in 
leading roles, alongside or even without the human. Because “man in the world enjoys 
no a priori privilege over animals and things,” he writes, the human should enjoy no 
such privilege in the film world (2005: 06).   As such cinema provides the necessary 
dimensionality to the animal. It offers a point of view other than our own, a point of 
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view that could transform the image inside the frame at any moment, and even how we 
look at our own world outside the frame. 
 
XII. Touching That Other Night: Where Optic Meets Haptic 
 
In the opening passage of Bailly’s The Animal Side he recounts in a beautiful 
passage (translated by Catherine Porter) an indelible encounter with a deer. The deer 
appears on the periphery of his car as he is driving home one evening. The passage 
makes a particular case for the potency of this meeting point of two worlds, where 
umwelten bear against one another: 
 
The deer was in its night and I in mine, each of us alone. Still, in the interval of 
the chase, I am quite sure of what I touched: it was that other night, the deer’s 
night coming to me, not given over but granted for an instant, that instant 
opening onto another world. A vision, nothing but a vision—the ‘pure origin’ of 
an animal from the underbrush—but clearer than any thought…. this is the truth, 
speaking of animals, from which I wanted to begin. (Bailly 2-3) 
 
It is a provocative way to open his work. Bailly’s account is textual, of course, but it is 
also in the vein of Derrida’s game of looking with his cat, and Uexküll’s screenic soap 
bubbles, anchored to a mobilized gaze that is expressly cinematic. As Anat Pick writes in 
her review of Bailly’s work, “the mysterious night drive, the unknown man at the wheel, 
the frightened deer, the camera’s sneaky advance up the road, the noirish cues are all 
here” (2013: 178). In this instance, the car becomes the proxy for the camera. The scene 
involves a disclosure of another world to the senses, through a partial, visual frame. 
Bailly’s gaze lingers on the deer and its surround, seeing it in deep focus as it emerges, 
beyond human control, from the underbrush toward the car lights. That the encounter is 
framed in cinematic terms suggests once again that the modality of cinema is best suited 
for relaying the field of action of an encounter, particularly actions that materialize from 
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a non-human and non-rational causality, before consciousness and interpretation.  
Significantly, Bailly surmises from his experience of seeing the deer from the 
vantage point of the moving car, that there is a power at the point of contact with 
animals, even if it is mediated (5). For all encounters with animals are always mediated, 
if not by the windshield of a car, then the anthropological machine of human thinking 
and seeing.  Contact is not about crossing over into the other, but about acknowledging 
boundaries that cannot be surpassed. This contact, Bailly continues, is singular and 
consists of “scarcely formed, always nascent” touch (Bailly 5). Bailly’s emphasis on the 
visual and its transformation into touch, suggests the ways in which aesthetic 
contemplation can lead to ontological apprehension, from seeing to grasping.  
Animal encounters are sensory encounters. In the visual field particularly they 
are about both seeing and touching. Seeing an animal is often accompanied by either a 
desire to touch it, or a desire not to be touched by it. But this tactility is not necessarily 
literal. As Bailly remarks, 
 
it was as if with my eyes, in that instant, for the duration of that instant, I had 
touched some part of the animal world. Touched, yes, touched with my eyes, 
despite the impossibility. In no way had I entered that world; on the contrary, it 
was rather as if its strangeness had declared itself anew, as if I had actually been 
allowed for an instant to see something from which as a human being I shall be 
forever excluded. (2) 
 
The encounter marks the overlap between the various umwelten: Bailly’s, the car’s, the 
deer’s. They are lured together in this particular moment, without ever knowing how or 
why. This coming together makes manifest the textured limits of their respective worlds, 
an intersection that feels more powerful than sight, that solicits a sensation that 
fleetingly feels like touch.  
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Looking can indeed evoke a sense of touch, through what Laura Marks has 
termed “haptic visuality” (162). Though Marks is discussing the longing for a sense of 
home that sensually intensifies the diaspora film experience, her description of haptic 
looking resonates with the experience of looking at animals too. Haptic looking, Marks 
continues, “tends to move over the surface of its object rather than to plunge into 
illusionistic depth... It is more inclined to move than to focus, more inclined to graze 
than to gaze” (162). If the cinema screen provides the image with a skin, then to look is 
to graze that skin, to lightly touch the surface without breaking it. Haptic looking does 
not seek identification, “so much as it encourages a bodily relationship between the 
viewer and the image…it tends less to isolate and focus upon objects than simply be co-
present with them (164). In the end, haptic visuality affirms not only that an exchange of 
glances has taken place. It suggests that the onlookers have seen one another, 
acknowledged their solidity, their situated-ness in a world, and their potential for 
responses and resistances.  
Even Bazin invoked this haptic dimension of visuality when he attempted to 
reconcile the represented world with the real world. He insisted that the screen object 
and the model “share a common being, after the fashion of a fingerprint” (Bazin 2005a: 
15). This allusion to touch brings attention to the tangibility of the image, its 
susceptibility to, and its inextricability from a world. The reference to the fingerprint 
might initially seem to suggest that Bazin is claiming that an image is but a lesser trace 
of something more fully dimensional—in this case, a finger. But he goes on to say that 
ultimately “the photographic image is the object itself” (2005a: 14-15).  This creates the 
possibility where the finger and the fingerprint share the same ontological status: one 
does not point toward the existence of the other. Rather they both equally exist—just at 
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different registers.   
Berger and others have understood the animal image in the opposite way, as a 
poor substitute for the real thing. The visual field, Lippit insists, is full of these lifeless 
remainders, making modernity a “vast mausoleum of animal being” (187). Without any 
ontological weight to anchor them, these phantoms haunt the current literature.  In 
order to exorcize them from visual culture we have to acknowledge these ghosts, and 
stop believing in them. We must open up our spaces for contact with real animals. As I 
have tried to show, this involves acknowledging the plenitude of the aesthetic animal by 
tending to the relationships that bind the finger to fingerprint, the animal to its image. 
Cinema’s non-human gaze provides a powerful lens to look awry, and catch sight of the 
great outdoors of human thinking.   
Cinema creates a clearing for the animal event, an event which is primarily 
aesthetic, but not merely so. Bazin insisted that cinema at its best brings together 
heterogeneous elements, and in their aesthetic tension, something new is created. Such 
cinematic realism is reminiscent of what Rancière elsewhere calls the “heterogeneous 
sensible,” the revolutionary power of aesthetic interventions that incite tensions 
between the representable and the unrepresentable (2002: 142). These interventions 
jostle human perception and reorganize the field of sensibility. Cinema transforms 
aesthetic animals into haptic images, invests them with a “third meaning,” an excess of 
significance that means they become real. When animals are real, they can surprise us 
and offer opportunities to see the familiar, anew.  
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XIII. Primal Scenes and Funny Feelings: Toward an “Aesthetics of 
Livingness”  
The case studies that follow are unexpected occasions to bear witness to the 
surprising propinquity of animals and technology. The scenarios on which they are 
based—an octopus absconding a camera and making a movie, a non-human ape playing 
a video game on an iPad, and a carrier pigeon racing against the Internet to meet a 
computer—enact Bazininan juxtapositions. That is, they manifest the radical co-
existence and relationships between heterogeneous things: animals and technology, the 
organic and inorganic, nature and culture, and reality and representation. They are 
unsettling but transformative realist interventions.  
In this way, they are not unlike “primal scenes.” Sigmund Freud identified the 
primal scene as that crucial moment, real or imagined, when a child witnesses for the 
first time her parents in the throes of sexual activity. In psychoanalysis, this scene plays 
a key function in human becoming. This happening is traumatic for the human subject, 
not simply because it is confusing and misunderstood as violent, but because it 
generates an uncomfortable feeling of exclusion. The child has, up until this point, 
always thought she was at the centre of every relationship. Now, not only must she 
accept her new station, she must confront unexpected relationships among familiar 
things that, in her limited understanding, she cannot explain. She must acknowledge 
and come to terms with this previously hidden relationship that has suddenly become 
manifest. Her confusion, in turn, encourages her to recalibrate her worldview.  
These animal-media primal scenes operate in a similar fashion. By including only 
animals and technological media, they exclude the human and encourage us to endure, 
for a moment, what it feels like to be peripheral. They prompt us to realize that we are 
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not always at the focus of every relationship. This exclusion creates a space for the 
disclosure of something real: that is, previously concealed relationships, and the limits 
of our own knowledge and experience. In this space, it becomes possible to acknowledge 
the desire, the comportment, and the being of others.  
The case studies generate funny feelings in another significant way as well. They 
may function as unsettling primal scenes, but they are just as much scenes from 
situational or screwball comedies with their non-verbal jests of slapstick. This comical 
syntax is purposeful, and serves several functions here. First, many of these encounters 
actually are transpiring in the comic mode. The fact that each case study’s establishing 
scenario sounds like it might be the set up for a joke is no accident. Two out of three of 
them have actually provided the basis for April Fools’ Day pranks.  This humorous 
dimension is a meaningful sign that they are disclosing existing boundaries and playing 
with them.  
The Internet is rife with such amusingly absurd juxtapositions, trading in the 
visual pleasure of animals interacting with cultural artifacts. From cockatiels dancing to 
the sounds of the Backstreet Boys, dogs wrestling with vacuum cleaners or riding 
skateboards, cats attacking printers, running on treadmills, or making music on pianos, 
to rabbits coasting on roombas, bears jumping on trampolines, foxes fixing themselves a 
sandwich, frogs playing video games, goats taking the bus, and monkeys washing dishes, 
virtual spaces are currently teeming with a seemingly endless parade of creaturely 
curiosities.  
While it is tempting to characterize these animals online as “cute,” in their 
attempts to maneuver and negotiate with objects to which they do not fully understand, 
I read these interactions as actively “zany,” in Seanne Ngai’s sense of the term. While 
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cute, Ngai notes, is an aesthetic category that can generate tenderness and affection, it 
also tends to eroticize powerlessness, and fetishize consumption (1, 3). Not only that, 
identifying something as “cute” runs the risk of diminishing even the observer: thanks to 
the infectious charm of the cute, we often take on infantile language when we talk about 
cute phenomena (Ngai 3; 8).11 Charming but ultimately irrelevant, cuteness can be 
construed as degrading rather than enriching public life. This is certainly how “cute” 
animal content is framed in popular culture.12 Images, videos, and animated gifs of such 
animals are excluded from serious inquiry, often considered guilty pleasures, passive 
consumables, tools for procrastination and avoiding more economically valuable 
activities like work.  
Highlighting the slapstick choreography of animals, improvised at the sites of 
encounter, provides a way toward thinking animals as zany. Zany is, for Ngai, another 
minor aesthetic category: one of mimetic action that sensuously and affectively reflects 
the performance-driven conditions of late capitalism (Ngai 1; 8). Zany is a form of 
expression that belongs to the comic mode, and is best embodied by slapstick comedy. 
As Ngai points out, “the zany” comes from Zanni, a stock character from commedia dell 
arte (literally “the comedy of art”), the cultural precursor to slapstick. It encapsulates “a 
strenuous relation to playing that seems to be on a deeper level about work” (Ngai 7).   
                                                 
11 This certainly appears to be the case with Harman, as he describes “a sweet little donkey” with its “sweet 
little mouth and tongue” (142). However, it is even more pronounced in the development and popularity 
of “LOLspeak” or “kitty pidgin,” which refers to the slang that playfully mimics how cats might speak in 
English if they could. That is, similar to baby talk, with ample spelling mistakes and grammatical errors 
(Gawne and Vaugan 2011). 
12 New research by Jessica Gall Myrick at Indiana University Bloomington, however, suggests that 
watching online content such as cat videos can actually boost energy levels and increase positive feelings, 
indirectly stimulating human motivation to complete tasks (“Not-so-guilty Pleasure” 2015).  
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However, with regards to animals, the zany becomes less about work and the 
modern human experience, and more about the multi-species performative and affective 
experiences of technological modernity. Many scholars have, after all, noted slapstick’s 
special relationship with industrialization. It enjoyed renewed popularity during the 
machine age. Slapstick was a boon for silent film comedies, and technologies were a 
wellspring for slapstick: reflexive sites to explore the strange affects and operational 
logics of machines. Technology gave slapstick a whole new set of workable routines. It 
may be a comedy of planned and repetitive gags, but it is also a comedy about the comic, 
contingent, confounding experiences of modernity. Experiences that often involve 
peculiar juxtapositions. 
In fact, meandering through the current visual field, one can easily be amused in 
much the same way that Foucault admits he was while perusing Borges’ fictitious animal 
encyclopedia. For him, the laughter generated from strange taxonomies and surprising 
juxtapositions jostled “all the ordered surfaces and all the planes with which we are 
accustomed to tame the wild profusion of existing things,” as he writes in The Order of 
Things (xvii). This disturbance threatens the very architecture that supports what he 
calls, “the age-old distinction between the Same and the Other” (xvii). Laughter, by 
breaching boundaries, also illuminates them, disclosing the existence of much more 
serious, deeply entrenched systems of organization. In this case, what appears is a 
system of classification that makes opposites out of nature and culture.  These 
ontological and epistemological categories, Foucault ultimately argues, create the 
conditions that frame and put limits on how we sense, perceive, and understand the 
world.  
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Laughter, as Immanuel Kant describes it, is a phenomenon that arises from the 
moment when “the bubble of our expectation was extended to the full and suddenly 
went off into nothing” (161). Kant’s bubble analogy resonates effectively with Uexküll’s, 
suggesting that the site where umwelten meet, where two spheres of significance press 
against one another, can generate substantial friction. It also suggests that the contact 
zone between animals and media and their particular umwelten often announces itself 
through the visual pleasure of the comic. This friction can generate amusement; but it 
can also compromise the membrane of our expectations in productive ways. Though 
Uexküll insists the tension produced by two adjacent umwelten is not powerful enough 
to burst respective bubbles, when they jostle against each other they can disclose partial 
sights that can lead to significant insights.  
Second, this comic mode provides a way to restore what Jonathan Burt calls, “the 
aesthetics of livingness” to animal imagery (2006). These lively, comic aesthetics 
encourage us to think not just about what the animal is, but also about what it does. It is 
a way to acknowledge animals in animal imagery as part of a larger network of worldly 
relations, wherein they actively explore, resist, play with, negotiate, or surrender to 
stimuli in their environments. It is a tactic to account for the ontological plenitude of the 
animal in the visual field, give it the opportunity to communicate, to be open to 
encounter, to engage with, transform, and become with its environment, and most 
importantly, to make meaning. It is a way of filling out the animal so that it can affect, 
and participate in the production of knowledge.  
 Third, approaching animal imagery in the comic mode also presents an 
opportunity to counteract the decidedly tragic mode that, as I have outlined above, 
dominates discussions of animals in modernity. Animals are reduced to insubstantial 
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specters and vehicles for melancholy, best expressed in Lippit’s insistence on 
technologies as “virtual shelters for displaced animals” and visual culture as “a vast 
mausoleum for animal being” (187). Thinking about the visual field as brimming with 
lively and ludic animals provides a vital counterpoint to the stubborn hold of these more 
funereal figurations. More than a mausoleum for animal being, a digital menagerie, a 
bestiary, or a tableau vivant, the Internet is alive with real animals. This fact becomes 
clear when we tend to how animals find their way into digital spaces, rather than why 
humans are compelled to put them there.13   
 This idea of animals haunting the aesthetic landscape of modernity is poetic, 
poignant, and pervasive, but in the end, it only serves to ontologically diminish animals. 
It furthers their cultural annexation by denying their reciprocal entanglement in their 
environments, and their activities in and around the production of their imagery. It 
ignores the fact that representation is an active process. The insistence that animal 
imagery is completely separate from real animals is not only an issue of not 
                                                 
13 Take, for example, the peculiar and persistent phenomenon of cats on the Internet. By now, it is an 
undisputed truism that cats dominate web content. Regardless of its veracity, it is treated as a fait 
accompli. The recent exhibit at The Museum of the Moving Image in New York though titled “How Cats 
Took Over the Internet” is actual more interested in why humans like cats, and what they like to do with 
their images (2015). This interpretation ignores the larger material reality of the offline world, particularly 
that of the domestic realm, which is frequently collocated by both cats and the Internet.  
Missing from the cultural conversation is the possible correlation between cats literally sitting on 
laptops and cats appearing on websites. Because they dwell in human homes, cats are never far from the 
Internet; they tarry in the physical spaces where Internet activity takes place. They step on keyboards, rub 
their faces on screens, attack printers, and chew on Ethernet and power cables while their errant fur clogs 
up computer vents. That the computer, its peripherals, and supports, as well as the immediate space 
around them require “cat-proofing,” suggests that felines are at least partly—even if indirectly—
responsible for their own presence online (see for example cat-proof software, Pawsense 
http://www.bitboost.com/pawsense/ or “CATable” a desk designed by Lyc’s Architecture to be used as a 
human workstation and play/resting station for cats http://lycs-arc.com/archives/3759  
To a certain extent, humans are involved in putting these animals online, but animals whether 
directly or indirectly, leave these traces behind online, and we can, in turn, make meaning from them. 
Whether they appear in images or videos, or macros, memes, animated gifs, or are merely alluded to in 
personal anecdotes on blogs, or social media, or in strange, offbeat news items in the margins of popular 
media, these are animal artifacts, digital traces left by actual animals. This project identifies them, 
addresses their ontological validity, and uses them as starting points to track animal-media encounters 
through culture.  
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acknowledging the animal participation in image making. The insistence on associating 
animal appearances with death, as Burt argues throughout his work, also stems from a 
larger suspicion about aesthetics more generally and an insistence on language as a 
measure of difference. Lacking language, animals become meaningless in and of 
themselves: they are symbols of lack, empty containers for human meanings. This leads 
to a fundamental privileging of the ideal and the abstract over the real and the concrete. 
This is a deeply entrenched fault into which the non-human often vanishes.  
This non-aesthetic, textual-linguistic approach to the animal favours a 
generalized idea of the animal as a symbol of nature over the real, singular, living, 
breathing being that actually appears. As a result, this non-aesthetic approach reinforces 
human idealism, making it possible to believe that nature has to be sacrificed so we can 
become human and modern. Challenging this moroseness is not meant to deny the 
existence or significance of more destructive or oppositional encounters between 
animals and technology or be cavalier about animal suffering at the hands of humans 
and technology. However, the over-emphasis on animal victimization and sacrifice only 
diminishes animals further by reducing them to undifferentiated passive object matter 
for human mastery and treachery. The upcoming case studies attempt to look at 
animals, cinematically, in full acknowledgement of the relationship between their 
aesthetic appearance and their ontology. The hope is to follow these animals as they 
wander in the visual field, so that when they happen upon technology, we can have a 
better grasp of what exactly transpires as two textured worlds touch, and concede to 
their mutual presence. 
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Chapter 2 
  
An Octopus Steals a Camera and Makes a Movie:  
Revisiting Cinema’s Non-Anthropocentric Ontology  
 
 
nature at last does more than imitate art: she imitates the artist. 
–André Bazin, from “The Ontology of the 
Photographic Image,” in What is Cinema? Vol. 1 
(2005: 15). 
 
film springs forth from the world to which it ultimately returns.  
–Anat Pick, from “Three Worlds: Dwelling and 
Worldhood on Screen,” in Screening Nature: Cinema 
Beyond the Human (2013: 21).  
 
the accidental is absolutely just as necessary as the necessary. 
   –Søren Kierkegaard, from Either/Or (1:234). 
 
I. Octopus, Meet Camera 
In the spring of 2010, somewhere near the ocean floor off the coast of Wellington, 
New Zealand, a Giant Pacific octopus stole Victor Huang’s digital camera, and 
accidentally made a movie. Huang, an amateur free diver, had been on a leisurely 
afternoon dive when he spotted the octopus nestled in a nearby bed of seaweed. 
Enlivened by this rare sighting, he reached for the camera—just as the octopus reached 
for it too. After a brief struggle, the animal managed to wrestle the device out of Huang’s 
clutches, and quickly fled the scene.  
Huang followed in hot pursuit until he caught up with the intrepid cephalopod. 
Then, using his spear gun for leverage, he pried the camera free from the octopus’s 
suctioned grip. Unharmed, it lost interest and eventually retreated to the turbid water 
below. Fortuitously, the camera remained engaged throughout the entire ordeal. Of 
course, none of the details of the event are discernible in the resulting footage which is 
all strange angles, disorienting movements, and blurred images. Huang uploaded it 
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anyway and shared it on YouTube, but for the sake of narrative coherence, he inserted 
descriptive subtitles, added a dramatic musical score, and gave the final form the 
perfunctory title: “octopus steals my video camera and swims off with it (while it’s 
Recording)” (Victor’s Videos 15 Apr. 2010).14 These attempts to tame the wildness of the 
images and render them intelligible only serve to emphasize their unruly character. 
Admittedly, the circumstances that contributed to the video are farcical. On their 
own, they may add up to a little more than an amusing anecdote. Yet, despite its 
outward absurdity and seeming singularity, the constellation of events at the crux of 
“octopus steals my video camera” is by no means rare. In fact, YouTube is teeming with 
similar videos, borne of animals encountering cameras and pilfering them in mid-
record. Aside from octopuses, other known camera thieves-turned-filmmakers include 
gulls, macaque monkeys, dogs, manta rays, sharks, lions, crabs, eagles, striated 
caracaras, and squirrels.15  The videos that constitute this creaturely catalogue have their 
particulars, but they are all nonetheless made under comparable conditions and 
manifest distinctive similarities in form, style, and subject matter. Cumulatively, they 
make enough coherence to suggest a nascent genre, one I provisionally call “accidental 
animal videos”: that is, accidental films wherein animals are significantly implicated in 
their making.   
                                                 
14 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x5DyBkYKqnM 
15 See for example: “Seagull Stole Go Pro” (Lukas Karasek: 23 June 2011), “Monkey Steals GoPro Hero 3+” 
(Mochilao TV : 22 Jan. 2014), “dog steals camera” (djcfc11: 20 Dec. 2009), “Book 'em Danno: Klepto 
Manta  Mugs Cameraman” (Into the Drink: 9 Sept. 2010), “Great White Shark attacks GoPro underwater 
robotic camera” (bodhispeak: 7 Aug. 2014), “Lions Pinch Camera” (Roger de la Harpe: 23 May 2011), 
“Crab Steals Go Pro” (Diederick Ryan: 23 Oct. 2013), “eagle steals camera from crocodile trap” (The 
Telegraph: 2 Dec. 2013), “Amazing! Bird Steals Egg Camera and Films Penguin Colony” 
(JohnDownerProd: 17 Jan. 2014), and “A squirrel nabbed my GoPro and carried it up a tree (and then 
dropped it)” (VivaFrei: 7 Nov. 2014).  
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In her work on new documentary, Stella Bruzzi identifies accidental films as 
amateur works that lack premeditation, intention, authorship, editing, and narrative 
that become significant when they capture something “by accident rather than design” 
(18). They are typically of very poor quality. And yet because of their peculiar purchase 
on real events, their indeterminacy only increases their exegetical allure. However, for 
all their epistemic appeal, accidental films fail to reveal what they promise to depict. 
Much like the Zapruder footage of the JFK assassination—which Bruzzi identifies as 
exemplary of this cinematic form—their value is located less in the factual details they 
provide and more in the way they disclose something of reality and the perimeters of its 
representability.  
These videos hardly offer much detail; the camera is too deeply implicated in the 
unfolding events to offer clear views of them. These do not show animal-camera 
encounters so much as they serve as evidence that they took place at all. This encourages 
us to acknowledge that these encounters are not entirely unprovoked. They can suggest 
to us something about the reality in which they were made, namely the increasingly 
ubiquitous presence of cameras in the perceptual thresholds of non-human animals in 
their everyday lives.  
Rather than simply documenting animal-camera encounters, then, they also 
document another encounter: one between a fugitive, more-than-human reality and the 
camera’s mechanical insistence on turning that reality into intelligible images. In short 
these little videos end up documenting the process of cinematic representation itself. 
Instead of representational failures, they are reality’s accomplishments. They affirm the 
richness of reality, and at the same time, cinema’s ability to suggest something of that 
richness. These representational underachievers achieve something quite beautiful and 
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rare: cinematic realism—in a truly Bazinian sense. As much as animal-camera 
encounters are interesting in and of themselves, rendered in audio-visual form they 
become even more intriguing. For not only do they take place, they also create a place 
for non-anthropocentric contemplation and speculation. They make a clearing in the 
human umwelt to consider in earnest what happens at the limits of human perception, 
and the edges of representation.   
Accidental animal videos may be droll diversions, but this chapter takes them 
seriously as opportunities to genuinely explore reality at the limits of the human. The 
chapter builds a case for accidental animal videos as instances of cinematic realism, as 
outlined by André Bazin. Identifying them as realist is not merely an exercise in 
aesthetic appreciation or formal categorization. As Bazin insists, realism is valuable only 
insofar as it can bring increased meaning and significance to what is created (1973: 85). 
Discussions of a film’s realism inevitably delve into deeper questions about the nature of 
reality, and cinema’s capacity to provide access to, or at least gesture toward, that 
reality. Identifying accidental animal videos as realist is a maneuver to put them to 
work, to get at the reality in which they are made, and learn more about the medium 
that makes them possible 
For Bazin, tending to a film’s style is merely an alibi to segue into grander 
discussions of the nature of reality on the one hand, and the nature of cinema and its 
relationship to that reality, on the other. Cinematic realism is mobilized here as a 
method by which to evaluate what these videos can offer to our understanding and 
appreciation of the world, beyond our familiar experience of it. Cinematic realism 
cannot be defined absolutely; for Bazin, it becomes clear only in context. As Daniel 
Morgan argues, Bazin’s realism “entails a closer examination of how a film’s style counts 
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as an acknowledgement of the reality conveyed through its photographic base” (471). 
Realism is therefore a method for elucidating how a particular film establishes, through 
its aesthetics, a relationship to the world.  
It is a mobile method that moves laterally between aesthetics and ontology, 
between representation and reality, while never sacrificing the latter for the former. 
That is, it productively draws attention to the conflicts between the aesthetics of animal 
imagery and the material reality of its production. These conflicts, I argue, temper our 
sense of entitlement to access the world, and encourage us to welcome instead what is 
offered. In this way, accidental animal videos are significant rejoinders to the anti-realist 
tradition of wildlife imagery. They constitute flashes of actual wild life, moments where 
nature and culture play while flummoxed humans helplessly stare on. 
Accidental films are highly cathectic sites for a variety of reasons, not the least of 
which is because they are unexpected tangents, deviating substantially from whatever 
the insipient human motivations were—if any—for starting the camera to begin with. As 
indelible depictions of the unexpected, it is unsurprising that accidental animal videos 
often achieve viral status on the web. “octopus steals my video camera” for example has, 
since its initial upload, garnered over 6 million views on YouTube and even made its 
way to television, where it was showcased on the Animal Planet series, “Weird, True and 
Freaky” (2010).  
Its popularity alone does not substantiate its significance, but considered 
alongside the user comments about the video, it does suggest something of the visual 
pleasure that an octopus’s directorial debut can incite. Over on the social networking 
site Metafilter (“Eight Arms to Film You”), one user described the video as “a Dogme 95 
version of a buddy film” (maudlin). Another quipped that the octopus must have 
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“realized the limits of the new media, and decided to stick to ink” (kuujjuarapikm). 
Meanwhile someone else remarked that the “octopus was clearly influenced by Stan 
Brakhage and Jean Painléve” (drab_parts).  
These irreverent and anthropomorphizing discussions, in conjunction with the 
video’s viral status, constitute a kind of cinephilic appreciation. Cinephilia, as Mary Ann 
Doane writes, may name a love of cinema writ large, but it is also an affection for the 
desultory detail, “the uncontrollable aspect of cinematic representation, its material 
predilection for the accidental, the contingent” (2002: 226). These moments, she 
continues, can show us where cinematic conventions tremble and threaten to collapse, 
and a furnish fleeting glimpses of what exceeds representation (Doane 2002: 227). What 
matters is not what the cinephilic pleasure means, but that it is present. Cinephilia 
indicates the appearance of something that cannot be systematized or assimilated into 
representation—something real.  
Finally, these videos are the productive outcomes of the camera’s explicit slippage 
from human control. They are instances where the non-human is the aesthetic catalyst 
for representation. As such they provide occasion to reflect on cinema’s potential as a 
non-anthropocentric medium. For Bazin, what makes cinema’s essential realism 
possible are exactly these non-human interventions. Intrusions from non-human 
forces—whether avalanches or whale sharks, or in this case octopuses—foreground, 
amplify, and support what the camera itself is already doing: intervening as a third-
party between humans and their environment, to conjure images of the world in 
unexpected ways, that “our eyes alone could not have taught us to love” (Bazin 2005a: 
16).  
At the same time, as instances where nature literally becomes the artist, these 
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little dramaturgies of Nature offer an additionally generative counterpoint to the 
anthropocentricism specifically at work in traditional wildlife imagery. By disclosing the 
seams of wildlife imagery, they offer glimmers of the material reality of its making--
which is traditionally obscured in the service of maintaining the nature-culture, animal-
human divide. These sudden, unanticipated interruptions simultaneously illuminate the 
mutual entanglement of animals and cameras, nature and culture, reality and 
representation. They bring into question the genre’s conventions and the validity of 
voyeuristic humans freely gazing at seemingly indifferent animals as though they were 
inhabitants of an untouched nature over there. Nature does not only not conform to how 
we want to see it—as a fantasy space, an Eden we left behind and hope one day to 
return—but it actively and delightfully rebels against our stubborn insistence on such 
conceptual partitioning. 
 
II. Dialectical Frictions: Animals/Cameras, Reality/Representation, 
and Nature/Culture  
 
Accidental animal videos set out in the direction of conventional wildlife imagery. 
They unfold under the human pretense of capturing and producing images of animals 
and landscapes as Nature, at the same time, from a privileged position outside of 
Nature. As such, they carry an anti-realist logic of representation. That is, one that 
reflects and reinforces, at a conceptual and aesthetic level, the idealistic separation of 
Nature from Culture, animal from human, and reality from representation. This 
partitioning is a uniquely human project, a project about which this particular New 
Zealand octopus could care less.  
Thanks to the interventions of such capricious animals, these human efforts to 
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systematize the world end up going significantly, comically awry. What emerges is the 
kind of ancillary footage that might otherwise appear on a blooper reel of an actual 
wildlife documentary. They offer views of what is typically obscured in wildlife imagery: 
the material reality of its production. This newly roused attention catalyzes a 
reorientation toward the real, where nature and culture collaborate and play—despite 
the modern human insistence otherwise.  
Furthermore, with their rough-and-tumble aesthetic, these videos are more 
confounding than clarifying.  The blurry, jostling footage, all strange angles and warped 
perspectives, offers little in the way of informational detail. Rather than undermine their 
communicative power, these imperfections contribute to it. In failing to reproduce a 
world that conforms to the manner in which humans desire to see it, accidental animal 
videos generate instead a series of “discorrelated images.” That is, what Shane Denson 
refers to as images that do not correspond to the human perceptual system and trouble 
the correlation between human being and knowing (2016). In this way, accidental 
animal videos acknowledge that reality exceeds our grasp of it; they hint at the excess of 
reality that extends beyond the frame of human subjectivity.  
Thanks to these discorrelated images, accidental animal videos figure exactly as 
the kind “mis-fit” moments between reality and representation to which Bazin was 
drawn. As Ivone Margulies notes, Bazin often tended to scenes that featured “the radical 
breach between the transience of existence and mechanical reproduction” (2003: 5). 
This was more than a personal affectation. Bazin cherished these moments because they 
showcase “the dialectic between reality and abstraction, between the concrete and the 
ideal” (1973: 84). 
 Cinema’s disposition to capture and transform reality and reality’s stubborn 
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resistance to be captured, together incite a creative dialectic for Bazin, one that serves a 
dual function. As Anat Pick and Guinevere Narraway remark in their introduction to 
Screening Nature: Cinema Beyond the Human, this dialectic both reveals and affirms 
“the reality of the world and the realism of the medium” (2).  The tumultuous 
negotiation between the systematicity of cinematic representation and the intractability 
of reality, affirmed for Bazin, the materiality shared by both reality and representation. 
Emphasizing this essential link is not only a way to elevate and clarify the significance of 
cinematic forms, it is equally a means of extending our understanding of reality more 
generally.  
Accidental animal videos offer an additional, and equally appealing, mis-fit: that 
between nature and culture. They disclose the shared materiality between these two 
conceptually separate realms. As such they are exactly the kind of nature-culture 
hybrids that Bruno Latour claims are produced as a result of the continued insistence on 
the separation of nature and culture. In We Have Never Been Modern, he argues that 
the more we try to keep these worlds apart, the more they will come together in 
unseemly hybrid forms (10-11). That nature and culture are still persistently imagined as 
distinct ontological zones despite their continued mixing is, for Latour, a testament to 
the stubbornness of the modern critical stance. 
In order to get past this kind of thinking, it is necessary to direct our attention to 
the work of hybridization, and take stock of the processes of purification that make them 
possible. In the words of Timothy Morton, it is necessary to think “the ecological 
thought.” That is, to think ecologically about the world, without the restrictive 
conceptual frameworks of nature and culture. “The ecological view,” he writes, is “a vast, 
sprawling mesh of interconnections without a definite center or edge. It is radical 
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intimacy, coexistence with other beings, sentient and otherwise” (2010: 8). It is, then, an 
active opening up of human thinking that makes it possible to encounter new and 
unanticipated phenomena.  
The distillation of nature and culture into two distinct and oppositional 
categories is perpetually carried out in the domain of wild animal imagery in what 
Matthew Brower calls “the discursive regime of wildlife photography” (xvii). This 
imagery produces nature as a disinterested, immutable, and eternal realm outside the 
space of culture and the time of history. As such, it provides the ground onto which the 
nature-culture divide is drawn and validated. In order to get beyond this conceptual 
trap, Brower contends, wildlife imagery needs to be denaturalized (xviii). Images of 
nature, thanks to the techniques and rhetoric of wildlife imagery, appear direct and 
unaffected. They tend to obscure human presence and signs of mediation: any and all 
indicators that the images are in fact historically and culturally situated and technically 
contrived.  
As a countermeasure, Brower advises that we acknowledge that these ostensibly 
objective and natural images have a style. In order to appreciate this imagery as the 
outcome of more complex, interrelated processes between humans, animals, and 
cameras, we must identify and make manifest the latent technical and cultural 
techniques in the images themselves. This is Brower’s own tactic in Developing 
Animals, where he uses the aesthetics of animal imagery to illuminate the physical 
relationships between filmmakers, cameras, and animals and their situation within 
larger historical and discursive matrices. The question for Brower is not what wildlife 
photography is or why it exists, but what it does: what it does to our understanding of 
the world, of non-human animals and our relationship to them, as well as our 
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understanding of the photographic medium. Though he never explicitly cites him, this is 
a particularly Bazininan approach.  
 
III. What Cinema Does 
Bazin was likewise less interested in defining what cinema is, and much more 
interested in exploring what it does: how it operates and what it fails or manages to 
achieve. Despite the fact that much of his criticism was published under the multi-
volume work, What is Cinema? Bazin never explicitly answers this question. Whatever 
cinema is, it emerges in action during the momentary concrescence of filmmaker, 
camera, and world. Because accidental animal videos do not involve a human 
filmmaker, it is tempting to conclude that they must therefore be un-cinematic. 
However, it is important to note that in this triad of filmmaker, camera, and world, 
Bazin prioritized the relationship between camera and world over the role of the 
filmmaker, which was tertiary at best. “All the arts are based on the presence of man,” 
he writes, “only photography derives an advantage from his absence” (2005a: 13).   
What separates cinema from all other media is that it grants the world a unique 
capacity to produce images automatically, a process to which the human is only 
peripherally aware. The human filmmaker is not essential to the image, she may decide 
how and what to record, but she is merely a facilitator, reality’s faithful steward. For 
cinema is fundamentally a realist medium: it offers “a recreation of the world in its own 
image” (2005a: 21). With cinema, Bazin writes, “nature at last does more than imitate 
art: she imitates the artist” (2005A: 15). The world, not the human director, is the 
creator of the work. This is what ultimately distinguishes cinema from theatre. Theatre, 
Bazin maintains, is a distinctly human dramaturgy: it positions the human as “its cause 
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and its subject” (2005a: 106).  Cinema by contrast is a “dramaturgy of Nature” (Bazin 
2005a: 110).  In deferring the human, cinema allows the world to become not only the 
leading character, but also the very aesthetic catalyst for representation. 
Accidental animal videos marginalize the role of the filmmaker even further. In 
commandeering cameras, animals not only resist totalizing human figuration, they 
become active producers of images. It is true that all animals participate to some degree 
in the production of their likeness, as well as their material and semiotic effects (Burt 
2002: 32). However, in accidental animal videos, this animal participation becomes 
especially pronounced. Animals are not just dynamic actors within the mise-en-scène, 
they are also more accurately metteurs-en-scène. They are directly intervening in the 
process of filmmaking, controlling the camera’s position, movement, and framing.  In 
this way, animal videos come to constitute dramaturgies of nature: animals make the 
world in their own image. These videos are literal manifestations of what Bazin had only 
ever meant metaphorically to articulate the non-human essence of cinema’s realism.  
As much as accidental animal videos are beholden to chance, their consistencies 
in form suggest that they nevertheless rely on certain material preconditions. While they 
appear accidental to us, in reality, they are not so random. There is a reciprocal 
attraction between animals and cameras in the new media environment, catalyzed by 
the increasing mobility, ubiquity, and functionality of digital cameras. These videos are 
also borne of cinema’s own perennial penchant for ontological realism. As much as they 
are nascent forms, they revisit and renew attention toward cinema’s fundamental 
relationship to contingency and materiality. This relationship is primarily an 
achievement of the camera’s automaticity. While the human may engage the camera, 
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what happens once it begins the process of recording moves beyond the bounds of her 
control.  
“Every new development added to the cinema must take it nearer and nearer to 
its origins,” Bazin proclaims in “The Myth of Total Cinema” (21). While technological 
developments do bring into being new techniques and forms for cinema, these iterations 
still operate recursively. That is, they conjure into the present, moments of contingency 
and otherness that transform and recalibrate human experience. However, cinema 
appears, through its elementary link to materiality, it is able to give substance to a world 
that would otherwise escape our attention. Cinema’s ability to do this is an 
accomplishment of its automaticity and its non-human remove. Only in the moment of 
slippage from human control does the world appear in ways that we would never have 
thought to imagine it. This is how cinema makes possible new opportunities to engage 
with unfamiliar vistas of existence.  
 
IV. Bazininan Realism: A Clarification  
Realism, Bazin readily admits, is not easily defined; it is not a set of criteria that 
can be applied to a given film. Rather, realism is inherent to cinema; it comes from 
within. A realist style, he writes, is one that can be understood as an “inner 
dynamic…somewhat like the relation of energy to matter or the specific physics of the 
work” (2005b: 31). This does not mean that all films are ultimately realist, merely that 
they all bear an embryonic realism that can, given the proper conditions, flourish.  
Cinema’s native logic is, Bazin contends, centrifugal: it moves away from the frame. 
Painting, by contrast is centripetal: it contains a world inside a frame which polarizes 
space, and our attention, inwards. The cinema screen, meanwhile, mobilizes attention 
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away from itself, toward the world (2005a: 166). Realism is this fundamental movement 
toward the real. And that movement, Bazin insists, “can take a thousand different 
routes” (1973: 85).  
Though Bazin’s realism is often associated with the naturalistic style of Italian 
Neorealism and the French New Wave, it is not limited to these. While he admired their 
use of the long take, deep focus, and non-professional actors, he was less interested in 
the techniques themselves than he was in the attitudes that motivated them. What 
mattered was that these directors did not make “reality the servant of some à priori 
point of view” (2005b: 64). He lauds Jean Renoir for example, for “the attention he pays 
to the importance of individual things in relation to one another. He does not sacrifice 
the tree to the forest” (1973: 84). Realism is, thus, an ethical commitment to the singular 
and the particular over the conventional and the general. 
As such, Bazin not only identified realism in European art cinema, he found it in 
exploration documentaries, surrealist films, science films, and even slapstick comedies. 
He was incredibly generous in his readings of even the most artless films, which James 
Tweedie takes as a sign of his “appalling and intriguing bad taste” (277). Bazin had no 
problem plumbing the depths of popular culture in order to locate and retrieve valuable 
instances of cinematic realism that could illuminate “the reality of the world and the 
realism of the medium” (Pick and Narraway 2).  
He approached each work as a half-formed communicative gesture; it was the 
task of the critic to continue this communicative work, to expand the meaning at which 
the film is only able to hint. Realism, then, can manifest in any number of ways, but it 
never takes for granted that reality is fully available to representation. This respect for 
the real is integral to the operation of cinema’s native logic. Cinema is, first and 
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foremost, a medium that makes worlds. However, it is also part of and caught up in the 
world, which means the vistas it offers are never total or infinite. Cinematic 
representation may offer images of people, animals, places, and things within wider 
ecologies, eclectic and interrelated fields of action and potential action, but these 
glimpses are always situated and therefore partial.  
Cinema does not just create worlds, but believable worlds that rival the 
ontological authority of our own world. “At the source of all realism,” Bazin says, there is 
an aesthetic paradox that must be resolved (2005b: 64). This not simply the paradox of 
the concrete and the abstract, of authenticity and artifice, but of the concurrent 
existence of two unique universes: the profilmic reality, and reality itself. Two solid 
worlds cannot occupy the same place at the same time. As Bazin affirms, “the world of 
the screen and our world cannot be juxtaposed…the very concept of universe is spatially 
exclusive” (2005a: 109). One universe must necessarily yield to the other: at some point 
we must give ourselves over to the filmed world, allow it to become the Universe, if only 
for the duration of the film (2005a: 109).  
It is this transfer that makes it possible for the spectator to enter into a genuine 
relationship with it, catalyzing reactions, relations, and transformations. In order for 
this transfer to take place, however, the world onscreen must have the necessary 
ontological authority that realism provides. The cinema frame is only ever partial; 
realism suggests that the world onscreen is grander and more complex than it appears, 
that it is “part of something prolonged indefinitely into the universe” (2005a: 166). 
Realism is, then, fundamental to the creation of a sense of worldliness that exceeds the 
apparatus’ ability to represent it.  
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Thus, if cinema creates a world in tandem with our own, then realism grants that 
world the necessary integrity so that we may, for a time, believe in it. It makes it possible 
to shift between reality and representation, and forge meaningful relationships with 
worlds onscreen, and off. For at stake in realism is the powerful communicative capacity 
of cinematic images. Realism makes possible their ability to affect us “like a 
phenomenon in nature, like a flower or a snowflake” (Bazin 2005a: 13).  While it is 
tempting to associate this realism with photographic indexicality, the relationship 
between object and image is not strictly indexical. Bazin explains that cinema creates an 
ontological equivalence between images and objects—but is it not a question of 
verisimilitude. As he explains in “The Ontology of the Photographic Image”:  
the photographic image is the object itself, the object freed from the 
conditions of time and space that govern it. No matter how fuzzy, 
distorted, or discolored, no matter how lacking in documentary value the 
image may be, it shares, by virtue of the very process of its becoming, the 
being of the model of which it is the reproduction; it is the model. (2005a: 
14)  
 
The image does not refer to the model: it is the model. As nebulous as this passage is, 
Bazin seems to suggest that cinematic images are more than signs that communicate 
absent presence. The reproduction becomes indistinguishable from the model “by virtue 
of the very process of becoming,” he writes. That is to say, the image becomes the model 
thanks to the material processes by which an object becomes a representation.  
However, cinema does not simply reproduce objects: it also animates them in 
situ. They are reproduced within their environments openly interacting with and 
responding to other objects, textures, and forces. Cinematic rendering is ecological: it 
produces ecologies while also being produced by them. The way cinema tends to objects 
and their relations makes it so that a filmed event can be just as potent, if not more so, 
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than the actual event on which it is based. The fatal encounter between a bull and a 
bullfighter in The Bullfight, Bazin claims, is “as moving as the spectacle of the real 
instant that it reproduces” (2003: 31). “In a certain sense,” he continues, “it is even more 
moving because it magnifies the quality of the original moment through the contrast of 
its repetition” (2003: 31). This encounter between bull, human, and camera is not 
powerful because it refers to an event that really happened. It is potent because the film 
retains the integral urgency of this vexed relationship, allows the spectator to hold it 
uncomfortably in her regard, and attempt to reintegrate it into new panoramas of 
meaning. 
In sum, realism is essential to cinema. It is integral to creating structurally sound 
worlds that feel multi-dimensional so that we can explore new avenues of being and 
knowing. Realism is also a process, one that works toward what Bazin calls, “true 
realism”: giving significant expression to the world “both concretely and its essence” 
(Bazin 2005a: 12). The possibility of achieving true realism provides the motivation for 
all cinematic representation. But true realism always remains at the level of aspiration; 
it is part of what Bazin called “the myth of total cinema,” an ideal that must never be 
achieved. Such an achievement would reduce reality by claiming it can be contained 
fully in representation.  
While realism is essential to cinema, the camera’s automaticity is in turn essential 
to that realism. Bazin presumes the camera’s non-human remove is open to the 
communicability of the world in ways that the human subject is not. As such, realism 
requires the surrender of the human to the disinterested automaticity of the camera, in 
deference to the world. When humans are too tightly lodged in the processes of 
representation, they undermine cinema’s native operational logic of realism. This is 
 115 
especially evinced in Bazin’s oft-cited criticism of montage. An overreliance on editing, 
he felt, works against cinema’s tendency to make worlds and establish a spatial-
temporal unity between humans, animals, things and the surrounding world (Bazin 
2005a: 52). Montage becomes a human strategy to dominate and control the image of 
the world as it struggles to appear.  
Cinema promotes a decidedly non-anthropocentric perspective, and too much 
human intervention undermines this precious point of view, turning it away from the 
real and back toward the human. The result is a mode of representation Bazin calls, 
“pseudorealism.” That is, “a deception aimed at fooling the eye (or for that matter the 
mind)” (2005a: 12).  Pseudorealism duplicates the world that conforms to the way 
humans imagine it and wish it to appear, evidenced by the ancient Egyptians who tried 
to suggest life in the embalmed bodies of their loved ones. Pseudorealism serves a 
primarily therapeutic function, affirming the human over the world. With the invention 
of the camera, there was no longer a need to settle for pseudorealism; but many films 
resorted to it anyway.  
“Look carefully at bad films” Bazin proclaims, “and you will see that they are 
composed of nothing but symbolism and signs, of conventions, of dramatic, moral, and 
emotional hieroglyphs” (1973: 84-5). Despite their beauty, technical artistry, and 
documentary realism, much of contemporary wildlife imagery— in the vein of the BBC’s 
much celebrated series, Planet Earth (2006)—constitute “bad” or anti-realist films. 
They manifest the dominance of human idealism over worldly realism. This imagery 
denies the reality of nature, by producing nature as a mythical place, a sanctuary 
untouched by the processes of modernity. They suggest on the one hand that it is a space 
humans left behind for the sake of progress, but, on the other, one that remains ever a 
 116 
palatial sanctuary lying in wait for our prodigal return. In both cases, they summon the 
natural world as a fantasy space for us.  
They also promote a voyeuristic and expansionist gaze, one characterized by what 
Pick calls “ocular inflation” (2013: 21). This enhanced visibility of nature extends the 
limits of the human gaze, without ever tending to the implications of human presence. 
They make nature fully available to the camera and give the impression of immersive 
closeness with nature. And yet this closeness can only be achieved through conceptual 
distance. Any acknowledgement of proximity would threaten nature with the corrupting 
touch of culture. The desire to protect nature from human interference and cultivate an 
appreciation for its sublime, untouched beauty appears well intentioned. However, it 
actively precludes any possibility of approaching nature in more responsible ways. 
“Putting something called Nature on a pedestal and admiring it from afar does for the 
environment what patriarchy does for the figure of Woman,” Timothy Morton contends 
in his critique of environmentalism: “it is a paradoxical act of sadistic admiration” 
(2007: 5). What it admires is not nature as it actually appears, but nature as a concept 
created and sustained by humans.    
In drawing attention to the frictions that occur between the aesthetics of animal 
images and the processes and contexts of their production, accidental animal videos 
actively impose limits on the omnipotence of the human gaze. They thwart the human 
voyeuristic fantasy of total access to pure, deep nature separate from culture. What they 
offer instead are glimpses of true wilderness, a representational frontier that resists 
human control, does not respect the nature-culture divide, and troubles the centrality of 
the human. In so doing, accidental animal videos are doing something expressly realist, 
and cinematic. 
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Bazin appreciated cinema because it decentered and sometimes eclipsed the 
human, positioning it “only as an accessory, like an extra, or in counterpoint to nature 
which is the true leading character” (2005a: 102).  But this is not because he devalued 
human beings. To the contrary, Bazin held the human in high esteem. He merely felt 
that the valuation of the human should not come at the cost of the devaluation of the 
non-human. Cinema encourages us to appreciate that, in reality, humans do not occupy 
the centre of the universe. In the cinema, just as in real life, the human has “no a priori 
privilege over animals and things” (Bazin 2005a: 106). While Bazin was a humanist, his 
ontology is so generous that Jennifer Fay insists that his humanism is much “more 
capacious and creaturely than is typically acknowledged” (2008: 42).16  
In accidental animal videos, animals and cameras are the primary creative 
catalysts for production of the images. When the human is displaced, the world is able to 
transfer something of itself into the image; nature sets the scene.  This, in turn, provides 
the film world the necessary structural integrity for it to support its inhabitants—human 
and non-human alike—and create space for imagining and making possible new 
relationships. As largely the aesthetic achievements of non-human intervention, 
accidental animal videos re-affirm the importance of the non-human to cinema’s unique 
world-making and world-disclosing capabilities. They are important reminders that the 
camera is not an extension of the human, nor a complement, a superior analog to the 
human sensorium that makes the world fully accessible to our control. Rather the 
camera is, at its best, a potential corrective to errors of Agamben’s anthropological 
machine. 
                                                 
16 In this way, Bazin prepares the way for object oriented ontologies which have recently come into 
fashion, which propose that all things equally exist, even though they may not exist equally (Bogost 11).  
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Cinema functions primarily as a non-human, and non-anthropocentric mode of 
intervention between humans and their environments. It offers something we do not 
control or anticipate. As much as the human decides what to record, and positions the 
camera accordingly, once she releases the shutter, a process wholly beyond human 
control takes over. The resulting image is produced by a complex interaction between 
camera and world.  
Instances where non-human agents and forces become the aesthetic catalysts for 
cinematic creation only help amplify this process. Bazin’s attention to small details such 
as “the murmur of a waterfall, or the rushing sound of soil escaping from a broken vase” 
served for him as assurances of a world coming into being (2005a: 110). At the same 
time, they also re-emphasized the fundamental role of uncontrollable—non-human—
aspects of representation to the images’ communicative power. The camera, by being 
amenable to the lively dynamism of the eclectic materiality of the mise-en-scène 
becomes much more than a conduit for human desires, it is a conduit for the world 
coming into presence.  
 
V. The Photographic Blind Spot, Extended, Amplified, and 
Deconstructed 
 
Accidental films are not significant simply because they show something 
remarkable; they are significant because they show something remarkable, 
unintentionally. They are steered less by the human operating the camera, and more by 
the dynamics of the event unfolding. At issue is their timing, not simply their technique. 
The details of what they show are less important than the random collusion of forces 
that enabled them to show something at all. Accidental films emphasize the camera’s 
automaticity and its access to contingency by suggesting the wealth of what can be 
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achieved when the camera slips out of human control. They emerge as a result of forces 
that are initially incidental to the event, but once the films are made, become essential 
and inextricable from the event.   
The surplus value of images, as Peter Geimer notes, typically depends on this 
slippage. He writes, in “Image as Trace: Speculations About an Undead Paradigm,” that 
this value is largely generated in the photographer’s “blind spot” during the split-second 
of photographic capture. Once the shutter is activated, whatever slips into it is out of 
human control (Geimer 19). Images are what manifest at the very moment when 
“artistic intention coincides with the unexpected, the unpredictable, the chance event” 
(Geimer 19).  
Bazin similarly argues in “The Ontology of the Photographic Image” that what 
grants the photographic image its unique power is that it is made automatically, without 
human intervention. But Bazin sees this contingency as more than simply photographic 
surplus. Instead of being in excess of photographic reproduction, he argues, it is 
essential it. While the human photographer can bring something of her personality to 
the image, it is not crucial to it (in fact, in many cases it is even detrimental to it). What 
is essential to the image is what was not intentionally brought in. This becomes 
especially clear for Bazin in instances where this photographic blind spot is extended 
and amplified. In those fleeting moments when the intrusion of the contingent is so 
powerful that it thwarts human intention entirely, something truly cinematic is created. 
One example Bazin provides is Annapurna (1953), Marcel Ichac’s documentary 
about a group of mountaineers climbing a ridge in the Himalayas. When an avalanche 
snatches the camera from the hands of French mountaineer Maurice Herzog during the 
making of the film, the filming stops. The story is only able to pick up a day and half 
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later, at which point Herzog and his companions appear to have endured an “ascent to a 
hell of ice” (2005a: 162). The forces and conditions working against them were so 
inhospitable, Bazin writes, that they were not able to “preserve the camera’s sight of it” 
(2005a: 163). This lapse, rather than an interruption or a failure to represent, is an 
acknowledgement of the film’s—especially harsh—circumstances of production. At the 
same time, it testifies to the limits of the camera to truly and totally capture the 
experience, and the boundlessness and intractability of reality.  
Bazin points to a similar incident in Kon Tiki (1950), Thor Heyerdahl’s amateur 
film about a small group of scientists travelling a 4000-mile nautical expedition to 
Polynesia on a rudimentary raft. When a whale shark jumps aboard their flimsy vessel, 
it forces the men to drop the camera. The filmmaking must stop in order for that they 
may protect their lives. The scene is therefore only partially rendered. The footage of the 
scene, Bazin remarks, “is so short that you have to process it ten times over in the 
optical printer before you can spot what is happening” (2005a: 161). Again, rather than a 
failure to represent reality, Bazin reads this as an achievement of reality, its 
incommensurability is acknowledged in the laboured process of representation.  
The film does not wholly depict the encounter between the men and the shark; it 
offers something far richer. The shot, he observes, “was taken at the very moment when 
a capricious movement of the monster might well have annihilated the raft and sent 
camera and cameraman seven or eight thousand meters into the deep” (2005a: 161). As 
such it evokes more accurately the danger, the stakes of the action (2005a: 161).  It 
draws attention to and accentuates the vexed physical relationships between human, 
animal, and camera, relationships that extend well beyond the image. “The missing 
documents are the negative imprints of the expedition—its inscription chiselled deep,” 
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he writes (2005a: 162). Kon Tiki’s elliptical images become clues that accumulate, like 
pieces of a puzzle that we must work with in order to figure out the world of the film. 
They are like “those moss-covered stones that, surviving, allow us to reconstruct 
buildings and statues that no longer exist,” Bazin writes (2005a: 160). This movement 
from the image toward reality and back again suggests the complex vector of relations 
that constitute realism.  
Kon Tiki not only has missing parts, it is also full of imperfections. Bazin notes 
that the crew had little knowledge of how to use a camera. This coupled with poor 
shooting conditions results in a film that is riddled with problems from wrong film 
speeds to errors in exposure and jerky camerawork. And yet, Bazin writes, “Kon Tiki is 
an admirable and overwhelming film” that “manages to be the most beautiful of films 
while not being a film at all” (2005a: 161, 160). Rather, its “fluid and trembling images 
are as it were the objectivitized memory of the actors in the drama” (2005a: 161). The 
imperfections testify that the camera was not just a witness to whatever transpired, it 
was also an active participant in its coming into being. Bazin extolls Kon Tiki because 
“the making of it is so totally identified with the action that it so imperfectly unfolds” 
(2005a: 161). Its poor quality corroborates just how tightly its images are tethered to the 
material conditions of their production. The camera is too intimately entangled with the 
unfolding of the events it attempts to capture to successfully represent them. 
For this reason, accidental films, as Bruzzi notes, are examples of “non-fiction 
film at its most objective” (10). This objectivity, however, hardly satisfyies our desire to 
know, Bruzzi adds. They aspire to reveal what will always remain beyond the images: 
the motivation and the causal forces of the actions they depict (Bruzzi 21).  The 
Zapruder footage, for example, promises to disclose what really happened to JFK on 
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that fateful November day. Likewise, Annapurna and Kon Tiki aspire to relay the details 
of dangerous historically significant expeditions. They excite a desire to know, but 
ultimately neglect to satisfy that desire. However, their value as records is not located in 
the content itself, so much as the forces and phenomena that give shape to that content. 
Accidental films are not records of reality so much as they are records of the complex 
and dynamic processes of representation. Their unintended imperfections suggest the 
hard work of containing a recalcitrant reality in cinematic form. For Bazin, this 
indeterminacy catalyzes a discovery or an acknowledgement of aspects of reality that we 
have either renounced, forgotten, or ignored.  
Accidental films may seem like marginal, ephemeral forms, incidental to cinema’s 
history, its theory, and its canon. However, they are in fact essential to them. Their 
characteristic feature—the camera slipping from human control—more than some 
curiosity is a constituent of cinema itself. Whether it is the velocity of an avalanche, the 
weight of a whale shark, or in the case of “octopus steals my video camera” the suctioned 
grip of an octopus, these tertiary, autogenic intrusions, seemingly peripheral to and 
indifferent toward the human, and “aesthetically at odds with the rest of the work” are 
what make a film truly realist, and thus cinematic (Bazin 2005a: 110). They intensify the 
operations of cinema’s essential mechanism—its capacity to link up and move between 
worlds—and illuminate the extent to which this movement relies specifically on its non-
human remove. This is what accidental animal films show us about cinema. They also 
show us something about the reality of animal lives, and the material-discursive 
strategies used to suppress it.  
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VI.  Making Nature Untouchable: The Discursive Regime of Wildlife 
Imagery  
 As Matthew Brower makes abundantly clear in his material-discursive history, 
wildlife imagery is not simply a byproduct of turning cameras toward animals in their 
environments (193). The practice of photographing animals is not an unintended upshot 
of the development of photographic (and proto-photographic) technologies. Taking a 
camera into animal environments or reaching for the camera during an animal sighting 
might appear innocent, instinctual, or organic. But in fact, the forces that motivate such 
actions, and support and maintain them are far more complex. They are also deeply 
entangled in the larger material-discursive maneuvers of modernity, that attempt to 
organize animals and humans, nature and culture in strategic ways.  
These machinations do not take place outside the image either, they are made 
manifest in the aesthetics of the imagery itself; if not exclusively in the frame, then in 
the tension to which it alludes between what is inside and outside the frame. As Brower 
skillfully illustrates, looking carefully at images of animals in full consideration of their 
conditions of production—from the material and technical particularities of the camera, 
the animal’s disposition and comportment, and the physical arrangement of camera, 
animal, and human in relationship to one another—can help us situate those conditions 
of production within larger material-discursive histories.  
The practice of documenting wildlife, as Brower demonstrates, has involved a 
variety of technologies and techniques over the years, and these variations directly 
correlate with shifting discursive interests that marshal animals and nature in particular 
ways. Currently the practices of making wild animals visible are informed by what he 
calls “the discursive regime of wildlife photography” (xvii). It manifests in voyeuristic 
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images, wherein animals are highly visible and oblivious to the presence of the camera, 
and all signs of mediation are obscured and unacknowledged in the image itself.  
This regime insists on not only separating nature and culture, but also 
representing nature as a “world empty of humans and their traces” (Brower 83). Nature 
becomes a space outside culture that can only be accessed with the camera. The camera 
serves to absolve the human of the burden of directly engaging and negotiating with the 
animals. Brower is not the only one to remark on this trend. Gregg Mitman likewise 
observes in his work Reel Nature: America’s Romance with Wildlife on Film that 
conventional imagery of wild animals tries to “capitalize on our desire to be close to 
nature, yet curiously removed from it” (206). Meanwhile, Derek Bousé identifies a 
similar “ethic (or an illusion) of nonintervention” in his genealogy of wildlife 
documentaries (27). 
Brower traces the emergence of this discursive regime back to the development of 
an apparatus called “the photographic blind.” The photographic blind refers to an 
enclosure used to obscure the photographer and the camera from the animal being 
photographed. Of course, before it formally materialized, it was an idea, one made 
imaginable by technological improvements to cameras such as longer focal lengths 
which allowed for greater distance between animal and camera. With the introduction of 
the telephoto lens, for example, close-ups of wild animals could be achieved without 
having to be physically close to them, or engage with them directly. This technological 
particularity made it easier to produce animal images, it also marked the beginning of a 
certain voyeuristic aesthetic.  
This in turn, cultivated a sense that the invisibility of both the camera and the 
operator, and the indifference of the animals granted more authentic access to the truth 
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of animal lives. As Brower remarks, “the observer’s invisibility comes to authenticate the 
image and the animals depicted, fostering a conception of animals as occupying a 
radically nonhuman space” (Brower 2011: xxix). In this way the blind is also a discursive 
apparatus, one that builds on the visual logic of the camera obscura. That is, it 
separates nature and culture by aligning the former with an objective ground for truth, 
and the latter with the deceptive terrain of subjectivity (Brower 2011: 109). 
Underlying this separation of nature and culture is a rhetoric of purity and 
protection, one that is cemented by an even more significant separation: that of sight 
from touch. The photographic blind insists above all on the obfuscation of all signs of 
direct contact. The familiar platitude, “take only pictures, leave only footprints,” implies 
that turning cameras on animals in the wild is a nonintrusive and benevolent activity 
that “shows proper respect for the fragility of nature” (Brower xiii). Looking without 
touching is construed as the ideal way to relate to animals.  
This separation of sight from touch is another modern maneuver. Touch, as 
Jonathan Crary argues in Techniques of the Observer, was actually understood to be an 
important component of vision in the 17th and 18th centuries. But by the 19th century, 
touch came to be disassociated from sight. This process, Crary explains, was part of the 
larger separation and abstraction of the senses caused by the technological and 
industrial remapping of the body (19). “The loss of touch as a conceptual component of 
vision,” Crary suggests, “meant the unloosening of the eye from the network of 
referentiality incarnated in tactility and its subjective relation to perceived space” (19). 
That is, the separation of sight from touch, and the consequent prioritizing of vision 
over other sensory faculties greatly reduced the ability and desire of the observer to 
appreciate the wider dynamic fields of action in which she was a part.  
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This partitioning of nature from culture at the intersection of sight and touch 
remains rampant in modern wildlife imagery in the trope of visible but “untouched” 
nature. The aforementioned Planet Earth (2006) is the most obvious example of this.17 
While Planet Earth’s exhilarating imagery is a product of many years of human time 
and labour, the series—its existence, its popularity, and the fact that it singlehandedly 
renewed a staid genre— is primarily indebted to the new technological capacities of 
cameras.18 It was, after all, the high-definition, ultra-high speed, compact, lightweight 
digital cameras that allowed “Earth” to be seen, as the series byline announces, “As 
You’ve Never Seen It Before.” And yet as much as these technological affordances are 
heralded in the series’ promotional material, there is no trace of them in footage itself.  
The cameras never intrude; they remain relatively unacknowledged by the 
animals they record. While the animals may inadvertently meet the camera’s gaze from 
time to time, they certainly never touch the camera or encourage contemplation of its 
presence. Animals swim, fly, or amble across the frame as if the cameras and the myriad 
of filmmaking apparatuses were not present at all. This invisibility is further assured by 
the disembodied voice of narrator David Attenborough, who speaks from a safe 
“elsewhere” so that his presence does not tarnish the pure, unmolested nature disclosed 
in the frame. Planet Earth retains the fantasy of having full, effortless access to deep 
nature by simply looking at it, but never touching it. 
Conventional wildlife imagery, exemplified in Planet Earth, obscures any and all 
encounters between animals and cameras. It uses strategies to distract the spectator 
                                                 
17 Others include the BBC’s The Blue Planet (2001) and Frozen Planet (2011), as well as Disney’s more 
recent foray (to say nothing of their previous ventures) into the genre with films like African Cats (2011), 
Chimpanzees (2012) and Bears (2014). 
18 Not the least of which is the cineflex heligimble, a gyroscopic stabilizing mechanism that created new 
possibilities for high quality aerial cinematography (Slenske 2007). 
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from even acknowledging their actual proximity by playing up other kinds of animal 
encounters, contingencies, and novelties. As Mitman writes, in Walt Disney’s early 
documentary series, True Life Adventures, filmmakers often pursued unexpected 
happenings (119). These episodes of action, also called “nuggets,” became crucial to 
wildlife films.  Highlighting the quirks of individual animals was a means to assure 
audiences that they were seeing something rare and singular—a direct affordance of the 
camera’s invisible and omniscient eye.  
These sequences also helped guard against the inevitable banality that 
characterizes much of the footage of animals in their environments, and contributed to 
Disney’s success in monopolizing the market. Though elemental to wildlife films, as a 
result of time constraints and technological limitations, these chance encounters were 
often not left up to chance. Disney’s White Wilderness (James Algar, 1958) for example, 
is known for its rare, unrivaled footage of lemmings (Arctic rodents) committing mass 
suicide by hurling themselves off a cliff into the Arctic Ocean. In reality however, the 
lemmings were forced to jump by a contraption set up by the filmmakers. Meanwhile, 
their watery grave was not the Arctic ocean but rather the Bow river in downtown 
Calgary (Bousé 65). 
These representational strategies not only functioned to divert attention away 
from the logistics and contrivances of filmmaking, but by cultivating seemingly-singular 
spectacles, they also affirmed the value and necessity of keeping humans and signs of 
civilization out of the picture. The insistence on separating animals and humans at the 
level of the image functions as a kind of protective partitioning: it safeguards animals 
from humans, and humans from animals. Of course, the irony is that the production of 
animal imagery can actually be incredibly disruptive and destructive to animals. 
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Animals are harassed, stressed out, injured, and often killed. And yet the rhetoric of 
wildlife imagery continues to deny that any actual interaction between animals, 
cameras, and photographers does, can, or should take place. As such, it offers no space 
to account for such encounters or address them in potentially more positive, mutually 
beneficial ways.19 This continued insistence on the irreconcilable opposition between 
nature and culture forecloses any other possibilities of being otherwise. 
The desire to see animals from an impossible, unbridgeable distance speaks to a 
fantasy of human clairvoyance and omniscience. The associated desire to make the 
human invisible, and produce images of animals as if humans were not present, enables 
animals to appear in the space of deep nature that is not only outside culture, but also 
outside history. As it appears in wildlife documentaries, nature unfolds on its own time. 
With the camera, humans have access to this exclusive realm. And though humans are 
not part of it, it nevertheless exists for humans. This nature is a lost, pre-cultural, pre-
technological Eden we have supposedly left behind, and at the same time it becomes a 
future shelter, a place to begin again once we have presumably destroyed the world.  
Amateur content is not immune from this seductive cultural logic. Accidental 
animal videos are a case in point: they start out with all the conventional trappings of 
wildlife imagery, and a specifically human agenda. When Victor Huang went diving that 
day, for example, he not only took his underwater camera with him, he also brought his 
spear gun. The latter may have been merely a precaution, but its inclusion suggests that 
                                                 
19 Humans likewise need to be protected from animals—as demonstrated by the fate of Timothy Treadwell 
in Werner Herzog’s Grizzly Man (2005). In some ways, Grizzly Man offers a counterpoint to conventional 
wildlife imagery, framing nature as ruthlessly indifferent to the human, and drawing attention to the 
unseemly intimacy between bears, humans, and cameras. Nevertheless, it still suggests that fatalities 
between animals and humans are inevitable. Animals and humans, nature and culture are violently, 
irrevocably, incompatible.  
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regardless of how inchoate his intentions, they were not innocent. The production of 
wildlife imagery never is. Huang was very clearly on the hunt that day, if not for 
animals, for animal images. As he swam closer to the octopus with his camera at the 
ready, he betrayed that well-worn desire, conscious or otherwise, to mobilize the animal 
body as an idealized figure of nature.20 That is, a symbol culled from an eternal, 
immutable realm outside the time of history or the space of culture. In his hunt for 
nature, to take something from it, Victor Huang presumed to be outside of nature. He 
could not have been more wrong.  
 
VII. Wildlife Imagery, Interrupted or, Unsettling the Fourth Wall  
The only way to trouble and dismantle the discursive regime of wildlife imagery, 
Brower suggests, is to denaturalize it (xviii). One way to do this is by focusing on its 
conditions of production; more specifically the traces of these conditions as they are 
manifested in the aesthetics of the animal imagery itself. This is what Brower manages 
to do in his work, illustrating how images of wildlife always suggest something about 
animal-camera relationships.  
For example, the first photographic images of animals were not exactly “wild.” 
Rather, they featured tame, captive, or domesticated animals, and sometimes even dead 
and taxidermied ones. These images depicting docile or inert animal bodies are not a 
result of a human inclination to see animals in this way; instead they suggest a 
fundamental incompatibility between the materiality of the first cameras and the 
                                                 
20 The added detail provides an unwitting throwback to a time when hunting for animals and hunting for 
animal images were in fact materially and discursively entwined. The practice of “camera hunting” was 
popular in the 19th century, wherein images of animals were taken along with and, eventually, instead of 
their lives (see: Brower 25-82). 
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dynamic and unpredictable comportments of wild animals (2011: 27). Early cameras 
were cumbersome with delicate parts, and were therefore difficult and awkward to 
transport into the field. They also required long exposure times, which made it 
impossible to photograph the spontaneous and rapid movements of live animals in the 
wild.  
Eventually wild animals replaced tame ones, but this new kind of animal 
photography was characterized by animals featured in close-up, often with “startled, 
frightened, and angry” expressions (Brower 2011: 38). Again, rather than a human 
stylistic predilection, these images evinced, on the one hand, what faster shutter speeds 
and quicker exposure times could achieve. But on the other they suggested the limits of 
short focal lengths, and the uncomfortable physical proximity to animals that such 
lenses required (Brower 2011: 33). Many photographers had to rely on invasive hunting 
techniques in order to apprehend elusive and wily wildlife (Brower xxviii).  
Modern animal imagery, meanwhile, represents wildlife in clear, richly-detailed 
close-ups, where animals appear oblivious to the camera (Brower xxix). Likewise, this is 
not simply an artistic choice; it is also an affordance of the increasingly longer focal 
lengths of cameras, which allow animals to be photographed without having to be 
physically near them. At the same time, this aesthetic also developed out of the 
protective camouflage of the photographic blind, a contraption under which the 
photographer armed with a camera could take photos of animals nearby while 
remaining unseen.  
Accidental animal videos mark the arrival of new aesthetic of animal imagery, 
and therefore, another shift in the relationship between animals and cameras. They 
make visible what is typically obscured in modern wildlife imagery—the process of 
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mediation. These videos constitute a kind of “anti-photographic blind” that redirects our 
attention away from the image, to the current frictions and negotiations that transpire 
between the aesthetics of animal representations and the conditions of their actual 
production. Not only do they illuminate the fraught materiality of animal imagery, they 
also suggest the particularities of that materiality.  
As much as accidental animal videos are beholden to chance, they are 
nevertheless reliant on a set of preconditions regarding the material relationship 
between animals and cameras. In fact, the more we consider these relationships and the 
conditions under which these videos are produced, the less accidental they begin to 
appear. The proximity of animals and cameras, always a condition of wildlife imagery, 
has been steadily escalating, particularly in recent years. By available evidence, it 
certainly seems as though wild animals are becoming increasingly camera-aware, if not 
technically savvy. Animals are, more and more frequently, having close encounters with 
cameras.  
These meetings are made possibly by changes to the materiality and functionality 
of the photographic apparatus, which make them more perceptible and accessible to 
animals. The cameras at the crux of these encounters are not just digital, but also 
smaller, lighter, more mobile and maneuverable. Sometimes they involve camera 
phones, but more commonly they involve rugged and compact personal digital cameras 
made for producing high definition, extreme action video. Such cameras tend to be 
designed for filming on the move during kinetic situations. They have fixed lenses and 
do not involve moving, breakable parts. Network enabled, they can communicate 
remotely with paired peripheral devices and the Internet. They can be carried close to 
bodies, sometimes even affixed to them. They can be mounted to almost anything: 
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fastened with suction cups, they can be affixed to a bicycle, a surfboard, or the arms of 
an octopus.   
Stable vantage points are not required, nor are human perceptual systems. They 
can operate without the human, and can even be handled by animals. That they are not 
handled expertly is beside the point; what matters is that they are handled at all. The 
ubiquity, portability, accessibility, functionality, capacity, and network interoperability 
of cameras and camera-enabled devices make animals more available to image capture 
and grants these moving and still images wider distribution. However, these same 
affordances also make them accessible to animals themselves, to their gaze but more 
importantly, their touch.    
The camera’s increasing accessibility to animals reaches fruition in accidental 
animal videos, but the intimacy between them has been building for some time. This is 
evidenced by adjacent phenomena like animal “photobombs” or “videobombs.” These 
“bombs” name the process by which the framing of a photo or a video is unintentionally 
disrupted by an animal at the moment of recording. The most indelible example of this 
occurrence is that of “Crasher Squirrel,” the rodent that accidentally appeared in the 
foreground of Melissa and Jackson Brandts’ self- portrait at Banff National Park in 
2009. After pre-programming the shutter release on their camera, the Brandts placed 
the camera just a few feet away, and posed in front of the Rockies. A ground squirrel, 
likely alerted by the camera’s peculiar beeping sounds, stumbled into the camera’s view 
at the last minute and inadvertently displaced the Brandts as the focal point of their 
photo.  
Meanwhile, animal self-portraits, or “selfies,” are also indications of this 
increasing camera-awareness. In such circumstances animals are often the intended or 
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desired subjects for the camera, but in an unexpected turn, animals end up addressing 
the camera directly. These animal-camera encounters result in candid animal portraits, 
where animals appear as if they are intentionally posing for the camera. They are 
commonly associated with pets—due to their proximity to camera-enabled phones, 
tablets and laptops in human environments—but they also increasingly involve non-
domesticated animals.21 The case of the macaque monkey selfie in Indonesia that 
opened Chapter 1 is perhaps the most notable example of this, thanks in no small part to 
its involvement in a unique copyright case (Gibbs 2014).  
These wild, feral, free-range, semi-captive, or domesticated animal “selfies” are 
fortuitous, materializing from animals investigating these devices. Not only are they 
suspicious of the intrusive cameras of amateur and professional nature and wildlife 
photographers. They are also aware of hidden cameras, such as the seemingly 
unobtrusive ones found in camera traps. In the Bolivian jungle for example, Andean 
bears have been known to dismantle surveillance cameras hidden in trees (Gannon 
2013). More and more, animals are activating the shutters of camera traps set up by 
scientists, not simply by walking past them, but by closing in on them for careful 
inspection (see for example, McPherson 2014; Fig. 2.1).22  
                                                 
21 “Snapcat” promotes the tagline “Photos of Cats. By Cats.” It facilitates “selfies” by luring cats into a 
virtual photo booth with red laser-like screen animations. The cursor works as a shutter; when the cat 
touches it, it activates a built in camera and produces cat “selfies.” 
22 See “Animal Selfies: Wildlife Photographs Taken by Remotely-Activated Camera Traps in India” (Sim 
2014), for an impressive series of animal “selfies” gleaned from camera traps placed by Wildlife 
Conservation Society-India. For a more comprehensive exploration of camera-trap photography, see 
Roland Kays recent monograph, Candid Creatures: How Camera Traps Reveal the Mysteries of Nature 
(2016). 
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As the long history of photographing and filming live animals suggests, cameras 
have figured in the day-to-day lives of animals in varying ways at different scales.  
However, in the new media environment, this presence is becoming more pronounced. 
Cameras are not only nested in smartphones, tablets and laptops, but camera traps are 
set up in the most remote and inaccessible areas. Live streaming surveillance cameras 
are positioned in intimate animal spaces, and high performance cameras like those in 
the GoPro series or “Crittercams”23 are physically mounted to animal bodies. 
Sometimes, cameras even end up inadvertently in animal spaces. In the summer of 
2014, for example, a skydiver’s helmet-mounted GoPro was dislodged just before he was 
about to jump. The camera fell thousands of feet and landed in the muddy earth of a 
pigpen, recording all the while. By chance, the camera settled with the lens facing 
upward, and it was able to capture footage of an inquisitive pig as it tried to determine 
                                                 
23 Developed by Greg Marshall, it is an apparatus that includes small cameras mounted to animal bodies 
to depict the world from the animals’ point of view. Cameras are custom fitted based on individual species 
physiology.  
 
Fig.2.1 Snow Leopard Caught in 
Camera Trap. Photo by Richard 
Bischof, Norwegian University 
of Life Sciences and Muhammad 
Ali Nawaz, Snow Leopard 
Foundation, Pakistan (2014) 
Source: National Geographic 
(McPherson 2014). 
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the device’s edibility. The camera, and the resulting footage, were finally discovered 
months later by Mia Munselle, the pig’s caretaker (Kooser 2014). She uploaded the 
footage to YouTube (“Camera falls from airplane and lands in pig pen” 9 Feb. 2014) (Fig. 
2.2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cameras are now more than ever substantially integrated in the living spaces of 
domesticated, feral, and wild animals. And from available evidence, animals are 
discerning and highly reactive to these devices. As the above examples suggest, animals 
are exploring these objects emerging in their everyday surround and beginning to probe 
their significance—even when humans go to great lengths to hide them.  
Accidental animal videos take this animal-camera relationship to the next level. 
For not only are animals taking notice of cameras, they are taking control of them, and 
by extension the processes of image production. In seizing this control, animals are 
unintentionally promoting themselves as recalcitrant subjects, resisting human 
attempts to frame them. At the same time, they are also redefining the terms and 
conditions of representation. What they are producing instead is a parade of 
“discorrelated images.” The concept, coined by Shane Denson, refers to images that do 
 
Fig. 2.2. Pig 
investigates errant 
GoPro in “Camera falls 
from airplane and 
lands in pig pen” (Mia 
Munselle, USA, 2014). 
Author’s screenshot. 
Source: YouTube. 
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not correspond to the human perceptual system and trouble the correlation between 
human thought and being (2016).  
Denson, however, identifies these increasingly discorrelated images as a new 
phenomenon, aligning them with Steven Shaviro’s notion of the “post-cinematic.” That 
is, the new media dispositif wherein the cinematic camera has been replaced by mobile 
digital imaging apparatuses. Allegedly, these post-cinematic cameras produce images 
that generate “a kind of ambient, free-floating sensibility that…cannot be attributed to 
any subject in particular” (Shaviro 2). The power of the discorrelated images of the post-
cinematic supposedly lies in their ability to provide valuable counter-images to the 
correlated images of the cinematic.  
Shaviro and Denson are speaking of course to Vivian Sobchack (1992) and others 
who have argued that the cinematic apparatus is analogous to human corporeality and 
subjectivity. Certainly, the “handheld” camera can amplify this aesthetic of human 
embodiment. The perceptible, uneven movements of the camera can accentuate the 
body of the camera operator, and its interaction with the profilmic world (e.g., Albright 
2011; Hesseberth 2014). This close visual-tactile relationship between the human body 
and camera has, in the past, created a particular metaphysics of human authorial 
presence. However, this human correlation is not endemic to the cinema. 
By seizing the camera, and taking control of its movement and its framing, 
animals are overtly disturbing this perceived homology between the camera and the 
human filmmaker, the screen and the spectator. In “octopus steals my video camera,” 
for example, the “multi-arm-held” aesthetic alludes to an especially mysterious 
metaphysics: the perceptual alterity of cold-blooded, marine-dwelling invertebrate 
being. This alien presence is invoked by discorrelated images, but rather than 
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announcing a new post-cinematic sensibility that departs from the cinematic, these 
images mark a return to it. That is, they amplify and intensify the fundamental non-
subjective dimension of cinema that has been there all along. Cinema can, and certainly 
has, affirmed and reproduced this correlation between human and camera, but it is not 
essential to it.  
 
VIII. Animals, Alterity, and the Confrontational Power of the Cinematic 
Image  
 
“Octopuses are intriguing and unpredictable.”  
—Roland C. Anderson, Jennifer A. Mather, and James B. 
Wood, from Octopus: The Ocean’s Intelligent Invertebrate 
(9). 
 
The enigmatically alien nature of octopuses has been a wellspring for the modern 
imagination. It certainly factored into Jean Painlevé’s and Geneviève Hamon’s surrealist 
science film, The Love Life of the Octopus [Les Amours de la pieuvre] (1965). Their film 
does indeed produce, as Eva S. Hayward claims in her thoughtful analysis, “a refracted 
spectatorship that bends the spectator away from self-reflection and self-identification 
toward a Surrealist disorientation and displacement” (29). Read another way, however, 
the film merely augments the disorientation that the octopus itself already produces in 
the human just by its very appearance.  
Fiction writers have been exploring the surreal experience of octopus’s alterity 
well before Painlevé and Hamon. The octopus was the central inspiration for H.P. 
Lovecraft’s evil primordial deity first introduced in the short story, “Call of the Cthulhu” 
(1928). Octopuses also figured largely in H.G. Wells’ War of the Worlds (1897) as a 
hostile race of aliens set on the extermination of humans. Meanwhile, Victor Hugo was 
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preoccupied by the creature’s terrifying “unreality” in Toilers of the Sea (1866). 
Octopuses, the novel’s narrator proclaims, 
mark the transition of our reality into another. They seem to belong to that 
commencement of terrible life which the dreamer sees confusedly through 
the loophole of the night […] They are indeed phantoms as much as 
monsters. They are proved and yet improbable. Their fate is to exist in 
spite of à priori reasonings. (295)  
Hugo’s protagonist, Gilliatt, is wholly unable to identify with or even understand the 
creature. It is nearly a complete inversion of human existence, calling into question the 
very authority and exceptionality of human seeing, knowing, and being. In addition to 
fighting for his life, Gilliatt must also fend off the paralyzing existential dread that the 
creature incites. In confronting the octopus, Gilliatt faces the more-than-human 
mysteries of existence, and the human being’s cosmic insignificance in an arcane 
universe.  
               Because the outward appearance of the octopus is so significantly different than 
anything humanly familiar, it challenges the possibilities of the sympathetic 
imagination. They have long been mobilized as potent figures of difference for humans.  
At the same time that Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution was refiguring conceptions 
of the human and of life itself, octopuses emerged as terrifying reminders of the 
irrepressible persistence and the seemingly supernatural achievement of ostensibly 
primordial forms.  
Octopuses have head-like mantles and two large eyes that have focusing lenses 
capable of seeing high-resolution detail. This is the extent of their similarity to humans. 
Their eyes are on either side of their mantle; their pupils are rectangular slits, which 
grant them greater peripheral vision. They also get additional sensory information from 
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their extra-ocular vision. Thanks to photosensitive skin cell receptors, they can change 
texture and color to either put themselves on display, or to camouflage themselves, 
depending on their needs. They are also cold-blooded organisms and their circulatory 
system is not centralized: they have three hearts that pump blue copper-based blood.  
As invertebrates; they do not have a central nervous system. Instead, their 
intelligence is distributed across eight, “smart” arms, which can operate with or 
independently of each other. One arm can even grow back should one be severed. Each 
arm has hundreds of pliable, sensor-rich suckers, adept at gripping and maneuvering 
objects, as well as smelling and tasting them (Schweid 35). As such, they are surprisingly 
nimble and cunning. In the wild, they are known to enter crab traps, eat the crabs, and 
then leave again before the traps are pulled up to the surface. In captivity, they have 
surreptitiously escaped from and returned to their enclosures, and have even 
dismantled aquariums (Schweid 13).24  
They are able to exist and thrive in all oceans, at every depth and in the most 
inhospitable of environments. They can even survive for a time on land, and despite 
being boneless, are able to crawl. In the water, they are strong and fast swimmers.  They 
get around by contracting and shooting water through supple internal funnels. They also 
use this technique to move sand, rocks, and other debris in order to dig up hidden prey, 
clean out their dens, and push away intruders. As protean forms they demonstrate 
incredible flexibility. Some, such as the mimic octopus, are impressive shape shifters, 
and are able to take on the shape and comportment of other species. They are often 
prey, but also accomplished hunters. They have chitinous, bird-like beaks that are well 
                                                 
24 Just recently, Inky, a Giant Pacific octopus made headlines when it escaped from the National 
Aquarium of New Zealand in Napier and disappeared into a drain pipe near its tank, never to be seen 
again (Bilefsky 2016). 
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muscled, and can inject poisonous venom into a wound (Anderson, Mather, and Wood: 
111).  
Their physiological otherness, encourages the uncomfortable contemplation of a 
wholly foreign, and ancient mode of being. After all, the incredible ancestral lineage of 
modern day octopuses goes back over 400 million years (Schweid 14). As much as 
octopuses are strange, they are also old and familiar, evoking a feeling of the uncanny. 
To return to the Hugo quote above: they “mark the transition of our reality into another” 
(295).  Their peculiar, un-human bodies can summon with them an equally bizarre 
unreality, one that does not simply invert human understandings of reality, but also 
precedes the very notion of it. Encounters with animals can generate surprising 
juxtapositions between bodies and between worlds, but octopuses especially so, thanks 
to their particularly significant otherness. This confrontation with radical otherness is 
homologous to the encounter with the cinematic image itself. Animals and cinematic 
images, Pollman writes, “have a lot in common, for both affect our understanding of 
ourselves and our bodies, our relationship to other creatures (and to creatureliness), and 
our ability to reflect on or sense vitality” (2011: 128).  
The parallels between animals encounters and cinematic experience was not lost 
on Bazin, whose interest in cinema was inseparable from his interest in animals.  As a 
film critic he loved cinema, but he also loved animals. “He kept all sorts of pets,” 
François Truffaut writes in his foreword to What is Cinema? Vol. 2, “a chameleon, a 
parrot, squirrels, tortoises, a crocodile and other creatures I cannot list because I don’t 
know how to spell their names” (2005b: vi). While all animals fascinated Bazin, unusual 
and less charismatic ones captivated him especially. He was particularly concerned with 
reptiles, Dudley Andrew notes in Bazin’s biography, for “despite a lifetime of study, he 
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could never quite imagine how they experienced the world” (1978: 12-13). Animals 
presented a different mode of being in and engaging with the world. That they carried 
on with their own private, mysterious lives in tandem with our own was a reminder for 
Bazin that reality is not reducible only to that which appears to us. Animals 
demonstrated the way cinematic images work: that is, by “harboring surprises and 
discoveries yet to be made” even in the most carefully constructed environments 
(Andrew 1978: 12).  
Bazin valued these tensions between stability and instability, between legibility 
and indeterminacy, and predictability and contingency. For him, they accentuated and 
cultivated attention toward the fundamental tension between reality and representation 
at the heart of cinema. He appreciated these frictions wherever they appeared—between 
a character and a prop, an actor and a character, a script and a performance, a filmed 
event and its representation. Observing this predilection, Serge Daney suggests that 
Bazin’s fundamental law for filmmaking is "whenever it is possible to enclose two 
heterogeneous objects in the same frame, editing is prohibited" (32). The tension 
between different phenomena incites irreversible transformations to our perception. 
Editing can obscure or inhibit sensory access to this metamorphosis, which explains 
Bazin’s respect for the long take.   
Bazin was especially interested in cinematic moments involving animals. When 
animals are present onscreen, they amplify—more than other kinds of oppositional 
phenomena—cinema’s confrontational power, the source of which is essentially non-
human. He tended specifically to unedited scenes where animals were framed together 
with other beings, such as a child and a horse in Crin Blanc (Lamorisse 1953), a child 
and a lion in Where No Vultures Fly (Watt 1951), and a crocodile and a heron in 
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Louisiana Story (Flaherty 1948). Remarking on Bazin’s partiality toward animals in his 
writings on cinema, Daney playfully speculates that, “we shall see that the essence of 
cinema becomes a story about animals” (32).  
Daney is not merely being provocative. Animals have in fact been present at 
seminal moments in the development of cinema. This presence is not coincidental; 
animals bring something elemental to cinema. They introduce elements of contingency 
and vitality, creating the possibility for transformation. Animals are part of cinema’s 
larger project of exploring the frontiers of human perceptual experience, and rational 
understanding. At the same time, they operate as counterpoints to the technology’s 
native tendencies toward representability, systematicity, and predictability. They make 
manifest the basic tensions at the crux of the cinematic image itself: artifice, 
predictability, contrivance, and intelligibility on the one hand, and life, risk, chance, and 
unintelligibility on the other.  
Bazin himself explicitly states that, “Animal films reveal the cinema to us” (1955: 
2-3,8; Cahill 267). Animals onscreen disclose cinema’s ontological foundations as a non-
anthropocentric medium. They demonstrate its native tendency to juxtapose worlds, 
and perspectives, the familiar with the unfamiliar, and different kinds and ways of 
being, human and non-human. They bring the medium itself into view. This is not to say 
that animals are just attractive symbols of otherness, useful figures that function as 
guarantors of the real, or proxies for cinematic contingency. Their value as sources of 
difference is located in the full sovereignty of their being and the fact that they belong to 
fields of perception and action beyond human control. Accidental animal videos amplify 
this fact: that animals resist and undermine our attempts to represent them. These 
videos affirm the dialectical struggle between reality and representation, and the power 
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of non-human animals to encourage us to see cinema as something that does not merely 
serve human desires, but serves the world, in all its more-than-human complexity and 
dynamism. They can help remediate how we traditional gaze at animals, and the 
octopus in particular.  
 The transformative potential offered by the octopus’s alterity has, of late, been 
hampered by the anthropomorphic gaze. While the 19th and early 20th century 
imagination fled in fear from the octopus’s alterity, a century later, humans have been 
inoculated, seeing something familiar in their gaze: themselves. The current literature 
about octopuses is full of anecdotes about impressions of lucidity, mutual familiarity, 
and meaningful looks, which seems to be an outcome of the octopus’s large, camera-like 
eyes, and its impressive manual dexterity. “Gazing for any length of time at an octopus,” 
Richard Schweid observes in his cultural history of the creature, “leads to the 
inescapable conclusion that the animal is looking back, and is somehow thinking about 
what it is seeing” (1).  
Likewise, Roger Hanlon, a scientist who has been working with octopuses since 
1968, insists that, “anyone who has seen an octopus in an aquarium will have had the 
uncanny impression of being carefully watched” (Hanlon and Messenger 1; see also 
Wells 142).  Jean Boal, a biologist at Millersville University in Pennsylvania, certainly 
got this impression when she tried to feed a female California mud flat octopus some old 
shrimp. She insists that the octopus met her gaze, grabbed it from her, swam over to the 
drain of her tank, and proceeded to stuff the offending item down the opening, all the 
while without ever breaking eye contact (qtd. in Linden 42-43).  
These accounts about shared gazes, however, betray a blatant 
anthropocentricism. The octopus’ alien otherness is eclipsed by the overwhelming 
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human tendency to see itself not only in the octopus’ gaze but also occupying the very 
centre of it.  As a case in point, when Victor Huang encountered that Giant Pacific 
octopus that fateful day, he immediately thought the octopus was after him. After all, the 
epic confrontation between man and nature in the primordial sea especially is deeply 
entrenched in our cultural mythology. That the octopus reached for the camera instead, 
and surreptitiously swam off with it, offers a surprising twist in the narrative. This 
unexpected diversion acts as a reminder that animals and technology, two supposed 
supplements to human subjectivity, are not necessarily supplements at all. Snubbed by 
the octopus and robbed of his camera, Huang’s experience serves as a valuable lesson in 
human hubris: the human, despite its expectation otherwise, does not occupy the 
central position of every relationship.  
 
IX. Aesthetic Communication and Overlapping Ecologies 
 
Just looking, 
you think, as if such an enterprise 
were safe, as if she were not 
the pupil-Pandora she is, 
who can open a jar if only 
you’ll teach her.  
   — “Octopus vulgaris,” Nicky Beer (2008) 
 
Octopuses are curious. They live in fluctuating, dynamic, and high-risk 
environments wherein they are frequently confronted by new stimuli. A curiosity about 
the things in their environment, probing their potential uses and risks, is a matter of 
their survival. No doubt, this inquisitiveness has contributed a great deal to their 
adaptability and their resourcefulness. Remarking on this particular aspect of their 
demeanor, Burghardt states, “one would expect that if any invertebrate would play it 
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might be an octopus” (2005: 373). Thus it is not altogether surprising that an octopus 
would take notice of a camera or play with it. 
Play is the process whereby an animal investigates an object’s qualities and 
explores its limits and potentials. But whether the octopus is playing with the camera 
aimlessly, or for a particular purpose cannot be discerned. However, the very fact that 
the octopus perceived the camera at all indicates that it had designs on it. For Jakob von 
Uexküll, any object “becomes a carrier of meaning as soon as it enters into a relationship 
with a subject” (140). Animals are not merely observers, he maintains; they do not enter 
into relationships with objects in general, or by accident. Rather, they forge 
relationships with objects in particular. This means that once seized by the animal’s 
perceptual system the object becomes a specific carrier of meaning for it (Uexküll 140). 
To be a carrier of meaning, certain aspects of the object must complement an aspect of 
the animal’s perceptual apparatus in some way (Uexküll 143).  
It may seem strange for an octopus to pursue a camera, but octopuses have 
already evinced familiarity with other human objects: detritus such as shipwrecks, old 
pipes, cans, shoes and even beer bottles.25 Thus many ostensible human-world objects 
can offer affordances for the octopus, which means that octopuses are not only able to 
notice them, but are primed to perceive the potential uses of these objects. Of course, a 
Panasonic Lumix DMC-FT2 (TS2) is clearly materially distinct from a beer bottle; an 
octopus can hide inside it. For us, cameras are for making images. The octopus uses the 
                                                 
25 During a scuba dive in Puget sound, marine biologist Roland Anderson came across eight beer bottles 
on the ocean floor, each one filled by a tiny red octopus (Anderson, Mather and Wood 74). The animals 
were clearly taking full advantage of this new resource where there may not have been any other suitable 
den sites. 
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camera to this end, albeit inadvertently. And yet, for the octopus, cameras are for 
something else.  
To think about how the same object can figure in different environments, 
Uexküll’s offers the example of a meadow flower, showing how an object can take on a 
plurality of notes depending on the kinds of “functional tones” it creates: 
 
Plucking the flower transforms the flower into a decoration in the girl-
world [decorating tone]. Running along the stem transforms the stem into 
a path in the ant-world [transporting tone], and the spittle-bug larva’s 
sticking it transforms the stem into a source of building material [dwelling 
tone]…every action impresses its meaning on a meaningless object and 
makes it thereby into a subject-related carrier of meaning in each 
respective environment. (Uexküll 146)  
 
The camera, like the meadow flower, by virtue of the octopus’s meddling, must 
necessarily bear a certain functional tone.  
A feeding tone is the most likely. Octopuses are color blind, so it would not have 
been piqued by the bright blue hue of the camera’s outer finish. Their eyes are 
particularly sensitive to light and movement however, so it was likely alerted by the 
camera’s illuminated LCD viewfinder screen. The brightness self-adjusts according to 
ambient light levels. In the semi-darkness near in the ocean floor, the camera was 
probably quite bright at the time. It is also possible that the camera shares a similar 
polarity with bioluminescence, the light emitted by some deep-sea dwellers—dwellers 
that octopuses also like to eat.  In addition to its luminosity, the camera’s small size and 
hard exterior may granted it a likeness to a shellfish, which octopuses are particularly 
fond of eating. Giant Pacific octopuses in particular enjoy big Dungeness crabs and 
geoduck clams (Anderson, Mather, and Wood 15).  
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And, because octopus have adapted to feeding on hard-shelled organisms, they 
are particularly equipped to manually handle them. While the packaging problem may 
be an issue for other predators, octopuses are adept at prying shells apart. They have 
flexible, bendable, and variable-sized suckers on their arms. These suckers enable them 
to hold shells open and pull tiny animals out of hiding. They can perform the most 
delicate of tasks with these suckered tips, such as untying knots of surgical silk 
(Anderson, Mather, and Wood 83). The suckers on its arms also act as chemical sensors, 
and provide the animal with information about the object in its clutches. Different kinds 
of shellfish require different techniques for extraction. Octopuses can bite and drill 
through shells with their sharp beaks and serrated teeth, but they often inspect and 
assess the shell’s thickness and depth first in order to figure out where and how to drill 
(Anderson, Mather, and Wood 61-3). Surely it would eventually realize that the camera 
is an unseemly object, but it is worth noting that octopuses will eat just about any 
animal that cannot evade them. It is accustomed to strange encounters with 
unidentifiable kinds. To it, the camera is no different.   
It is also possible that the camera took on a decorating or dwelling tone: 
octopuses often adorn the immediate exterior of their dens with neat piles of empty 
shells, bones, and rocks (Anderson, Mather, and Wood 71). These middens are 
sometimes called “gardens” because they are adjacent to the octopus’ den, and they 
appear as a form of ornamentation. However, these leftover shells also serve as 
protective walls to block the entrance of their dens from intruders (Anderson, Mather, 
and Wood 67). As Schweid remarks, the common octopus is a domestic creature, a 
homebody: it “likes nothing better than to find an inviting den, strew some rocks and 
clam shells in front of it and curl up inside, occasionally coming out in search of food” 
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(28). Looking for hard-shelled objects is part of its process of making a safe and inviting 
home for itself.  
Whether the camera bears a feeding tone, a decorating tone, or a dwelling tone, 
or something else entirely, remains unclear. Ultimately, the cause of “octopus steals my 
video camera” cannot be clarified. Causation, as Graham Harman explains it in Guerilla 
Metaphysics, can only ever be “vicarious” or indirect. The true cause of any action is 
enacted from a place that exists, but to which we do not have access.  What we can know 
is that vicarious causation is generated by an aesthetic attraction between things, what 
Harman calls “allure” (245). Allure is a momentary surface communication where some 
aspect of an object’s reality is glimpsed by another object. Allure can describe what 
compels an animal to steal a camera. As a term, it is imprecise and opaque; but what 
allure is, is not as important as what it does. It produces, as Harman explains, a “special 
and intermittent experience in which the intimate bond between a thing’s unity and its 
plurality of notes somehow partially disintegrates” (2005: 143). As such, when two 
phenomena are lured together, a sensual object, “breaks loose from its own qualities;” it 
becomes defamiliarized, it becomes new (2005: 148).  
Animals, Uexküll insists, only see objects that bear markers of significance to 
them specifically. That the octopus grabs the camera suggests that it was for a moment 
meaningful to it. This appropriation in turn suggests that the camera has qualities that 
we have not acknowledged or have simply forgotten. In forcing us to reckon with them, 
allure can “unleash objects that had been largely muffled in their relations with us, and 
can translate already recognized objects into more potent form” (Harman 2005: 245). A 
digital camera is a human-world tool used by humans to record the world for human 
ends. It has, however, become too comfortably an extension of the human sensorium. 
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Here, in the sticky arms of an octopus the camera has become productively estranged; it 
has to be considered something else. Often abstracted and obscured by the process of 
filmmaking—especially in the process of wildlife imagery—the camera becomes more 
than a force that mediates and remediates human vision, it is an earthly form, 
stubbornly material and entangled in the world.  
 
X. Conclusion: Mitigating the Human-World Picture 
In “The Age of the World Picture,” Heidegger critiques the proclivity of modern 
technology to transform the world into an object of and for representation. For him, this 
transformation is always a reduction wherein the infinite world is made into something 
finite.  This diminishes the world to a scale that humans can comfortably fit into, so that 
they can put themselves “into the picture…into the scene” (1977: 131). Now in the so-
called geological epoch of the Anthropocene—characterized by the rapid and substantive 
transformation of the earth by technologically-enabled human activities— this process 
of humanizing the world has seemingly reached fruition. Human interventions are now 
restructuring ecosystems, speeding up species extinctions, and contributing to serious 
ecological crises such as climate change. Though all organisms transform their 
environments, so the Anthropocene-rhetoric goes, the sheer scale and force of our 
schemes is unprecedented. Humans are significantly determining the appearance and 
operation of the world, quite literally making the world in our own image.  
But Heidegger presumes that in becoming a representation the world is not only 
fully rendered and reduced but also severed from a larger matrix of meaning. But as I 
have hoped to have shown, the process of representation is dynamic and dialectical. 
Accidental animal videos illustrate that the camera reaches out for the world, but it does 
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not swallow it up and appropriate it. The world and its phenomena are not to be 
underestimated. Representation is never totalizing or complete, and it is not without 
struggle. Acknowledging the ways in which these struggles find their way into 
representation are valuable way to affirm that the images cannot be disentangled from 
the processes by which they are made. 
If the anthropological machine is a human-camera that delivers the world to us in 
our image, then the value of cinema is its potential to mediate the world to us 
differently, provisioning an important counter-image to the human-world picture. The 
camera’s automatism is essential to the integrity of this mediation: its non-human 
remove protects the surprising hybridity of reality from our tendency to familiarize it 
and put our designs on it. Invitational, it guarantees the intrusion of the unexpected so 
germane to perceptual transformation.  It may not be a panacea for the 
anthropocentricism that deforms the world, but cinema can certainly intervene to 
remediate this limited worldview.  
Accidental animal videos are a friendly reminder of this, affirming that cinema 
still has the capacity to bring unfamiliar and unanticipated images to our attention. 
Images of resistance: proof that there remain aspects of the world that refuse capture, 
that still slip, maddeningly through our fingers. The world that asserts itself here is 
crafty and convivial: it pushes back and demands that we awaken from the dream of 
human mastery.  
What these ultimately suggest is that technological modernity is a multispecies 
affair, and that cinema has the potential to expand the limits of our imagined 
community.  Siegfried Kracauer likened cinema to such an alternative social space. He 
praised its radical inclusiveness, but he also valued its reflexivity. As Miriam B. Hansen 
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explains in her introduction to his Theory of Film: The Redemption of Physical Reality, 
cinema for Kracauer “attracted and made visible to itself and society an emerging, 
heterogenous mass public,” while at the same time, also engaging, at the level of the 
senses, “the contradictions of modernity” (xi). Accidental animal videos testify to a 
similar kind of cinematic vernacular, a much more creaturely modernism, an aesthetic 
matrix where the strange, more-than human sensory-perceptual experiences of 
modernity are articulated and brought to our attention. Regardless of our strategies of 
exclusion, animals continue to position themselves as part of the hybrid nature-cultures 
that comprise the social. 
We cannot know why this particular Giant Pacific Octopus stole Victor Huang’s 
camera. In the end it does not really matter why, only that in taking the camera away, 
the octopus brought back to the shore of our perception something far more valuable: an 
artifact from an alien world, where until now, it lay unclaimed like a gift from the tide. 
What we deem accidental is not extraneous but necessary. It marks the existence of 
other perspectives, other ways of getting on in the world, and operational processes that 
exceed our comprehension. These are as essential to the fabric of reality as they are to 
cinema.  
Animals present productive discontinuities at the surface of encounter. This gap 
is too often mistaken for a void that needs to be filled, or a surface that needs to be 
plumbed when in fact, it is a space for improvisation, gesticulation, and possibility. 
Media, as material-sensory-aesthetic interventions can constitute touchstones where we 
are able to convene and relate to one another in ways that productively challenge our 
traditional understandings of communication. Not only of cinematic communication, its 
aesthetic operations and ethical quandaries, but communication as a process more 
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broadly. They offer opportunities to think about it less as a means to occupy or inhabit 
the place of others, and instead as a means to cultivate and provision a place for them. 
Not a sublime idealized place, but a provisionally livable one.    
I continue this effort to open up our definition of communication in the next 
chapter. I examine the practice of staging encounters between non-human apes in zoos 
and touchscreen tablets, and use this as an occasion to explore the ways in which non-
human apes have been and continue to hold our communication imaginary captive. 
Their similarity to us is both a threat and lure that excites and stokes the modern ideal 
of communication as a fantasy of lossless exchange and unlimited universal access to the 
mysterious interiority of others. At the same time, however, captive apes clarify for us 
the confines of this narrow definition of communication, and encourage us toward a 
practical understanding of communication as something far more hospitable. 
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Chapter 3  
 
An Orangutan Plays with an iPad in Paradise:  
Staging Communication and Offering Accommodation in Captivity  
 
 For the human, practically everything can be a mirror.  
—Dominic Pettman, from Human Error: Species Being and 
Media Machines (10). 
 
Modern media have altered forever the meaning of 
anthropomorphism.  
—John Durham Peters, from Speaking into the Air: A 
History of the Idea of Communication (228). 
  
The anthropogenic machine…is an optical machine constructed of a 
series of mirrors in which man, looking at himself, sees his own 
image always already deformed in the features of an ape.  
—Giorgio Agamben, from The Open: Man and Animal (26-
7).     
 
I. Ape, Meet iPad  
A gorilla is pictured, perched on a grassy knoll. Its eyes are cast downwards, 
transfixed on the iPad screen that it holds at arm’s-length. Its left hand is supporting the 
tablet, while its right hand is touching the screen. The focus of its attention is 
tantalizingly concealed. The caption reads, “New toy ... intrigued gorilla prods iPad.” 
The image in question appeared in the April 2011 issue of the UK newspaper The Sun, 
alongside an article entitled, “Planet of the Apps.” The title playfully alludes to the 
prolific Planet of the Apes franchise, conjuring up for the imagination the boundless 
potential of non-human ape intelligence. The reference also provokes the excitement of 
its readers by mobilizing the alluring and well-trod narrative of apes becoming human.  
  Scientists from the University of Kent, the article reports, are giving iPads to 
gorillas in zoos as a means of keeping them occupied during their time in captivity 
(Flynn 2011). It alleges that the gorillas explored a number of different apps, and that 
they were particularly fond of the game “Angry Birds.” Eventually the gorillas became so 
 154 
enamored with the tablets that they supposedly carried them around protectively “as if 
they were babies” (Flynn 2011). In the end however, this mimetic enactment proved to 
be little more than an April Fools’ Day hoax (Morrison and Owen 2012). Nevertheless, 
the scenario set a stir in Claire Richard, the primary gorilla keeper at the Milwaukee 
County Zoo, a zealous desire to transform this fantasy into a reality.  
Richard shared the story with her friends on Facebook, remarking that she 
wanted an iPad for Maji, one the zoo’s resident gorillas (Uebelherr 2011). Her Facebook 
friend Kim Houk, a zoo volunteer, commented that she should get one for Mahal too—
the zoo’s youngest and recently acquired orangutan. Scott Engel, an app developer and 
orangutan enthusiast took the bait, and donated a used iPad. More donations followed 
(Uebelherr 2011). Only months after the ruse first appeared in The Sun, apes at the 
Milwaukee County Zoo were actually playing with iPads; even drawing pictures using 
apps like Doodle Buddy (Lee 2012). Though initially imagined for gorillas, in the end it 
was the zoo’s orangutans, Mahal and M.J., who seemed to display more interest in the 
devices.  
Eventually Richard Zimmerman, founder of the non-profit advocacy organization 
Orangutan Outreach, got involved. He had already been primed: he admitted to being 
similarly inspired to create such a project while watching Steve Jobs publicly unveil the 
iPad in January of 2010 (Mathur 2012). “When I saw the close-ups of [Jobs’] fingers on 
the iPad” he confesses, “I thought to myself—This is perfect for orangutans!’” (qtd. in 
Mathur 2012).  And so “Apps for Apes” was born.  
In its current manifestation, the project is an enrichment initiative that strives to 
pair captive orangutans with donated iPads in zoos, while also promoting education 
about orangutan endangerment, and garnering support for orangutan conservation in 
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the wild.  Since its initial implementation at the Milwaukee County Zoo, it has gained 
considerable traction. The initiative has partnered up with zoos all across the world, 
from New Zealand and Mexico, to the United States and Canada, including Ontario’s 
own Toronto Zoo. And, as it has gathered momentum, its three-part mandate has 
seemingly given way to more ambitious aspirations: most notably to edify orangutans, 
and make them into tech-savvy, communicative subjects.  
Without a doubt, “Apps for Apes” is carried out in the name of love for 
orangutans. But no matter how deeply felt this love is, it is not immune from 
epistemological temptations. As this chapter hopes to show, staging encounters between 
non-human apes and communication technology is a risky venture given the historically 
entrenched discursive legacy of putting the two together. This history, I argue, has 
substantially reduced the conditions of possibility for the generation of more creative 
and tactful encounters.  
Compounding the problem is also an impoverished understanding of 
communication as an ideal of mental communion, and total access to interiority. These 
factors have limited options for more reciprocally beneficial relations—but they have not 
removed them altogether. “Apps for Apes” can be read as applications for apes—ways of 
putting apes into operation—for human ends. However, the project can also 
alternatively be read as applications for apes. The initiative has, after all, resulted in a 
turn toward application design for apes and a consideration of apes as users. This spirit 
of accommodation creates an opening in the project for a more generous orientation 
toward non-human apes. It also creates opportunities to reimagine communication as 
less about human access and the expansion of human consciousness, and more about 
making provisionally livable worlds together.  
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II. Apes and Technology: Uncanny Bedfellows 
That this serious initiative sprang forth from an offhand joke speaks to the 
provocative power and imaginative thrill of putting non-human apes and technology 
together.26  Certainly, the image of a gorilla using—and amusing itself with—an iPad, 
makes for an indelible vision. Part of its appeal, no doubt, is that it offers a compelling 
endorsement of the technology—and personal, digital communication devices more 
generally. It presents what Nicole Shukin calls the irresistible pre-discursive mimesis of 
the animal body, a recurring trope in the modern imaginary that has become “an iconic 
analogy of the effective immediacy of technological communication” (141). The iPad, as 
it is mobilized in the hands of the gorilla, passes itself off as a communication interface 
so easy and intuitive that even non-human apes can interact with it.  
The real power of this fantastical scenario, however, is not the suggestion that 
non-human apes are able to use personal communication devices. Rather it lies in the 
promise that non-human apes might constitute viable—that is, intelligent and thus 
human-like—subjectivities that can be accessed and probed. Humans have a long 
history of seeking contact with seemingly intelligent others, especially charismatic 
mega-fauna like great apes. This history has etched a well-worn desire path in the 
perimeter between species. As such, the human ape is compulsively brought toward the 
non-human ape in the same way, each time.  
The image of a gorilla holding fast to its possessions, for example, is a retread of 
Koko the signing gorilla’s unforgettable appearances in National Geographic over thirty 
                                                 
26 It continues to inspire jokes in the popular press. Coverage of the “Apps for Apes” project persistently 
plays up the humorous dimension of apes playing with iPads, and behaving like humans. “Apps for Apes” 
even appeared on an “Enemy Within” segment on The Colbert Report (June 16 2012) where Colbert joked 
that the orangutans were training with iPads to become a new cyber terrorist threat to the U.S. 
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years ago. The first features her photographing herself with a camera in a mirror. The 
second, meanwhile, depicts her embracing her pet kitten. These images not only 
establish that the gorilla has “possessions.” As Donna Haraway notes in her analysis, 
they are mobilized as evidence that Koko is in possession of something even more 
significant: a sense of “self.” Koko’s trove of personal effects corroborates that she has a 
potentially coherent, singular interiority. But this “self,” Haraway postulates, is one 
clearly “crafted in the political theory and political economy, not to mention the 
consumer culture, of the modern west” (1989: 146). Her “self” rather than some 
inevitable manifestation of her essence is instead something wholly manufactured.  
This manufacturing of non-human ape subjectivity is not simply a process carried 
out for its own sake. The purposeful enculturation of non-human apes serves 
communicative ends. As such, it is instead, part of a nearly century-long commitment to 
making non-human apes into our own personal interlocutors. This is a relatively recent 
project, developing out of western, postwar primatology. And yet it is part of an even 
larger epochal enterprise: the cultural project of modern communication.  
The modern western condition, John Durham Peters argues, is characterized by a 
monomaniacal obsession with communication, wherein any and all encounters between 
ourselves and strange others are persistently measured against an impossible ideal. This 
ideal, Peters calls “the dream of perfect communication.” It is a myth of mental 
communion, whereby knowing what another is thinking is believed to bring mutual 
understanding and harmony to the world.  This ideal, it is believed, can be achieved by 
simply adding a miracle means into the mix: only the right medium can repair the 
fundamental chasm between the self and the other.  
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Communication is constitutive of the modern world, but our understanding of 
communication is deeply flawed. Communication has its roots in the Latin 
communicare, which means to share or make common. Before the 17th century, this 
understanding of communication was anchored to matter, to the physical world. After, it 
became more akin with sharing minds (Peters 77). This goal is, of course, impossible, 
which only serves to galvanize its allure. The interest in transcending communicative 
limits has “invited novel adventures of contact with particularly enigmatic others” 
(Peters 228).  Nowhere is this so pronounced as in the modern history of our encounters 
with non-human apes. Great apes are especially compelling for us, as we will see. But 
the desire to commune with them is not innocent. Rather it is invested in producing 
knowledge about human beings, and expanding human self-consciousness.  
Though “Apps for Apes” is in many ways a new and unique project, it also re-
enacts a familiar and enduring drama. It begins as an enrichment initiative and ends up 
as a communicative intervention. It betrays a deep-seated desire for shared interiority 
with inaccessible others. It is tantalized by the potential yield of the elusive minds of 
non-human apes especially. Likewise, it is emboldened by the new technology of the 
iPad and its potential to afford such access. Thus it runs the risk of casting non-human 
apes as insipient human subjects who bear coveted information. Subjects that can be in 
turn, actuated, made communicative, and accessible through technology. This is the 
dream of perfect communication: always bypassing the real in favour of the ideal, 
ultimately instrumentalizing and undermining our relationships with others.  
“Apps for Apes” is a project preoccupied with transcending the limits of 
communicability with regards to a series of vexing obstacles: species difference, the 
threat of extinction, and the enclosure of the zoo. With its haptic screen interface that 
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works as a portal to the world’s largest communication network, the iPad promises to 
offer a solution, or at least a diversion, to the problem of contact. And yet, the project 
fails to do so, thanks in large part to the resistance of the orangutans. As much as “Apps 
for Apes” is a mythical, discursively inscribed meeting point between non-human apes 
and communication technology, it is also a real, material meeting that requires willing 
partners.  
Attending to how these physical encounters between orangutans and iPads are 
designed, carried out, and negotiated puts limits on human entitlement to access. These 
obstacles are necessary reminders that transcendence, though framed in opposition to 
solipsism, only ends up reinforcing it. Instead of building bridges, “Apps for Apes” runs 
the risk of extending the human estate, at the cost of the non-human. These obstacles of 
contact are essential: they inspire a need for alternative routes, and provide the 
conditions of possibility for working out new ways of engaging with mysterious others. 
In continuing to mobilize our efforts toward divining methods to penetrate minds, we 
shirk the real work of relating and connecting. These moments of resistance serve as a 
reminder that rather than seek to transcend limits, communication must accept what 
remains immanent. For a truly tactful engagement, we must make do with what is 
offered to us, at the surface of encounter.  
 
III. Fictions and Frictions: On the Incompatibility of Orangutans and 
iPads  
Under the auspices of the “Apps for Apes” project, Orangutan Outreach solicits 
donations of used iPads from the public.  The devices are then distributed to interested 
zoos. Once there, they are deployed for cognitive and creative stimulation, 
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supplementing the orangutan’s preexisting physical enrichment schedules. The project’s 
explicit mandate, according to its website, is threefold: to alleviate boredom in captive 
orangutans by providing enrichment and gratification. It also aspires to raise awareness 
about the critical endangerment of orangutans in the wild. And finally, it hopes to 
promote and rally support for Orangutan Outreach’s own conservation and 
rehabilitation efforts in Indonesia and Malaysia where the world’s dwindling native 
orangutan populations currently reside. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At first glance, “Apps for Apes” appears fairly straightforward: iPads are 
transposed from human hands into those of orangutans. The project’s primary 
promotional photo (see Fig. 3.1) seems to confirm this effortless exchange. It depicts a 
young orangutan in its enclosure, sitting with an iPad propped up with its hands and 
feet. But upon closer examination, the iPad appears peculiar: its corners are much too 
pointy, its size too large and unseemly. As it turns out, the photo has been altered. To be 
 
Fig. 3.1: Doctored 
photo of orangutan 
holding an iPad 
serves as “Apps for 
Apes” promotional 
image. Photo by 
Scott Engel. Source: 
Orangutan 
Outreach. 
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fair, Orangutan Outreach does not try to hide this fact. On its site, the image is 
accompanied by the footnote: “Photo has been modified. The orangutans are not yet 
holding the iPads due to safety concerns.” However, whenever the image appears 
elsewhere in the popular press, this annotation is suspiciously missing, which serves to 
downplay, and even conceal the fact that orangutans do not actually handle the iPads 
directly, or on their own.  
Today’s touchscreens may be made of strong, damage resistant Corning® 
Gorilla® Glass (See Pogue 2010) but iPads are still far too delicate for the unwieldy 
touch of orangutans. Not only can they harm the iPads, the iPads can harm them: the 
devices contain hazardous metals, which could cause serious injury if ingested (Mathur 
2012). As a result, the orangutans’ sessions with the iPad are short, intermittent, 
indirect, and always supervised.  Humans hold the iPads toward the orangutans from 
outside their enclosures. Some orangutans look at the screens through glass windows. 
Others are able to touch them, but only by reaching through the spaces between the 
wires or bars of their holding pens. In addition, orangutans have to be taught to touch 
the screen with their fingers. Many try to use external implements like sticks, or other 
body parts like toes, lips or tongues (Fernandez-Blance 2012; Berridge 2014). Even then, 
the orangutans still have fingernails that curl over the tips of their fingers, preventing 
them from using the touchscreen properly (Fernandez-Blance 2012). Zookeepers have 
to hold the iPads at the right angle in order to account for this.  
iPad use is meant to be strictly voluntary. However, there are instances where 
zookeepers offer incentives to the apes, in the form of food rewards, to encourage them 
to play with iPads, or play with them in certain ways. Such conditioning is, of course, 
against the elective, non-utilitarian spirit of play. On occasions where the orangutans do 
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display an interest, they also have additional choices to play with whichever apps they 
enjoy. “If they’re engaged in an app, we’ll keep going,” Erin Stromberg, an orangutan 
keeper at the Smithsonian National Zoological Park explains, “If not, they have the 
choice to walk away” (qtd. in “National Zoo Orangutans” 2013). And they often do. 
Many of them are simply not interested in interacting with the devices at all. As 
Matthew Berridge, an orangutan keeper at the Toronto Zoo notes, the orangutans in his 
care “would rather do most other enrichments over using the iPad” (2014). 
These realities of orangutan-iPad interaction are persistently underreported in 
the promotion of “Apps for Apes.” Instead, there is much more interest in the project’s 
ever-expanding promissory horizon. While the reach of any new venture is bound to 
exceed its grasp, “Apps for Apes” is especially prone. As the opening anecdote indicates, 
the project was borne of—and continues to be mobilized by—the human desire to see 
non-human apes using and enjoying personal communication devices. While the 
particularities of the project—orangutans, iPads, zoos—may be relatively new, putting 
captive apes and technology together is not. 27   
In fact, psychologist Robert Yerkes, who founded the very first primate research 
laboratory in the United States, wrote almost a full century ago that, “The greatest 
possibility of improvement in our provision for captive primates lies in the invention 
and installation of apparatus which can be used for play and work” (1925: 229).  As this 
                                                 
27 Willie Smits was using touchscreen play with captive orangutans at the Appenheul Zoo in the 
Netherlands as early as 2006. These efforts inspired Hanna Wirman’s more recent orangutan gameplay 
design project, TOUCH (Bringing new Technology to Orangutans for Understanding and Communicating 
cross-species for greater Harmony) based out of Hong Kong’s Polytechnic University (2014). Meanwhile 
touchscreens have been used substantially with bonobos in the work at the Great Ape Trust, which has 
combined lexigrams (also called “Yerkish”) with the touchscreen to facilitate bonobos enrichment and 
communication.      
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proclamation indicates, technological intervention has long been imagined as a way to 
remediate the question of non-human primate life in captivity. However, what is 
significant about “Apps for Apes” is that it is not merely interested in remediation; it has 
much grander aspirations.  
 
IV. Great Ape Expectations: Enrichment, Edification, and 
Communication 
 
As aforementioned, the project promotes an explicit tripartite mandate—
implementing orangutan enrichment, increasing public education about orangutan 
endangerment, and cultivating economic support for conservation. However, it also 
appears to hold additional, tacit commitments. At times, for example, the project aspires 
to edify the orangutans. There is a sense that the orangutans are already similar to 
humans: they bear an incipient intelligence that simply needs the proper techniques and 
technologies in order to be cultivated. Turning orangutans into tech-savvy subjects 
serves a greater purpose, however: that is to turn them into communicative partners. 
Hovering around “Apps for Apes” is an assumption that orangutans contain rich interior 
lives that are just waiting to be accessed and articulated by the right means. And iPads 
appear here as miracle tools to facilitate this intra- and inter-species communication. 
They crystallize audio, visual and haptic modalities with additional qualities of 
portability, network accessibility, and commercial availability, which make it a viable 
option for such interventions.  
“Apps for Apes” began as an enrichment initiative. Since it has gained 
momentum, however, it has become additionally interested in the communicative 
potential of putting iPads and orangutans together—regardless of their incompatibility. 
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As Zimmerman explains, the initial phase of the project was to get the iPads into zoos. 
The second phase, meanwhile, was to implement wi-fi. The hope was that orangutans at 
different zoos might be able to communicate with each other via Skype or Facetime. As 
Zimmerman reveals, the expectation is that orangutans will go online and contact other 
orangutans in order play for what he calls “Primate Playdate” (Crecente 2011).  
These video chats could possibly reconnect orangutans with other orangutan 
friends or family who have been transferred to other zoos. Such interactions may 
potentially even serve a practical function with regards to captive breeding. Orangutans 
have to move between zoos for mating; “meeting” online first may help set the 
groundwork for better relationships. It might also allow for human-orangutan 
communication. As Linda Jacobs, a trainer working with orangutans explains, the iPad 
gives the orangutans “a way of letting us know what they know, what they’re capable of 
and what they’d like to have” (Waugh 2012). 
To a certain extent, this shifting promissory horizon is to be expected: as a pilot 
project, “Apps for Apes” is unfinished and is still in its early stages of development.  Not 
only that, it is animated and made meaningful by a wide-variety of actors: reporters, 
zookeepers, zoo volunteers, zoo representatives, zoo visitors, the general public, 
conservation activists like Zimmermann, as well as the orangutans themselves. These 
participants promote a wide-spectrum of priorities and interests and bring different 
interpretations to the project, which do not all necessarily align. That it is implemented 
in geographically disparate zoo environments across the world with diverse 
institutional, local and national contexts only compounds this ambiguity.  
 “Apps for Apes” is not a coherently articulated unified initiative by any means. 
However, the fact that it began for the purposes of enrichment, and ended up concerned 
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with communication is worth a closer examination. The shift toward communication is a 
familiar one—the history of primate research follows a similar trajectory. As such it 
seems innocuous, and inevitable. It is as though working with apes not only leads to a 
curiosity to know more about them, but also a desire to commune with them. After 
living with orangutans in the field for years, for example, primatologist Biruté Galdikas 
decided to bring someone in to teach sign language to one of her rehabilitant 
orangutans, Sugito. Her reasoning was that, while she had always enjoyed her time with 
Sugito, she had regretted the fact that she was never able to “talk” to him. Sign language 
presented an opportunity to finally examine “how he perceived and interpreted the 
world” (qtd. in Haraway 1989: 141).  
The desire to turn encounters with apes into explicitly communicative ones may 
appear to be an eventuality, but it is discursively wrought. The trajectory is steered by 
pervasive myths about non-human apes on the one hand, and a misunderstanding of 
communication on the other. Non-human apes are subject to a distortive and 
disproportionate amount of cultural fascination. The animal’s rich symbolic heritage as 
mirror image and reflection of humans, or as window into human nature suggests that 
its allure stems largely from its similarity to us.  This similarity is not unfounded. Non-
human apes have an outward humanoid appearance, and there are many overlaps in 
morphology, physiology, behavior, and DNA. But the discipline of primatology also 
plays a substantial role in the production of this anthropomorphic figure of the ape, as 
object of knowledge and potential interlocutor.  
The work of primatology is carried out across a number of fields. Regardless of 
from where its inquiry begins, its central concern is to produce knowledge about 
primates. And “primate” is not just any taxonomic order of mammals; significantly, it is 
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also the one that includes humans.  As a method of inquiry, then, it is interested in non-
human primates—but only insofar as these animals can expand knowledge about human 
primates. Non-human primates are used as a basis for comparison and contrast, models 
we use to learn more about ourselves, assert our place in an expanding network of 
relations, and affirm our own narratives about origins and futures. Consequently, in the 
cultural imaginary non-human primates have been consistently mobilized as portals to 
human evolutionary history and as natural, pre-cultural humans.  Exposing non-human 
apes to our technologies has been part of a strategy to make them more like us, so we 
can understand the processes by which we ourselves transitioned from nature to culture. 
While primate research is hardly a new endeavor, primatology as a discipline is a 
relatively recent science. It appeared just before the middle of the 20th century, and its 
emergence also marked a turn in primate research toward communication. Therefore, in 
addition to situating non-human apes as objects of knowledge, primatology began to 
position them as subjects who might potentially communicate that knowledge. Haraway 
identifies this preoccupation as concomitant with the postwar turn toward cybernetics 
and information theory. The interest in systems of communication and control, she 
maintains, guided primate research away from tangibles such as ape physiology. Instead 
it moved toward ape interiority and intentionality, and focused on how such motivations 
were translated into sociality, interaction, and meaningful coordinated and effective 
action. In this regard, the desire to communicate with apes was borne less from a desire 
to build mutually beneficial relationships, and more from a desire to access knowledge 
for its potential application to human society. It was a means to learn more about 
alternative and more effective methods of governance, management, and control of 
populations in the wake of postwar instability. 
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This marked interest in ape motivation and behavior and the articulation and 
dissemination of information, led to the development of methods to externalize ape 
interiority. In light of this, this shift becomes more than just a symptom of the 
cybernetic turn: it is also a consequence of the more sprawling project of modern 
communication. The notion that with the right techniques and technology, minds can 
meet and mend the physical rift between them is characteristic of the modern rhetoric of 
communication. As Peters ascertains, this project is characterized by an imperative to 
frame all encounters with strangers as communicative ones. It also holds these 
communicative efforts to an ideal of lossless exchange and unlimited universal access to 
the mysterious interiority of others. 
It is not a coincidence that primatology gained a foothold as a serious discipline 
in tandem with the establishment of modern communications. As Peters points out, the 
postwar obsession with “communication” was burnished by two complementary 
discourses, one technical, the other, therapeutic (28). The development of information 
theory framed communication as a purely technical process, one that reduced the 
process to the equal and effortless exchange of information. The therapeutic one, 
meanwhile, situated communication as at once a panacea and a patsy for modern 
alienation. These discourses are but two sides of the same coin, however; both see the 
solutions to the problems of communication as a matter of better technologies or better 
techniques (Peters 29).  
 “Apps for Apes,” whether it means to or not, emerges in the mire of this cultural 
legacy. It is braced by fantasies of apes as intelligent almost-humans. They are keepers 
of human secrets: all that is required are the right tools and techniques to unlock them. 
As the orangutan keeper Linda Jacobs claims, these animals, “have the intelligence they 
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need to communicate, but they don’t have the right equipment” (qtd. in Waugh 2012). 
The iPad appears as a potential equalizer between human and non-human apes that can 
facilitate the exchange of information, and bridge the frustrating chasm between 
species. However, in building a bridge, humans end up merely expanding human 
territory. For the search for intelligence in non-human animals is, as Erica Fudge notes, 
inextricable from an assertion of human exceptionalism, power, and dominion (2002b: 
116). In this search we do not encounter animals as mysterious strangers, but as 
potential humans. We want to commune with non-humans, but we attempt to do so by 
first making them more like us.  
By staging encounters between some of the oldest of the great apes and the 
newest of the personal, mobile, smart devices, “Apps for Apes” taps into a rich symbolic 
economy wherein the origins of human sociality meet its future. In this alluring fantasy, 
the orangutans’ receptive hands embrace the iPad, and in so doing welcome and affirm 
human being. It is dictated by many of the same anthropocentric imperatives that have 
and continue to underlie how we imagine and engage with non-human apes. 
 
V. Making Concessions 
It is tempting, given this institutional-discursive context, to take a cynical and 
contemptuous stance toward “Apps for Apes.” The project can easily be interpreted as 
applications for apes—ways of putting apes into operation. After all, the orangutans 
involved in this project are displaced from their natural habitats, living in places that are 
not of their own choosing, and subject to invasive management within the biopolitics of 
animal conservation and zoological display. Nowhere are the machinations of Michel 
Foucault’s biopower so explicit than in the apparatuses of conservation and captive 
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breeding where endangered animals are forcibly made to live. They are subject to 
routinized activities, extensive surveillance, physical exams, injections, and blood tests, 
all the while their wild counterparts are being let die in their native habitats.  
Bornean orangutans are endangered, while Sumatran orangutans are critically 
so. Poaching and the illegal pet trade are significant contributors to diminishing 
orangutan populations, but deforestation and habitat destruction are the largest factors, 
in combination with the irresponsible and unsustainable practices of oil palm 
monocultures (see for example Husson, Wich, Marshall et al. 2009: 77-96). The market 
for palm oil is expansive: not only is it a popular biofuel, it is a ubiquitous ingredient in 
countless foods and cosmetics, as well as cleaning agents such as washing detergents 
and toothpaste. Providing a home for a vulnerable population with disappearing 
habitats, the zoo emerges as a common—though not only—alternative home for them.28  
“Apps for Apes” raises awareness about the plight of orangutans in the wild, but it 
also promotes and validates the institution of the zoo. It reiterates the zoo’s 
commitments to education, protection, and conservation, but also increases its financial 
viability. Putting orangutans and iPads together generates exactly the kind of novelty 
and spectacle that encourages visitors to go to the zoo. Zoos are susceptible to market 
pressures. Their continued existence depends on the revenue generated from visitor 
admissions. In this regard, zoo participation in “Apps for Apes” might be read as more 
opportunistic than altruistic. It can be interpreted as a kind of neoliberal maneuvering, a 
way to make the physical scarcity of orangutans, and the charisma of their affective 
responses, productive.  
                                                 
28 Displaced orangutans also end up in parks and others protected areas, sanctuaries, rehabilitation 
centres, and research facilities, as well as human homes thanks to the illegal pet trade.   
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In addition, the notion of orangutans using iPads, not just for fun but also for 
edification and communication, encourages visitors to imagine new ways of interacting 
with orangutans. After all, animals in zoos are only available to the visitors’ gaze. While 
petting zoos create opportunities for visitors to directly touch animals, these are 
typically limited to domesticated species like goats, llamas, and sheep. Contact with 
most wild species, meanwhile, is actively avoided to ensure the wellbeing and safety of 
both animals and humans. This separation is often a major source of dissatisfaction in 
zoos, and technology often emerges as a way to address this gap, creating opportunities 
for alternative kinds of interaction (Perdue, Clay, Gaalema et al. 2011; Perdue, Clay, 
Gaalema et al. 2012). iPads enter the zoo in this capacity, tantalizing visitors with the 
promise of getting more intimately “in touch” with orangutans. 
As Shukin makes clear in Animal Capital: Rendering Life in Biopolitical Times, 
capitalism has a long and treacherous history of putting animals to work for their 
“ostensibly innate capacity for a sympathetic, even telepathic, communication of affect” 
(132). Their bodies have been used to dramatize, naturalize, and legitimize the way in 
which industrial capitalism has transformed the experiences and textures of everyday 
life. They have also been used to conceal larger violent and destructive political 
economies. By playing on Apple’s well-worn slogan, “There’s an App for that,” “Apps for 
Apes” could be called out for aligning itself with such a strategy, mobilizing animal affect 
as an alibi for any number of transgressions.29 Given the troubled history of apes being 
                                                 
29 And there are many. In an added layer of irony, bonobos and lowland gorillas, among other wildlife, are 
suffering from the unintended effects of mining for precious metals used in tablets. The Democratic 
Republic of the Congo produces the majority of the world’s Coltan, short for Columbium-tantalum, which 
is a black tar-like mineral that is a primary ingredient in touchscreen tablets and smartphones (see 
Redmond 2001).  
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brought into human culture as objects of fascination (e.g., the story of Nim Chimpsky in 
Hess 2008), knowledge, and entertainment it can be argued that the orangutan 
participants in the “Apps for Apes” project are unwitting and passive victims of human 
whims.  
The tragic fate of the Milwaukee County Zoo’s young orangutan Mahal, the first 
orangutan to participate in the “Apps for Apes” project, suggests as much. Mahal died in 
2012. It was discovered in 2014 that he succumbed to a rare parasite (Devitt 2014). His 
premature death was accidental, but at the same time, such occurrences are not 
uncommon in a zoo. Animals die in captivity all the time for a whole host of reasons, 
many of which are indirect outcomes of the very machinations of captivity itself (see 
Kemmerer 2010). Mahal is also featured prominently in the project’s primary 
promotional image. In this way, his death casts a pall over “Apes for Apes.” It serves as a 
reminder that while giving iPads to apes is amusing, it might equally be read as a wholly 
inappropriate and ineffectual offering that does little to transform or improve the real 
living conditions of orangutans.  
These concerns about the project’s ethical commitments are not altogether 
unwarranted. However, interpreting “Apps for Apes” as a case where dominant humans 
exploit passive orangutans runs the risk of oversimplifying what happens in these 
encounters. Such a stance vilifies humans, and is at odds with the genuine affection and 
compassion those involved with the project extend toward their keep. It also does a 
further disservice to the orangutans themselves by making them inert, passive objects of 
pity. Orangutans are no doubt tangled up in the thicket of various oppressive discursive, 
symbolic, and material systems.  But as the work of Jakob von Uexküll has illustrated, 
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animals do not simply live in their environments, they make them just as much as they 
are made by them.  
  
VI. iPads in the Zoo, or Technē in Paradise 
In June of 2009, the artists Christoph Steinbrener and Rainer Dempf debuted a 
provocative temporary public installation at the Schönbrunn Zoo in Vienna, Austria 
entitled, Trouble in Paradise. The installation sought to create “frictional spaces” within 
the zoo by placing various human made objects into select animal enclosures: “a 
railroad track in the bison pen, a tub next to the crocodile, a wrecked car at the rhinos’, 
an oil pump in the penguin basin, a drum of toxic waste in the aquarium, and a log cabin 
covered with snow in the elephant park” (2009).  
The aesthetic incongruity inspired by the introduction of these decidedly artificial 
objects reveals the existence of the paradisiacal fantasy of untouched nature that 
materializes within the traditional zoological display. The intervention disrupts the 
pleasure of the antediluvian reverie, and refocuses the zoo visitors’ attention instead on 
the actual relationships between human worlds and those of animals. Despite efforts to 
maintain an ontological separation between natural and cultural worlds, they already 
overlap. For the animals living here, there is no ontological distinction between the 
cultural and the natural components of its environment. They all equally constitute the 
mesh of matter that constitutes its home.   
The zoo, Matthew Chrulew observes, “is an apparatus for the production of 
paradise” (2011). The zoo presents itself as an idyll where animals are protected; they 
are free from predation, starvation, and inclement weather. They insist, as all paradises 
do, on partitions, elaborate fortifications, and safe distances. At the same time, Chrulew 
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contends, the limited space, the systematic, and routinized nature of the animals’ daily 
lives, and ubiquitous surveillance leave little room for aleatory events and stimulating 
encounters. This excess of leisure time, idleness, and boredom in Chrulew’s estimation, 
prevent the zoo from being truly paradisiacal. But these qualities are, in fact, part and 
parcel of the very definition of paradise.  
Paradise is first and foremost, a conceptual ideal. It is a paragon of place that 
prescribes a proper, and perfectly calibrated relationship between nature and culture, 
human and animal (McClung 2). Throughout history, William McClung argues, it has 
largely been imagined in the dueling architectural metaphors of arcadia and utopia. 
That is, as an untouched and harmonious wilderness, on the one hand, and as a walled 
garden, protected, and designed to perfection, on the other (2).30 The former 
nostalgically recalls the original Eden before the proverbial fall. The latter is a desperate 
fantasy of a world to come, envisioned from the bow of Noah’s Ark. The two 
interpretations are not mutually exclusive, but what is most significant about them is 
that both are equally untenable. Paradise is alluring, but in practice it is resolutely banal 
and unsustainable.  
Even Adam and Eve, humanity’s mythological progenitors, were bored in 
Paradise. As Lars Svendsen notes in A Philosophy of Boredom, a number of 
philosophers from Immanuel Kant, to Alberto Moravia and Robert Nisbet, have 
speculated that it was the very idleness and tedium of Eden that prompted their fall in 
the first place (Svendsen 20-1). In this case, their banishment by God becomes an act of 
                                                 
30 While the Eden of Genesis has often been conceptualized as a walled garden, McClung insists it was 
actually an unenclosed one. After all, it was its lack of protective enclosure that made it vulnerable to 
incursion by Satan in the form of the serpent. McClung suggests it only became enclosed after the Fall in 
order to keep Adam and Eve out (3). 
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mercy, a means of rescuing humanity from a fate of relentless monotony.  The zoo, then, 
is an apparatus for the production of paradise, and is equally an apparatus for the 
production of boredom. The animals have nothing to do. They are not given occasion to 
make their surrounding worlds, because they are already made by humans.  
Though they materialize in any number of ways, in whatever form zoos take, their 
architecture ends up suggesting more about human beings than it does about the 
animals therein. They make manifest attitudes about humanity’s desired relationship to 
the natural world. As such, any changes to the zoo throughout history can be understood 
as symptomatic of the ways the relationships between nature and culture get reimagined 
during the transformative processes of modernity. As highly cultivated places, they 
enact vexed and often contradictory relationships between human beings, nature, and 
technology. 
While the tradition of animal display has a long and varied history, the zoological 
garden is a relatively recent phenomenon. Before zoos, exhibiting animals took the form 
of royal or private menageries and crude traveling shows. This way of exhibiting animals 
was primarily concerned with flaunting the power, prestige, and wealth of the collectors 
(Rothsfels 19). They explicitly promoted human dominance over the natural world, a 
project that was often inscribed along lines of colonial power. Animals were appreciated 
as accumulated objects, symbols of conquest—and sometimes humans were too.31 As 
public collections, zoos marked a departure from this tradition, but were no means 
divorced from it. Paris’ Le Jardin des Plantes in 1793, the first zoological garden, 
displayed animals in barren, iron-barred cages.  Early zoos, like the menageries before 
                                                 
31 See Nigel Rothsfels’ Savages and Beasts: The Birth of the Modern Zoo (44-80) for a lengthy discussion 
of this violent dimension, including a history of exhibiting humans in zoos. 
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them, were equally entrenched in colonial exploitation, injury, and death on massive 
scales—of both animals and humans. As the strategies and aesthetics of public display 
grew more complex, this violent dimension of zoological gardens was creatively veiled. 
Eventually, zoos actively separated themselves from the menageries by promoting 
scientific, educational, and moral advancement (Braverman 26).  
The zoo became an enclave, a protected pocket of nature situated in the middle of 
the human metropolis.  As new and improved Edens, zoos were places “where the 
cruelty of nature was abolished and peace reigned under the benign influence of culture” 
(Baratay and Hardouin-Fugier 195). They offered an edifying salve for the shocks 
brought on by modernity’s transformation of everyday life. It is no surprise that zoos 
emerged at the end of the 18th century, just as definitions of nature were being reshaped 
by new industries and techniques. 
The shift from menageries to zoos also marked a shift away from exhibiting 
animals as displaced objects, and more as emplaced creatures. They still situated 
animals as the focal points of their exhibits, but unlike menageries, they became much 
more concerned with displaying animals as situated in natural spaces. Particularly after 
the reforms of “The Hagenbeck Revolution” instituted by German animal merchant, 
Carl Hagenback, near the end of the 19th century. Zoo designers and keepers became 
more concerned with the appearance of animal environments. Enclosures were designed 
to appear less like cages, and more like the animals’ native habitats. These immersion 
displays became increasingly popular—and remain so today—because they concealed 
evidence of captivity, and offered instead more realistic replicas of “nature” (Rothfels 
202). This naturalism was less for the sake of the animals, however, and more for the 
human visitors who wished to see animals as if they were in the wild. As such, zoos 
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became places where human visitors could find peace and pastoral tranquility from the 
unnatural trappings of the urban surround.  
The privileging of the experience of the human spectators over that of the animals 
took its toll, leading to visibly stressed-out animals, high mortality rates, and 
unsuccessful breeding. What followed was the less well-known “Hediger Revolution,” 
sparked by Heini Hediger, a Swiss animal biologist in the mid-20th century (Chrulew 
2011). Hediger proposed enclosures and techniques that were more functional for 
animal care, serving primarily the needs of the animals. While the two reforms 
identified with Hagenback and Hediger suggest a kind of teleological evolution, they do 
not mark one. Rather, the central conflict between aesthetics for humans and 
ergonomics for animals remains to this day, unresolved. Modern zoos tend to offer some 
combination of naturalism and functionalism, to varying degrees of success and failure. 
Regardless, both approaches depend on technologies and techniques for their 
implementation; naturalism especially. Naturalism may be desired, but it is an idealized 
and highly contrived aesthetic. Because it is not functional, it does not foster the kinds of 
novelty required to excite the interest of humans or animals. While incorporating 
technological mediation in zoos may appear unseemly and inconsistent with the 
aesthetics of naturalism, many zoos have and continue to rely on it, to varying scales of 
conspicuousness. It is used to create aleatory events and novelties in order to augment 
human—and to a lesser extent, animal—experience. As Burt notes, in the early 20th 
century, music was sometimes played for animals in zoos, either in live performances, or 
over gramophones. Films were also shown in their enclosures. At the London Zoo in 
1932, Congorilla (dir. Osa Johnson) was projected onto the wall of the enclosure of the 
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zoo’s resident gorilla’s Mok and Moina (Burt 2002: 270, 290n). Such interventions 
stimulated the animals, and also generated visitor interest in the exhibits. 
Read another way, such technological interventions are also a means by which 
humans can sublimate their inability to experience direct contact with the animals. 
Animal exhibition in zoos is guided by “immersion design,” which in addition to 
showing animals in naturalistic settings encourages the human visitors to feel immersed 
in nature (Braverman 33). This is no easy task, since direct, physical contact between 
zoo animals and human visitors is actively prevented. As Irus Braverman notes, “Fences, 
moats, cages, and separate air and water systems ensure that animals and humans 
cannot touch one another” (71). Zoos may seduce human visitors with promises of 
seeing animals and encountering and engaging with them, but they are not able to 
follow through on this promise, and often frustrate the desire even more.32 
Zoos purport to be places where people can go to see, and have meaningful 
encounters with animals, to connect with nature. However, the structural limitations of 
the zoo inhibit the possibility of direct connection. Contact is actively prevented, 
through architecture and aesthetics.  At the zoo, people can only look at animals, which 
is ultimately unsatisfying. As many critics of the zoo insist, the human gaze, significantly 
reduces the zoo animal, to the point where it is no longer “real.” A giraffe in a zoo is not 
a real giraffe, Randy Malamud complains, rather it is “a cultural stylization of a giraffe; a 
(stinted) representation” (1998: 29).  
Such statements echo Berger’s declaration that, even though zoos are full of live 
animals, nowhere can a human truly meet one. For captive animals, he insists, “have 
                                                 
32 Emily Vey Duke and Cooper Battersby explore this frustrated intimacy in their experimental short film, 
Beauty Plus Pity (2009), where a hunter confesses that he fantasizes about a zoo where all the animals are 
sedated and able to roam freely, thus allowing humans to finally touch them.  
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been immunised to encounter” (26). Chrulew reiterates this, insisting that zoo animals 
live a “wounded life, robbed of vital connectivities and expressions” (2011). Zoos are 
disappointing, then, because people do not just want to see animals, they want to have 
meaningful encounters with them. And if they cannot interact with them directly, they 
want to see them interacting with other animals and their environments, engaging with 
and responding to its textures and objects, its fellow cohabitants, transforming and 
being transformed by its surroundings. 
The fact that contact with animals at the zoo is so elusive has long been a source 
of contention for many zoo critics who claim that zoos take from animals their ability to 
avoid or engage others of their own volition. The implication is that the partitions that 
separate humans from animals inhibit contact and communication by stifling the 
conditions necessary for contingency. Zoos appear to reduce and constrain the 
possibilities for communicative and transformative encounters. Thus, introducing 
communication media makes sense; the iPad especially, since it summons the modality 
of touch, which is notably missing from zoo visitors’ experience. “Apps for Apes” was 
born of a desire to see apes touch the screen, and is motored by the myth that they do in 
fact touch them. Touch in “Apps for Apes” becomes a kind of assurance of the 
orangutans’ ability for and openness to connection, and the possibility that they may 
become accessible to us by entering into the virtual sublime of our treasured 
communication network.  
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VII. The Touchscreen and the Tangibility of the Communication 
Sublime 
 
Watching an ape slide its finger across an iPad screen to select its meal 
shows us just how close we are to our genetic cousins, and how intuitive 
the technology has become. 
—William Wolfe-Wylie, from “Toronto Team helping 
Orangutans Communicate with People” (2013) 
 
Touch is no cure for communication trouble: it is more primal, but equally 
intractable  
—John Durham Peters, from Speaking into the Air (270) 
 
In 2009, rumours of Apple’s plan to release its first computer tablet set astir an 
air of anticipation. This was only heightened by speculations about the failing health of 
the company’s co-founder, then chairman and CEO, Steve Jobs. The official 
announcement was made by Jobs himself during a keynote address in San Francisco on 
January 27, 2010. He gave a persuasive sermon about the magical, new-fangled device, 
looking frail and gaunt under the glow of the apple logo projected overhead. The now 
iconic partially eaten apple logo provocatively alludes to that transgression that 
precipitated Adam’s and Eve’s expulsion from Eden. Apple celebrates this fall from 
grace as the pivotal moment when humans transitioned from the world of nature that 
was given to them, to the world that they could make themselves. Apple’s success is 
owed to this primeval seduction and it produces a powerful symbolic foundation from 
which the iPad emerges. 
Jobs described the iPad as a third category of device that would fill the gap 
between laptops and smartphones; it was the final piece that would complete the holy 
trinity of mobile media. While the iPad supposedly exceeded its predecessors in a 
number of ways, its most significant achievement he alleged, was that it not only made 
the web more visible, but tangible. “To see the whole web page is phenomenal,” he 
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proclaimed. But even better, is to be, “right there, holding the Internet in your hands” 
(“iPad introduction 27 Jan 2010”). Touching and manipulating the web with one’s 
hands pretends to offer more satisfying access to the world’s largest communication 
network.      
The triumph of the iPad is partly an outcome of its capabilities and functionality, 
but it is equally reified by its cultural capital and the symbolic economy in which it is 
animated. It amplifies the tantalizing discourse of touch that Apple had previously 
introduced with the iPhone.33 While screens have always been touchable, they have only 
recently become receptive and responsive—and ubiquitous, thanks to the iPhone.  The 
first touchscreens were introduced in the 1960s by the British Royal Radar 
Establishment for flight control purposes, and were gradually implemented for 
commercial use such as point-of-sale terminals and kiosk displays (Kaerlein 177). When 
the iPhone appeared, it offered new possibilities for using the touchscreen interface 
because it was able to interpret multiple input signals, simultaneously, making it 
plausible to have a whole host of interaction variants (Kaerlein 177-8).34 Apple’s 
touchscreen technology has since been incorporated into a myriad of related devices.   
Touchability is associated with physicality, materiality, and accessibility; it is 
mobilized in the context of the iPad as a counterpoint to the immateriality, 
                                                 
33 The very first iPhone advertisement features its illuminated screen casting light into a dark surround, 
and a finger reaching in to make physical contact with it. The image is accompanied by the tagline 
“Touching is believing” which as Brett T. Robinson points out, “evokes the biblical account of the apostle 
Thomas, who refused to believe Christ had risen from the dead until he could touch the wounds of Jesus’ 
crucifixion” (2013). This image assures the message that, “seeing the new object is not sufficient; the 
intimacy of touch is required to consummate the highly anticipated union between consumer and object 
of desire. At the literal level, the ad poses an equivalency between the sense of touch and the act of 
knowing” (Robinson 2013). 
34 In a curious case of serendipity, the touchscreen of the iPhone—and the majority of mobile devices 
manufactured since—are made using a tough, durable surface called “Gorilla Glass,” manufacture by 
Corning. David Pogue from The New York Times refers to it as “the smartphone’s unsung hero” (2010).    
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insubstantiality, and uncertainty of virtual space. This juxtaposition imbues the iPad 
with a seductive and miraculous dimension: it allows users to touch what is 
untouchable. As Timo Kaerlein observes in his meditation on the promises and perils of 
the touchscreen: 
In a world of cloud computing, Big data, constant algorithmic 
interpretation of behaviour, and hardware that operates on the nano scale, 
the touchscreen suggests tangibility where there is little to none—
simultaneously doing so on a physical level by providing a reactive service 
that is palpable in a literal sense, and in the metaphorical way of 
purporting cognitive tangibility. (178) 
 
The touchscreen tablet materializes the perceived immateriality of modern digital 
communication: it is an assurance of presence, and of a presence that can be seized.  
“Not since Moses came down from on high with those commandments has a 
tablet generated so much interest,” Jim Goldman, then a technology correspondent for 
CNBC, observed (2010). Goldman’s cursory observation was not the only one to draw 
comparisons between Apple’s computer tablets and the Biblical stone ones. A popular 
Internet meme emerged around the same time. Using images from the film Ten 
Commandments (Cecil B. DeMille, 1956) it pictured Charlton Heston (or sometimes 
Steve Jobs) as Moses genuflecting with two iPad tablets in his arms. While such biblical 
allusions are made in jest, they nevertheless speak to the device’s mythic underpinnings.  
The allusion to the original stone tablets becomes more than a matter of formal 
symmetry, it is also a matter of symbolic resonance. Since God cannot take material 
form, he engraves the stony surface of the tablets with his touch instead.  The tablets are 
meant to be simultaneously a substitute for his presence, a testament not simply to his 
existence, but his communicability. For Peters the tablets mark a mythic foreshadowing. 
They anticipate the challenge of modern communication: the conundrum of “how to 
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conjure the credible presence of an absent body for an audience remote in time, space, 
or degree” (71). All communication media strive to extend human interaction across 
space-time, Peters notes, and aspire to approximate contact without touch (228). Touch 
is perceived to be the starting point of communication: all communicative acts gesture 
toward this site of mutual contact. It is this desire for physical contact to which the iPad 
offers itself up.  
As much as communication has taken on a variety of meanings throughout 
history, before technological modernity, it typically referred to a kind of physical 
transfer or transmission.  It was only after the development of communication media 
that the concept came to mean a significant, quasi-physical process that transpires 
between people, or subjects, in the shadow of seemingly extraordinary obstacles (Peters 
5).  Communicative acts were framed as all-or-nothing endeavours: bridges or chasms, 
successes or failures. Because communication media enabled aspects of bodies—sounds 
and sights—to be experienced without actually being co-present with them, they implied 
a kind of bodily transcendence. Media seemingly made something interior, inaccessible, 
and inextricable from the body, finally external, accessible, and freely circulated.  
Exhilarated by this perceived transcendence of limits, humans became 
preoccupied with identifying new communicative limits in order to surpass them. As 
Peters notes, modern communication sought to commune with those who appeared 
incommunicable: not just the distant and the dead, but non-humans such as computers, 
aliens, and animals.  Communication became a provocation, a problem to be solved. It 
was “the ultimate border crossing concept” Peters remarks, “traversing the bounds of 
species, machines, even divinity” (228). The pursuit of connection became a grander 
quest: it was not to just a matter of getting “in touch” with the other, but to achieve a 
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kind of oceanic wholeness, what Imar de Vries calls, “the communication sublime” (17-
18). That is, to inhabit a consummate and universally accessible communication space 
where information flows without impediment, and the partition of self and other 
dissolves.   
With its insistence on direct contact with the Internet, the tangibility of 
information, and the invisibility of the interface, the iPad appears as an enticing portal 
to the communication sublime. It promises to reinstate touch, the materiality and 
embodiment that are presumed to be missing from communication. It fulfills a need for 
a burden of proof, a physical trace that affirms that communication has indeed taken 
place. The modality of touch connects to a more deeply seated desire for contact, borne 
of our self-inflicted cosmic alienation. The iPad is but another new medium that 
promises to fulfill the fantasy of perfect communication with its pretense to 
connectivity, immediacy, and intimacy at a distance.  
“Apps for Apes” is in the thrall of the iPad; it is emboldened by its potential to 
bring orangutans into the communication sublime. This gesture is not exactly sudden. 
The touchscreen has been used in communicative interventions with other great apes, 
and other animals like dolphins (see Foresman 2010). It has also been used effectively in 
interventions with non-verbal humans, such as those with autism (see Kagohara et al. 
2013). But again, there are practical considerations for using the iPad as well. iPads are 
affordable, portable, and commercially available. These characteristics, in addition to 
their haptic visuality, make them ideal tools for non-verbal interactions. The existence of 
“Apps for Apes” is made possible by the iPad’s qualities, which make them, at least in 
theory, amenable to non-human apes, and orangutans especially.  
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Putting apes and iPads together is motivated by a historically situated desire to 
commune with non-human apes. While humans have a long history of seeking out new 
frontiers of contact, they not pursue contact with just any mysterious other. As Peters 
notes, “Determining the range of creatures we will communicate with is a political 
question, perhaps the political question” (230, emphasis in original). Deciding who to 
pursue as interlocutors, and who gets invited into the privileged circle of communication 
is hardly an innocent choice. It means deciding who matters and why, and to what end. 
That “Apps for Apes” has selected to transform non-human apes—and orangutans 
specifically—into communicative partners is not arbitrary. Non-human apes are 
especially alluring for us because we have placed them in the cradle of human being and 
knowing.   
 
VIII. Apes and Origins: “The Kin Who Never Left the Garden of Eden” 
 “The secrets of the animal’s likeness and unlikeness from man” are, according to 
John Berger, “about animals as an intercession between man and his origin” (4). And 
apes, more than any other animal, are consistently summoned as such intercessions. 
They are the yardsticks against which human being is measured. Human cultural history 
is permeated by the figure of the ape as a human stand-in. Throughout Western history 
especially, John Sorenson notes, apes tend to figure “as ugly cousins, miniatures, 
inferiors, impostors or indicators of our primal selves, often brutal or witless” (92).  
This could easily be a matter of our canny morphological resemblance. Even 
Carolus Linnaeus, the 18th century zoologist and founder of modern scientific taxonomy, 
“had a weakness for apes” (Agamben 2004: 23). As Agamben remarks, Linnaeus was 
unwilling to accept the Cartesian conception of animals as automatons because he was 
 185 
unconvinced that Descartes had ever seen an ape (2004: 23). This similarity in 
appearance makes apes uniquely different from other animals, and that similitude has 
only been validated by the fact that they are our closest relatives. After all, we share 
DNA and a common evolutionary history. Such likeness has been met with ambivalence, 
anxiety, disdain, and horror, and more recently, with excitement, curiosity, sympathy, 
and even love. While their similarities in appearance have no doubt contributed to the 
human preoccupation with non-human apes, the role of primatology in producing this 
conception of the ape should not be underestimated.  
Primatology materializes across a number of different fields, from anthropology 
and psychology to zoology, biology, and sociobiology, as well as ethology and ecology. It 
studies primates from a whole spectrum of different perspectives. “Primate” is that 
taxonomic order of mammals coined by Linnaeus, to mean “first.” This includes animals 
such as lemurs, bushbabies, tarsiers, marmosets, monkeys, apes, and of course, humans. 
While the term “primate” was introduced in the mid 18th century, the appearance of 
primatology as a methodology is much more recent, dating only as far back as 1941 with 
Theodore Ruch’s Bibliographia Primatologica (Haraway 1989: 24-5).  
Its appearance nearly halfway through the 20th century is timely. Primatology can 
be understood as one part of the more fundamental reimagining of the human in 
modernity. The Copernican Revolution certainly displaced the human, and troubled its 
relation to the world. But by the 20th century the cumulative effects of so many new 
developments, from Darwin’s theory of natural selection and Freud’s theory of the 
unconscious, to the atrocities of the Great Wars, rendered the human and its relation to 
the world all the more tenuous. There was a pressing need to redefine it, and resituate it 
in its place within an increasingly tumultuous terrain.  
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Primatology took up this project of redelineating the human in relation to the 
non-human. It is at heart, a comparative science. Even while it is focused on non-human 
primates, it is invested in the larger project of producing knowledge about human being: 
its origin, nature, and future. The narratives primatology mobilizes create knowledge 
about human and non-human apes, but they also shape how we understand the 
relationships between them, between animals and humans more generally, and the 
grander Manichean relation between Nature and Culture (Haraway 1989: 5). “Primate” 
is more than a taxonomic order, then, it is also an apparatus that produces human and 
non-human subjects, and articulates and prescribes what they mean to each other and 
to the world. 
The stories that primatology tells about humans and non-humans are so 
compelling they trickle down into popular culture—from Desmond Morris’ The Naked 
Ape and Dian Fossey’s Gorillas in the Mist to Jane Goodall’s many publications and 
films. The majority of our widely held assumptions about apes are informed by these 
influential contributions. A quick scan of popular books by primatologists betrays an 
unmistakable theme: Almost Human: A Journey into the World of Baboons (Strum 
1987), In the Shadow of Man (Goodall 1988), Next of Kin: My Conversations with 
Chimpanzees (Fouts 1998), Ape, Language and the Human Mind (Rumbaugh, Shanker 
and Taylor 1998), Our Inner Ape: A Leading Primatologist Explains Why We Are Who 
We Are (de Waal 2005), to name only a few. As much as these titles imply a 
commitment—even a love—of apes, this commitment is yoked to an underlying interest 
to get at the ostensibly more important question of human being.  
Non-human apes have become inextricable from this human quest for self-
knowledge. They offer the potential of accessing our “pre-rational, pre-management, 
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pre-cultural essence” (Haraway 1989:11). Their symbolic status as keepers of our origins 
and diviners of our destiny is articulated through perpetual invocations of Judeo-
Christian paradisiacal mythology. This is nowhere made so explicit as in the work of 
primatologist Buruté Galdikas, who writes in Reflections of Eden: My Years with the 
Orangutans of Borneo (1995), that apes are, 
 
our kin. The kin who never left the Garden of Eden and thus never lost 
their innocence, kin who never made complex tools, never used fire, and 
never went to war. These are kin who seek no masters, kin who do not 
need to be redeemed, kin who approximate the ancestors who are no 
longer on this earth, and kin who indicate the direction that we are going. 
(19-20)   
 
This rhetoric serves to elevate and amplify apes as prelapsarian paragons of humanity. 
Non-human apes conjure a fascinating human teleology, a narrative of before and after, 
of how things were, and how things should be. This invariably positions non-human 
apes as ideal objects of study for us, for they present the possible reformation and 
reconstruction of human nature (Haraway 1989: 9).  
Apes are seductive semiotic figures so potent for humans that they very easily 
preclude the possibility of seeing them any other way. They are significant others, but 
they have been reduced to portals that lead us perpetually back to ourselves. Discussions 
of non-human primates are replete with references to symmetries, echoes, and parallels 
in the form of metaphoric mirrors, reflections, and peepholes. As Ken Schweller makes 
explicit: non-human apes present, “a window into our not-too-distant evolutionary 
past.” Therefore, in studying them, he surmises “we learn ultimately about ourselves” 
(2011). Non-human apes are not framed as intrinsically valuable. They are not 
interesting in and of themselves. Rather, they are instrumentally valuable: they are only 
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as interesting as the epistemological yield of comparing and contrasting them with 
humans.  
In this cultural framing of apes, we truly see the work of Agamben’s 
anthropological machine. Humans, by virtue of being Homo sapiens—humans that 
know—have no specific identity other than the ability for self-recognition. Our species 
name neither refers to a category nor a substance, but to an imperative to seek and 
identify itself. As Agamben summarizes: “man is the animal that must recognize itself as 
human to be human” (26).  Much like Narcissus, the human being is endlessly 
fascinated by its own reflection but this captivation is its ultimate undoing. 35 
 Because apes are invested with so much symbolism in human culture, it is clear 
why humans wish to commune with apes. However, the participants of “Apps for Apes” 
are not just any apes, but orangutans in particular. More specifically, they are captive, 
mostly Sumatran orangutans living primarily in North American zoos. These 
orangutans have not been elected for this initiative arbitrarily, it has just as much to do 
with their species-being as it does with their cultural standing. The orangutan bears a 
unique characterization in the human imagination. This characterization is not 
randomly assigned by humans, but inspired by human-orangutan encounters, and more 
importantly, by the orangutans themselves and how they get on in the world. 
 
 
                                                 
35 Given this, it is hardly surprising that humans limit their esteem to animals that can pass the mirror 
test. The Mirror Self-Recognition test (MSR) has been a standard method for measuring an animal’s 
capacity for self-awareness (and human likeness)—and therefore intelligence and value—since its 
development in the 1970s. The more pressing question behind the test, however, is not whether or not an 
ape can recognize its own reflection, but rather why we must place so much value on an animal’s ability to 
do so. 
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IX. Solitary, Sensible, and Shrewd: Framing Orangutans as Ideal 
Users 
 
  The most legendary orangutan in human culture is a fictional one. It appeared in 
Edgar Allen Poe’s “Murders in the Rue Morgue,” what is now considered to be one of the 
first modern detective stories. The plot follows the investigation of a murdered young 
woman. However, the real mystery at the crux of the story is the indeterminacy of 
human nature—or, as Stephanie Rowe so aptly puts it, the aporia between the human 
and the non-human (119). For the story’s notorious reveal is that the killer is not human, 
but an escaped orangutan meant for Le Jardin des Plantes.  
That an orangutan could be a murderer by killing a human being with its own 
hands was meant to be terrifying. The human hand was once a symbol of an exclusively 
human agency. It embodied, as Rowe observes, “willed action born of the consciousness 
of a self that perceives itself in relation to the world” (107).  The horror that an 
orangutan might be equally capable of such willed action, malicious or otherwise, is 
consistent with the anxieties that flourished in the wake of Darwin’s theories of 
evolution. The scientific writing at the time cast doubt on human exceptionalism, and 
presented the unsettling possibility that the notion of a unique and superior human 
being was merely the figment of an ape’s imagination.  
 Incidentally, the orangutan in Poe’s story is purely the author’s construction. In 
fact, though the story relies heavily on taxonomist Georges Cuvier’s account of the 
animal, Poe actively disregards it. As Rowe points out, for Cuvier, “the orangutan is an 
animal known for its gentleness and tractability” (126). Poe’s orangutan is nothing like a 
real orangutan; it was created in the service of a horror narrative to enact the irrational, 
murderous essence at the heart of the human. In reality orangutans are not known to be 
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violent. In fact, in their cultural reputation they are known for being good natured. This 
status surely contributes greatly to the orangutans’ involvement in “Apps for Apes.”  
The iPad’s projected capacitive touchscreens (PCTs) are designed to work with 
electrical conductors such as the skin of human bodies (Kaerlein 179-180). However, 
because ape hands are so similar, they can arguably work just as well. In theory, because 
all of the great apes—gorillas, chimpanzees, bonobos, and orangutans—have padded, 
hairless hands with articulated fingers, opposable thumbs, and a predisposition for hand 
gesturing they are equally potential candidates for iPad usage. But just because all apes 
are physically capable of grasping the iPad and interacting with its touchscreen interface 
does not mean they do.  
In actuality, not all apes are amenable to the iPad. Many are not interested in the 
device whatsoever, and those that are, are not necessarily concerned with using them as 
prescribed. In their definitive book, Animal Tool Behaviour: The Use and Manufacture 
of Tools by Animals, Robert W. Shumaker, Kristina R. Walkup, and Benjamin B. Beck 
recount a well-worn anecdote among zookeepers that describes the varying dispositions, 
levels of curiosity, capacities for manipulation, and propensities for tool use in each of 
the great apes. The anecdote speculates about what would happen if a screwdriver had 
been accidentally left in the enclosure of a gorilla, a chimpanzee, a bonobo, or an 
orangutan, respectively. Though it does not in any way account for the variation in 
individual ape personalities, it is an efficient, effective—if facile—means of establishing 
differences in their general dispositions.  
The anecdote is too lengthy to include here. To summarize, it suggests that the 
gorilla would be apprehensive and reticent to engage with the screwdriver. It would 
eventually figure out it was not edible and would grow bored with it. The chimpanzee 
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would seize it excitedly, only to have it taken by the dominant male chimp, who would 
then explore its uses while guarding it covetously from the others. It would also 
eventually lose interest. The bonobo would be equally lively with the discovery, but 
unlike the chimp, would enthusiastically share it with its fellow bonobos. They would 
celebrate the find with sexual activity, and forget about the screwdriver entirely. The 
orangutan, meanwhile, would take notice of the tool, but would: 
ignore it, lest the keeper discover the oversight. If a keeper did notice, the 
ape would rush to the tool and surrender it only in trade for a preferred 
food. If a keeper did not notice, the ape would wait until night and then 
proceed to use the screwdriver to pick the locks or dismantle the cage and 
escape. (109-110) 
 
It is hardly surprising, given that gorillas have a reputation for being shy and 
cagey, that they did not become avid iPad users. They may have been the first test 
subjects, but proved much too resistant to them. “They were all very scared,” Clair 
Richard, the primary gorilla keeper at the Milwaukee County Zoo recounts. “Gorillas are 
afraid of everything. Because it’s something new and different, they’re real hesitant to 
even approach it” (qtd. in Uebelherr 2011). As such, they are not readily inclined to 
openly explore new objects in their environments. Furthermore, gorillas do not like to 
look directly at things, and so the iPad screen presents a particular challenge for them.  
It is equally unsurprising, then, that orangutans have allegedly taken quite well to 
the iPad, given that they are believed to be much more curious and contemplative than 
other apes.  Encounters between iPads and orangutans are consistently framed as 
successful, and this is certainly helped by their reputation, which naturalizes orangutans 
as not only well suited for iPads, but also as ideal users. After being presented with 
iPads, orangutans, one reporter claims, “quickly became Apple converts” (Platt 2012). 
According to Rob Waugh at the Daily Mail, Miami Zoo researchers are claiming that 
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orangutans “have an 'innate' ability to use Apple iPads - and enjoy using the 
touchscreens to draw, play games and even videoconference with other apes” (2012). 
Even Galdikas, a primatologist who specializes in orangutans, observes that, “iPads 
seem to work for humans. It's not surprising that orangutans, who share 97 percent of 
their genetic material with humans, like them, too" (qtd. in Fischer 2012).  
Orangutans do resemble humans in many ways.36 However their close relation to 
humans is still under dispute. It is speculated that they are not our closest genetic 
relatives—that would be chimpanzees and bonobos. In fact, many consider orangutans 
to be the oldest and most primitive of all the apes. They retain more characteristics of 
the ancestral hominoid (pre-ape primate) that lived 12-15 million years ago than any of 
the others (Call and Tomasello 70; Miles 45). Regardless of their degree of similarity, it 
is not perceived similarity alone that explains why they have been mobilized as ideal 
users. It has to do with their species history and culture: their physical and cognitive 
adeptness and their ostensible intelligence. 
Admittedly, the above characterizations of species are broad, and run the risk of 
over-generalizing. However, that danger only exists if we think of species in terms of 
natural kinds. It is much more helpful to think of species instead as ecologically situated 
ways of being in the world, as Thom van Dooren does in his Flight Ways: Life and Loss 
at the Edge of Extinction (2014). In his attempt to grapple with the magnitude and 
meaning of species loss, van Dooren proposes that members of a species be thought of 
less as life forms, and more as forms of life. In this way they are not simply 
representatives or ambassadors of their species, but are emplaced participants in the 
                                                 
36 Orangutans and humans share many similarities including gestation period, brain hemispheric 
asymmetry, characteristics of dentition, sexual physiology, copulatory behavior, hormonal levels, hair 
patterns, mammary gland placement and insightful style of cognition (Miles 44-45). 
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making of their species identity.  Species does not designate a set of essential qualities, 
but of ecologically situated practices and embodied knowledges that are at the same 
time, intimately entangled with a myriad of other species and other ways of life (van 
Dooren 12).   
 Orangutans are from the genus Pongo and members of the subfamily Pongidae 
and are widely known as “the Red Apes,” for their distinctly auburn-coloured hair. They 
are exclusively native to Asia. Currently the wild orangutan population is limited to the 
islands of Borneo and Sumatra, which give the two species of orangutan their names: 
Bornean (Pongo pygmaeus) and Sumatran (Pongo abelii). Their species identity has 
been fashioned from making themselves at home in these places. They have very long 
arms and short but mobile hind limbs that they have adapted for suspensory locomotion 
through the arboreal canopies of the rainforest (Call and Tomasello 70). Furthermore, 
their flat and expressive faces give them a canny human-like appearance, which has had 
a great influence on their folk history.  
In Malay, the word “orangutan” means “reasonable being of the woods” or “old 
person of the forest” (Miles 43). Traditionally, many locals even believed orangutans 
could talk but simply chose not to, so that they could avoid being put to work (Schaik 7). 
Though they are slow moving and demonstrate a reserved demeanor, it is commonly 
believed that they have a rich interior life, which has earned them the reputation as 
“thinkers of the jungle” (Schuster, Smits and Ullal 2008). Adding to this mystique is 
their alleged tendency toward solitude. Females and their offspring do enjoy close 
enduring bonds, but male orangutans are largely loners. This is probably a feeding 
adaptation: as large bodied fruit eaters, there is higher competition for food—in 
instances where food is more plentiful, orangutans have been known to be more social.  
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They are the least studied of all the apes, which only further amplifies their 
enigmatic reputation. Because of primatology’s emphasis on primate social systems, 
researchers have tended to favour more explicitly convivial apes such as gorillas, 
chimpanzees, and bonobos. Also contributing to their lack of study is their relative 
geographic inaccessibility. Their population density varies between 2 to 7 orangutans 
per square kilometer, and less than one orangutan per square kilometer in higher 
altitudes (Call and Tomasello 71). Not only are they dispersed, they are also primarily 
arboreal—though they do spend some time on the ground—and not easily available for 
field research. 
Wild orangutans are not widely known for their technical adeptness or cognitive 
sophistication. Though they do build nests out of branches and leaves, the highest form 
of tool use reported in wild orangutans until recently, is using a broken twig as a back 
scratcher (Schaik 1). Solitary lifestyles, the reasoning goes, do not create occasions for 
sharing learned behaviours such as tool use (Call and Tomasello 72). Captive orangutans 
however, especially those in zoos and research facilities, are recognized for being much 
more social and intelligent than their wild relatives. They demonstrate abilities to learn, 
deduce, and invent. Of course, animals in captive environments often outperform their 
wild counterparts, a phenomenon referred to as the “captivity bias” (Haslam 2013). In 
captivity, orangutans exceed other apes in their ability to manipulate objects (Miles 45). 
They also display a propensity for strategizing, as illustrated by their ability to be both 
quiet and crafty.  
Nowhere is this better illustrated than in the case of Fu Manchu, the infamous 
male orangutan who escaped from his enclosure at the Omaha Zoo multiple times in 
1968. Zookeepers were mystified by how he was getting out at night. It was later 
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discovered that he was climbing up into the air vent in his enclosure, crawling to the end 
of the duct, and picking the lock with a wire, which he kept hidden in his mouth during 
the day. It is speculated that the wire came from a broken light fixture in a neighboring 
enclosure, one belonging to an orangutan named Heavy Lamar.  
While it is unclear how Fu Manchu got ahold of the wire, as legend has it, he 
traded cookies with Heavy Lamar for it (see Linden 2002). In fashioning a tool and 
using it both effectively and surreptitiously, Fu Manchu demonstrated innovation, 
planning, foresight, and the ability to deceive. Fu Manchu is hardly an anomaly; other 
orangutan escape artists include Ken Allen, nicknamed “The Hairy Houdini” who was 
notorious for repeatedly getting out of his enclosure at the San Diego Zoo. The zoo had 
to hire someone to go undercover in order to figure out how Ken Allen was escaping, 
and then spent $45,000 on renovations to modify the enclosure (Adler 1986). Recently 
the Indiana Zoo spent $26 million on their International Orangutan Centre, only to have 
two orangutans escape from their enclosure almost right away (Rudavsky 2014).   
Given that enculturation seems to make orangutans smarter and more 
gregarious, we might assume that they bear within them this potential all along, even in 
the wild. Their intelligence is embryonic which makes them well primed for the 
enrichment and edification that human-made environments offer. Under such 
reasoning, however, it is not the orangutans themselves who have become crafty. Rather 
it is the work of human intervention and conditioning that has unlocked and liberated 
these qualities. Yet in a recent study of orangutans from Suaq, a swamp forest in 
Northern Sumatra, Carel van Schaik encountered wild orangutans unlike any other he 
had ever studied. He noted that they were “intelligent, socially tolerant, and 
technologically adept” (Schaik 167). They displayed a range of tool behaviours used to 
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increase food intake and to make life more comfortable, such as customizing sticks to 
extract seeds from hard fruits and repurposing leaves as napkins and gloves (Schaik 
147).  
Such findings suggest that where orangutans are more social, they do exhibit 
learned behaviours and traditions, which contribute to more of an incipient culture than 
previously believed (Schaik 137). More importantly, they also suggest that orangutans 
have complex relationships with their environments, and depending on their 
circumstances, can develop new skills, and embodied knowledges when they are 
required for their survival. Thus, different environments simply encourage orangutans 
to engage with and make meaning from their surroundings in novel ways. If orangutans 
display ingenuity and intelligence in captivity, this is not strictly a human achievement 
but developed from the orangutans’ receptive and participatory engagement with their 
environments.  
Therefore, encouraging orangutans to interact with iPads in zoos need not be 
perceived as a form of coercion. Orangutans should not be underestimated. They are 
gifted with a keen sense of sight (and sound as well) since they require appropriate 
depth perception and spatial awareness in order to live in the arboreal canopy of the 
rainforest.37 They use their hands and feet equally for arboreal locomotion, and as a 
result, have developed a discerning sense of touch. They also rely heavily on tactile 
gestures for communication (Call and Tomasello 91). These qualities combined, 
additionally contribute to a sense that orangutans might be predisposed to be iPad 
users.  
                                                 
37 Dr. Neil Mennie from the University of Nottingham Malaysia is currently studying the eye movements 
of orangutans to investigate “their ability to search for food and to compare their progress with humans in 
3D search and foraging” (Mennie, qtd. in “Seeing the World Through the Eyes of an Orangutan”). 
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At the same time, orangutans should not be overestimated. As Hannah Wirman 
points out, the assumption that orangutans are ideal and successful users of touchscreen 
technologies has its limitations. In her research designing digital games for captive 
orangutans, she has discovered that orangutan-touchscreen interactions often fail. She 
relates, for example, that orangutans like to use their full palms or fists, or other body 
parts to touch the screen. The screens have difficulty responding to such large input 
areas. In addition, the orangutans also approach the screens from unusual angles, 
moving around quite a bit, while displaying very short attention spans. Furthermore, 
they do not exhibit any discerning interest toward the screens. Rather, they treat screens 
like any other object, and as such they can be licked, poked, prodded, or taken and 
broken apart (Wirman 107). The reality of “Apps for Apes”—that the orangutans cannot 
hold the iPads directly, also troubles the notion of orangutans as ideal users. And yet, 
this fantasy persists nonetheless, because the dream of seeing apes successfully 
interacting with communication technologies is one too willful and too enticing to defer. 
 
X. Postwar Primatology: Humans, Apes, and The Problem of 
Communication 
 
The origins of this fantastical scenario are rooted in the 20th century western 
imaginary. Berger famously observed that animals have “secrets which, unlike the 
secrets of caves, mountains, seas, are specifically addressed to man” (5). In the wake of 
WWII, western primatology made it its mission to develop methods for accessing those 
secrets in the minds of apes. Late 19th and early 20th century primate research focused 
mainly on those living or dead, in laboratories, museums, and private collections.   
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The primary research imperative was to produce knowledge about the 
morphology and physiology of ape and simian bodies. It was also, as Haraway notes, a 
colonial affair where knowledge about the bodies of monkeys and apes were mobilized 
as part of an overriding racist, colonial-orientalist discourse (1989: 19). But after WWII, 
primate research shifted gears. It became less interested in studying non-human 
primates as lone individuals, and more as social beings, involved in larger processes of 
organization and interaction. Efforts were underway to observe their behaviours and 
interactions in the wild, as well their behaviours and responses to various stimuli in 
captive environments. 
 This is not to say that considerations of primate communication did not exist 
before WWII—they did, they were just much less systematic and much less 
technologically implicated. Arguably, animal communication was becoming a much 
more popular topic of study after the publication of Darwin’s Origin of Species (1859).  
However, the first experiments with ape communication did not get underway until the 
1930s and 1940s and mostly involved chimpanzees (see Kellogg  and Kellogg 1933: 
Hayes 1951). These experiments involved immersing chimps in human language and 
human environments. While the apes demonstrated some understanding of human 
words, attempts at teaching them to respond were uneventful due to their difficulties 
with vocalizing.38  
Thus, interest in primate behavior became secondary to more speculative 
involvement in their cognitive and neurological capacities, particularly in how apes 
                                                 
38 While many apes can vocalize vowel sounds, they are not able to vocalize consonants, since they lack the 
ability for “velopharyngeal closure,” which refers to the “brief blocking off of the nasal passages as air is 
forced through the mouth” which are required for making consonant sounds (Savage-Rumbaugh and 
Lewin 226). 
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communicated, articulated and translated intentions into actions. It is hardly a 
coincidence that the interest in primate communication awakened in tandem with 
growing popularity of information theory and the cybernetics, which, as Norbert Weiner 
defines it, is the study of systems of “control and communication in the animal and the 
machine” (1965: 11). Cybernetics marked a palpable shift away from the organism as its 
own system, and toward the organism as one nexus in a larger network of information, 
feedback, and organized action. For Haraway, the cybernetic turn was part of a strategy 
to temper the post-war anxieties about the destructive impulses of human beings and 
the fears of continued social instability.  
Therefore, primatology was just one part of more concerted efforts that were 
underway at the time to observe and predict the functioning of social systems. From the 
mid 1950s to the mid 1970s, primatology addressed postwar concerns by looking for 
new models of communication and examples of stable social systems in non-human 
primates (1989: 126-127). From the mid 1970s onward primatology focused less on 
social stability and more on the strategic possibilities that the study of primates could 
offer. Primatologists began to document and theorize the mental and emotional lives of 
non-human primates, in the hopes of identifying and illuminating the origins of 
strategic behavior (1989: 127-128).    
The avid interest in ape communication in the postwar period included recording 
and defining ape’s “gestural, vocal, and facial expressions for intra-specific 
communication,” such as Jane Goodall’s early work with chimpanzees (Haraway 1989: 
139). In the 1960s, researchers began attempting to teach apes American Sign Language 
(AMESLAN) to bypass vocalization issues, and build on the apes’ inherent propensity 
for gestural communication. The first non-human to learn to communicate with sign 
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language was Washoe (1965-2007), a female chimpanzee, under the auspices of R. Allen 
Gardner and Beatrix T. Gardner (1989). Meanwhile, Ann J. Premack and David 
Premack began experimenting with using a symbolic economy of colored plastic tokens 
to teach apes how to communicate, with varying success rates (1972).  
One of the most interesting developments in ape communication was the 
invention of “Yerkish” by Duane Rumbaugh, as part of his LANA (Language Analog) 
Project. Yerkish, so named because the research was conducted at the Yerkes National 
Primate Research Centre, consisted of “lexigrams”: graphical symbols that represent 
nouns, verbs, adjectives and other parts of speech (Rumbaugh 1977). Lexigrams were a 
significant development because they were made possible by computers, and more 
importantly, they continue to be used with touchscreen and tablet computers today. 
Early experiments were conducted with a chimpanzee, Lana (1970-), who was named 
after the project. She would activate a lexigram by touching a special crafted keyboard, 
which would light up and be projected onto a screen (Savage-Rumbaugh and Lewin 28). 
Eventually gaming joysticks replaced keyboards to maneuver the cursor on the screen 
(Schweller 2012).  
Ape language experiments continued into the 1970s, primarily with sign language 
such as the work of Herbert Terrace and the now infamous male chimp, Nim Chimpsky 
(1979). But even these experiments became increasingly implicated in computer 
technology. Penny Patterson’s work with Koko the gorilla, for example, mainly involved 
sign language. But, because Koko also understood spoken English, one researcher 
created a keyboard-computer linkage that enabled Koko to synthesize a human voice by 
pressing on particular keys (Patterson and Linden 109). Experiments also progressed 
with lexigrams as well, such as Sue-Savage Rumbaugh’s and Duane Rumbaugh’s work 
 201 
with two male chimpanzees, Sherman and Austin (Savage-Rumbaugh, Rumbaugh, and 
Boysen 1978).  
By the end of the 1970s, however, the enthusiasm, support, and funding for ape 
communication research began to dwindle. Some speculate that it was thanks in part to 
Terrace’s later conclusions that apes could not acquire language after all (Savage-
Rumbaugh and Lewin 1994). Also factored into its waning popularity were the ethical 
predicaments of ape communication experiments. As Adrian Desmond has pointed out, 
apes that have grown up human have “created an unprecedented moral crisis for 
mankind” (59).  
The surge of interest in ape language acquisition, beginning in the 1960s, for 
example, led to wild infant apes being forcibly taken from their mothers, placed into 
human homes, encouraged to learn human behaviours and become accustomed to 
human ways of life. But in most cases, once the apes reached a stage of maturity they 
became too difficult to care for, and were negligently discarded. Unable to return to 
their native environments, at best, some of these apes ended up in zoos and sanctuaries. 
Unfortunately, thanks to their species confusion, they were often lonely and depressed, 
and unable to get along with others of their kind. At worst these apes ended up in 
medical research laboratories, where they were no doubt subjected to undue suffering. 
Many died under lamentable and tragic circumstances.39 The fates of encultured apes, 
once communication experiments have ended, are precarious at best.  
                                                 
 
39 See for example the case of the male chimpanzee, Nim Chimpsky (1973-2000) recounted in Nim 
Chimpsky: The Chimp Who Would Be Human (2008) and the documentary Project Nim (James Marsh 
2011).  
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Not the craze it once was, ape communication research remains alive and well, 
with little signs of abating. H. Lyn White Miles continues to work with the male 
orangutan, Chantek, who uses sign language (Miles 1993). Sue Savage-Rumbaugh and 
Ken Schweller work with bonobos like Kanzi, at the Bonobo Hope Great Ape Trust 
Sanctuary in Des Moines, Iowa. Kanzi works mainly with lexigrams in conjunction with 
computer touchscreens, which he had been using even before the iPad. However, as 
Schweller observes, the growing commercial availability of the touchscreen with the 
release of the iPad and other computer tablets, is “helping to spark a renaissance of 
technology-aided research into primate development and cognition” (Schweller 2012). 
Schweller and his team have developed a lexigram app called “Bonobo Chat,” as well as 
text-to-speech synthesizers on Motorola Xoom tablets to build bonobos vocabularies 
and encourage them to be better communicators. 
New technologies such as the iPad fascinate as potential solutions to the 
perennial problem of interspecies communication, fueling the desire for new 
interventions. Schweller, for example, insists touchscreen tablets are “giving researchers 
the world over powerful new ways to study and unambiguously document ape 
communication” (2012). The touchscreen is deemed to be better than sign language, 
because sign language, Schweller claims, “leaves too much open to interpretation.” 
Lexigrams are preferable, he claims, because they work well in conjunction with the 
computer, and the computer “helps remove ambiguity” (2012). Touchscreen devices are 
positioned as transparent mediators, rendering communication effortless and 
automatic. There is a sense that human and non-human apes are situated on the same 
level, merely separated by a serviceable gap. All that appears to be required is the proper 
mechanism by which to ferry information back and forth.  
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XI. Simians, Similitude, and the Production of Communicative 
Subjects 
 
In order to make this communicative scaffolding thinkable, the relationship 
between human and non-human apes must be deemed symmetrical, analogous. The 
notion of apes doing human things is an age-old comedic trope, but one that typically 
served to affirm human exceptionalism. “It delights us to see apes engage in activities we 
perform” John Sorenson contends, because “in them we see less perfect versions of 
ourselves, which we find endlessly amusing. It seems especially hilarious if apes that 
emulate our behavior do so ineptly, because this reaffirms our superiority” (39-40). This 
trope is so perennial that we have coined the verb “to ape,” to refer to the imitation of 
someone or something, especially in an absurd or unthinking manner. However, the 
more recent “aping” of humans is not so much interested in affirming difference, as it is 
affirming similarity and equivalence. 
This search for similitude has cemented into what Sara Waller sees as a veritable 
cultural paradigm. In her estimation, it is a paradigm that anticipates surprising 
similarity between humans and nonhuman primates in terms of the way they think and 
feel (79). As such, scientific studies are often designed to privilege similarity with apes 
over profound differences (79). This similarity is not solely cultivated for its 
entertainment value. Nor is it a means to celebrate affinities. Rather, it still serves to 
reify human superiority. The more non-human apes appear to be just like us, the more 
they validate human being as the most legitimate and sought after way of being in the 
world. 
It positions humans as superior and more sophisticated than our less evolved kin. 
The assumption is that we are helping apes by edifying them, and making them more 
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like us. Headlines such as “'Apps For Apes' Is Using iPads To Help Primates 
Communicate, Get Smart” (Baker 2012), “National Zoo Orangutans Turn High-Tech 
with Apps for Apes (Smithsonian Conservation Biology Institute 2013), and “Dawn of 
the Planet of the iPad-Wielding Apes (Freed 2013) imply that a process of progression is 
taking place.  “Apps for Apes” means to improve the quality of life for captive 
orangutans. However, it is significantly distinct from other enrichment activities such as 
climbing on ropes and the like in that it is interested in developing their cognitive and 
communicative abilities. Giving iPads to apes under the pretenses of augmenting their 
experience of captivity is a means of cultivating subjectivity, a particularly human 
subjectivity. 
The treatment of “Apps for Apes” in the press recapitulates this penchant toward 
similitude. The notion of apes using iPads is taken as an affirmation that they are 
incredulously and delightfully like us—or at the very least on their way to becoming so. 
One article remarks that, “Humans aren’t the only species on the planet with a penchant 
for electronic gadgets” (Baker 2012). Many reports on the project describe the 
orangutans as if they were human. They begin with expositions of unidentified subjects 
using iPads, only to disclose later in the article that the subjects in question are apes.  
For example, Rob Waugh initiates his piece with: “Two 8-year-old twins love 
their iPad. They draw, play games and expand their vocabulary” (2012). The twins, he 
reveals next, are actually two female orangutans, Peanut and Pumpkin, at the Miami 
Zoo. The suggestion is that the manner in which orangutans and humans interact with 
the iPad is indistinguishable. Headlines such as “Orangutans Go Ape Over iPad Apps” 
(Uebelherr 2011), “Plugged in Primates: Apes Love the iPad” (ABC News 2011), and 
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“Apps for Apes: Orang-utans Want iPads for Christmas (Smith 2011) suggest that apes 
are not only playing with iPads like humans, but take equal pleasure in them as well. 
This similitude is also implicitly mobilized in the project itself. As Richard 
Zimmermann explains, the project’s aim is to make it clear to the public why orangutans 
need to be protected. They are able to do this, in his view, when they “show zoo visitors 
how similar humans and apes are, be it through observation, talking with wildlife 
experts or seeing the apes use the same technology we use everyday” (qtd. in “National 
Zoo Orangutans Turn High Tech” 2013). While the continued survival of orangutans 
hinges upon the human desire to care for them, this care is contingent upon instilling an 
explicit recognition and celebration of our sameness.  
This emphasis on affinity may appear benign and equitable, however this 
similitude is cultivated under extremely asymmetrical relationships. To be sure, apes 
acting like humans can be impressive, amusing, or emotionally stirring. But framing 
non-human apes as human only inoculates their strangeness. In making these strangers 
more familiar, we miss the opportunity to be confused, to learn how to negotiate and 
make provisional attempts at contact. Instead, we compulsively reenact the same 
encounter, over and over again—an encounter that, as the histories of captivity and 
primatology have indicated, will not necessarily benefit non-human apes. We end up 
immunizing ourselves to the potential richness of others. For we become unable to 
appreciate the value in difference, in what it means to communicate with respect for the 
mystery and the magnitude of the other. 
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XII. The Clever Hans Effect: The Desire for Similitude and the 
Occlusion of the Other  
 
In one of the more indelible examples of such a missed opportunity is the case of 
Clever Hans, the 19th century German horse that could allegedly do arithmetic. His 
teacher, Mr. von Osten, had supposedly taught Hans to add, subtract, multiply, divide, 
and even spell. When von Osten asked Hans a question, the horse would tap his hoof the 
correct number of times, indicating the right answer (Rosenthal and Rosnow 406). 
Upon closer analysis by external researchers, however, it was revealed that Hans was 
not actually answering the questions. Rather, he was responding to nonverbal cues 
unconsciously displayed by his trainer.  
The researchers found that even the slightest motion of the head, a mere raise of 
eyebrows, or the flare of the questioner’s nostrils could cue Hans to stop tapping 
(Rosenthal and Rosnow 406). This has since become the classic scenario of 
miscommunication. That is, as Peters explains, “a smooth interaction that, it turns out, 
has radically different meanings for each participant” (242). The outcome of these 
experiments is now called the observer-expectancy bias, where an observer 
inadvertently influences a research subject with a cognitive bias. It functions as a 
warning of the dangers of misunderstanding in animal communication. It is truly 
evidence of the worst human tendency to see, what Peters describes as, “the 
performance of the other as simply a staging for or projection of the self” (242). Rather 
than seeing Clever Hans as a differently calibrated being with varying abilities and 
interests, his trainer took Clever Hans to be a human-like horse. In focusing so much on 
similitude, he neglected to appreciate the actual communicative processes that were 
taking place. 
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Clever Hans did not understand human language or its symbolic systems, but he 
did nevertheless demonstrate something just as significant. In all the disappointment 
over Clever Hans’ inability to do math, his real achievement has been overlooked. The 
horse demonstrated an impressive affective sensitivity toward his human partner.  
Working intimately alongside him, the horse learned to perceive physical signals so 
subtle that other humans did not initially pick up on them. The horse was in fact 
demonstrating incredible embodied knowledge and skill. In this way, the story of Clever 
Hans illustrates not the horse’s inadequacy, or the perils of human bias, but the limited 
nature of the human concept of communication. If anything, the case of Clever Hans 
suggests that communication is much more complex and variegated than a simple 
dialogic exchange of information through language.  
 Communication is not something that one either fails or succeeds in achieving, 
but a process, a special form of action—creative action. “Communication is, above all 
else,” Jonathan Sterne persuasively argues, “a technē” (2006a: 91). Technē, the Greek 
root of technology meaning “to craft,” is in basic Aristotelian terms both “the process of 
producing things in the world and the capacity or knowledge of contingency—practical 
knowledge—that allows and accounts for that production” (Sterne 2006a: 91). It is a 
process of crafting, but it is also an unfolding sensibility toward the world, an embodied 
knowledge that makes this very means of relating and making possible in the first place. 
Technē Sterne maintains, “bridges the chasm between possibility and actuality” (2006a: 
92). It encompasses both technology—the hard and soft materials of apparatuses—as 
well as the techniques used to animate them. 
Communication is not, then, an organic, natural process of relating, whereby 
technologies and techniques are simply added. Rather technology and technique—
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technē—are endemic, indeed constitutive of communication itself. Furthermore, 
communication, while often understood to be the essential relation between self and 
other, presupposes an earlier relation: that between organism and world. As Jakob von 
Uexküll has made abundantly clear in his concept of umwelt, the first relation is that 
between organism and its surrounding environment. And most importantly this relation 
is interactive. That is, organisms do not simply live in their world, they also participate 
in its becoming. 
 Animals actively make and reshape their environments, communicating with 
elements in their surroundings through complex processes of signification. In this way, 
the organism’s essential way of being in the world is one of doing. Life itself is a kind of 
technē, a kind of sensibility that allows organisms to not only exist in a world, but to 
change it. Technē is, then, integral to the creation of the umwelt. In taking 
communication to be a form of technē, it becomes centrally implicated in the making of 
worlds, and the crafting of the conditions of possibility for worlds. What communication 
makes, then, are openings, where strangers can renegotiate their relations, recalibrate 
their sensibilities in tandem with whatever emerges at the sites of encounter. 
 
 
XIII. Apps for Apes: Accommodating Orangutans as Users  
 
The other, not the self should be the cause of whatever 
communication might mean.  
—John Durham Peters, from Speaking into the Air (265). 
 
To a large extent, “Apps for Apes” misconceives communication, and in a 
misguided gesture of hospitality threatens to put closures on orangutans and their 
worlds. However, it also creates openings, possibilities for greater appreciation and 
accommodation for them. At its most rudimentary, the project has encouraged attention 
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toward activities that orangutans enjoy. Science writer Alanna Mitchell reports, for 
example, that the orangutans at the Toronto Zoo delight in watching videos of 
themselves on the iPads, noting that they are especially fascinated opening up their 
mouths really wide, in order to see inside (qtd. on McDonald 2013). This is perhaps not 
what humans had in mind when they introduced the iPad to the orangutans. But such 
disappointments are not uncommon. Wirman recounts that some of the sexually 
maturing apes she was working rubbed their genitals on the touchscreen, poured liquids 
on it, as well as food (106). These disappointments are important starting points to 
think alternatively about the way the expectations we place on our encounters with 
others can occlude the autonomy and difference of the other.  
In the hands of an orangutan, the iPad is not the grand “revolutionary and 
magical” device that allowed Steve Jobs to hold the Internet in his hands. Apes do not 
appreciate the status or symbolic prestige of iPads.  They do not recognize that these 
devices have been manufactured by an array of complex processes and materials. Nor do 
they appreciate their usefulness for human labour and leisure, nor even recognize them 
as innovative technologies at all, ontologically different from other objects in their 
environment. The iPad under the touch of an orangutan becomes a purely sensual, 
material thing. It becomes a surface where light, movement, and sound address its 
sensorium, and invite it to react—or not. 
After several years of participation, zookeepers have discovered that the 
orangutans demonstrate preferences for apps they like to use. They prefer visual 
cognition games that use matching and memory. For example, Scott Engel, the iPad 
Enrichment Coordinator at the Milwaukee Zoo, reports that some of the orangutans are 
fond of drawing apps like Doodle Buddy and Draw Free, as well as games that require 
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dexterity and movement like iFishPond and Flick Kick Football. They also seem 
interested in the movement, sound, and color of interactive books like The Fantastic 
Flying Books of Morris Lessmore (Crecente 2011). This choice is of course, offered 
within a limited set of options, all within the confines of a contentious zoological 
enclosure.  
Nevertheless, this emphasis on orangutan stimulation and pleasure holds the 
door open for more orangutan-centric engagement than other kinds of ape-technology 
encounters. As a case in point, the “Apps for Apes” initiative has led to the design and 
release of an app specifically for orangutans. The app, called Orangutapp, evolved from 
a collaborative effort between the Toronto Zoo and the private design firm, 
SplitElement. Orangutapp is a selector app, whereby orangutans are able to specify 
which enrichment items they would like to do that day, and what they might like to eat 
(Wolfe-Wylie 2013).40  
What is significant about the application is that orangutans are intended as the 
primary users. As such, the designers considered them in the creation process. For 
example, they adjusted the size and position of the buttons on the screen because, 
“Orangutan fingers aren’t as precise as ours,” designer Christopher Lewis explains. “We 
had to make sure the buttons worked for their hands” (Wolfe-Wylie 2013). The app 
makes a direct address to their perceptual capacities in order to help them make their 
choices—no matter how small or limited these choices may be. The app is, admittedly, 
                                                 
40 Orangutans can establish relationships between symbols and the things they represent. Anne Russon 
observed one orangutan who when shown a symbol of a banana on a touchscreen, tried to eat it, 
suggesting that it could differentiate the image on the screen as more than a random glowing shape 
(“Quirks and Quarks” 2013).  Wirman also makes a similar observation noting that her orangutan 
collaborators seem to understand the distinction between live footage and graphic elements (108). 
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being used as part of the apparatus of captivity. However, it gestures toward improving 
orangutan care, allowing for greater customization within limited communication 
possibilities. It is valuable insofar as it is crafting a provisional means with the iPad for 
zookeepers and orangutans to live better, together.  
The app does not address any of the problems with the iPad, or the touchscreen 
itself. As Wirman suggests, humans are habituated to using technologies in “non-
ergonomic, uninteresting even nonsensical ways” (110). Orangutans are much more 
resistive. This movement toward design is an important pivot point that suggests that 
the project has the potential to move away from its anthropocentric orientation, and 
toward a more non-human user-centered approach. What is additionally significant 
about the app is the way it cultivates a correlation between what is onscreen and what is 
offscreen. Play behavior that moves freely between digital and analog, manual and 
screen based modes offers, in Wirman’s estimation, more orangutan-friendly 
engagement (111). There is no “distinctly ‘digital’” for orangutans, she speculates, for the 
digital “is overruled by the physical features of the screen” (108). Other people, other 
orangutans, and the myriad of things in their environments become equally co-present 
co-participants in their activities.     
The introduction of this app brings “Apps for Apes” into the burgeoning field 
loosely referred to as “animal-computer interaction” (ACI). The lives of animals have 
long been implicated in technologies and constituted by technological interactions. 
However, this fact has been largely ignored. Little consideration has been given to non-
humans as users of technologies. Thus the aims of ACI are to illuminate technologies 
and techniques that might give animals better quality of life. As Clara Mancini points 
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out in her manifesto on the topic, ACI should foster a more mutually beneficial 
relationship between humans and animals 
by enabling communication and promoting understanding between them; 
technology that allows companion animals to play entertaining games with 
their guardians or enables guardians to understand and respond to the 
emotions of their companion animals might be consistent with this aim. 
(Mancini 69) 
 
Some of these new ventures in designing technologies for and with animals include 
Mancini’s own Animal-Computer Interaction Lab (http://www.open.ac.uk/blogs/ACI). 
Others include: “Bronx OOZ,” headed by artist and engineer, Natalie Jeremijenko 
(www.environmentalhealthclinic.net/ooz), the “Playing With Pigs Project” a 
collaboration between Dutch-based game designers, philosophers and scientists 
(http://www.playingwithpigs.nl/) that designed the multispecies-player game 
“PigChase” for captive pigs destined for slaughter. Hanna Wirman’s TOUCH project is 
another example, which seeks to “bring new Technology to Orangutans for 
Understanding and Communicating cross-species for greater Harmony” 
(http://ludusanimalis.blogspot.ca/p/touch-project.html).  
We can never know what it is that orangutans ultimately want. Projects that seek 
to get at this mysterious question are destined for disappointment. Even on the best of 
days, communication between members of the same species is fraught. Apes may not be 
“talking” with iPads, but they are still communicating, expressively or with subtle 
nuance, with the help of their actions and gestures. This is not a diminished form of 
communication that needs to be advanced and enriched, but a different kind, that 
requires new attentions and considerations.  
In the end, “Apps for Apes” can help us to rethink communication as less about 
the exchange of information and more about an acknowledgement of the needs of the 
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other. It also suggests that communication looks much more like play. Play, as Marc 
Bekoff and Jessica Pierce argue, is valuable because it is a “unique category of behavior 
that tolerates asymmetries more than other categories of social behaviour” (461).  
Furthermore, it is by definition consensual, for play cannot occur without mutual 
participation.  Play requires equality or fairness, which they point out, makes it different 
from other forms of cooperative behavior whether it is hunting, gathering, or care giving 
(461).  
 There is, then, within “Apps for Apes,” an incipient gesture of playfulness and 
hospitality. The project aspires to temper boredom, a modern affliction to which 
animals living in the cultural spaces of zoos are especially subjected. Boredom leads to 
depression, stereotyped behaviours, illness, and even death. Admittedly, tackling 
boredom services a larger agenda: it is a way of keeping animals alive, but also making 
them interesting to look at. Bored orangutans are also boring for zoo visitors. But 
regardless of why, there is something valuable in this gesture. It is not entirely 
successful in enriching the experiences of all captive orangutans in zoo environments, 
though initial research has shown that touchscreen computer use does appear to offer 
some cognitive stimulation for certain orangutans (see for example Boostrom 2013; 
Clay, Galeema, and Maple et al. 2012).  It hardly provides a solution to the more 
troubling issues related to captivity, exhibition, and conservation. However, at the very 
least it is an acknowledgement that orangutans do not simply require life, but a 
particular quality of life. It makes orangutan stimulation, pleasure, and enjoyment 
matter.  
 
 
 214 
XIV. Conclusion: Techniques/Technologies of Hospitality for Strangers 
While discussing his experience at the Great Ape Trust, Schweller relates a 
charming anecdote about Panbanisha, one of the bonobos with which he worked. One 
day, he and some of his students were watching her tap on the touchscreen inside her 
enclosure. Upon seeing them, he maintains, “she grabbed her poster-board keyboard 
and used the lexigrams to invite her visitors to have some juice.” And so, he concludes, 
“We all stopped working and sat down outside her glass enclosure to enjoy a drink 
together” (Schweller 2012). This gesture of conviviality, instigated by Panbanisha 
herself, is a reminder that mental communion is not required to get along well together.  
What the touchscreen facilitates is valuable and meaningful. It does not reconcile 
something so ambitious as the divide between nature and culture nor animal and 
human. Instead it suggests that these chasms are divisions only we care about, and that 
in the context of the chance or staged encounter, they are completely beside the point. 
No doubt, Panbanisha notices that there are differences between her and her guests. But 
rather than dwelling on these difference, and the limits of her knowing, she uses the 
technologies and techniques available to her to reach out and offer accommodation 
anyway. 
Touchscreens, like all screens, are places of disclosure and concealment. 
Touching them does nothing to change this ontological certainty. It only creates, as 
Derrida notes, a geometrical tangent: it means touching what cannot truly be touched, 
“a limit without depth or surface, untouchable” (2005: 131). Touch may illuminate a 
limit, but this limit is not a void. Instead it is a common place that is available to all 
parties. This place will no doubt always confound us, and ensure that the work of 
communication is never finished. But mercifully, the limit is a place for contingencies. 
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Contingencies in turn create instances where displaced strangers seeking 
accommodation might enjoy hospitable encounters across differences. 
 Privileging communication as solely a symbolic process that transpires between 
minds impoverishes our relationships with non-human apes, and others more generally. 
Rather than accessibility, we should think communication instead in terms of 
hospitality, of taking others and their irrevocable situatedness in time and place, into 
consideration. We waste valuable efforts strategizing about how to coax the wild, 
inchoate interior of subjectivity to the outside, when we would fare better to 
acknowledge and attend to what is already outside. Communication is not some riddle 
to be solved and filed away, but a quandary that requires continual encouragement, 
maintenance, and negotiation.  
The following chapter troubles the primacy of the symbolic dimension of 
communication even further by focusing explicitly on these efforts. It turns toward the 
work of carrier pigeons and their help with the fleshing out of communication 
infrastructure in modernity. These birds have been persistently excluded from the 
history and theory of communication. The forthcoming discussion makes a case for their 
urgent inclusion. Their involvement makes clear that even when communication 
involves symbolic informational exchange, it always requires first and foremost a 
material cradle in order to support its becoming. Not only are non-human animals 
implicated in establishing the conceptual parameters of communication, they are also 
deeply involved in the actual material implementation of those parameters. s 
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Chapter 4 
 
A Pigeon Races Against the Internet to Meet a Computer: 
Exploring the Feathered Edges of the Modern Communication Network 
 
a bird of the air shall carry the voice, and that which hath wings 
shall tell the matter.  
     —Ecclesiastes 10:20 
 
I. Carrier Pigeon, Meet Internet  
 
In September of 2010 amid the lush British countryside, a couple of data-carrying 
homing pigeons raced the Internet and won. The event was a ruse meant to raise 
awareness about the frustratingly low broadband speeds in the rural UK. The hope was 
to demonstrate an urgent need for upgrades to the network infrastructure. Ten pigeons 
were tagged with RFID chips and fitted with micro SD flash memory cards containing 
the same five-minute video. They were then released from a Yorkshire farm to fly the 
digital video to a second location. Upon their arrival the video would be manually 
transferred to a computer. At the same time the pigeons were released, a team of 
humans started to upload the video file to YouTube using the farm’s Internet 
connection. A little over an hour later two pigeons, Rory and Tref, arrived with their 
video files at Skegness, nearly 120 km away. Meanwhile, back in Yorkshire, the Internet 
had only managed to upload a quarter of the same video to YouTube (“Pigeon Flies Past 
Broadband” 2010). What we are meant to take away from this little stunt is that the 
Internet service in the rural UK is not just slow, but so slow that even a carrier pigeon 
can surpass it.41   
                                                 
41 Incidentally, this was not the first time that the Internet had been outperformed by a carrier pigeon. 
Internet enthusiasts conducted a similar race in Israel in 2004, while another was held in South Africa in 
2009 (See: Ben-Basset et al. 2004; “Pigeon Transfers Data Faster” 2009).  
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That the pigeons could transmit data faster than the Internet was hardly a 
surprise to the competition’s organizers. It would, however, have been quite a shock to 
the Internet engineers who had joked about sending data by pigeon two decades earlier. 
In a series of now famous April Fools’ Day RFCs (Request for Comments), David 
Waitzman—and later, others—playfully proposed the concept of IPoAC (Internet 
Protocol Over Avian Carrier) to the Internet Engineering Task Force, the ad hoc 
organization that develops and promotes Internet standards (See Waitzman 1990; 
Waitzman 1999; and Carpenter and Hinden 2011). What ensued was a long-running 
lampoon of the carrier pigeon, with its “high delay, low throughput, and low altitude 
service,” and its absurdly low bandwidth which was “limited to leg length” (Waitzman 
1990). These mock proposals were of course, purely speculative. But the fact that they 
expected the carrier pigeon’s defeat, suggests something of the bird’s lowly reputation. 
Conceived as a rudimentary, retrograde relic from communications past, it seemed only 
natural to assume it would be no match for the world’s largest, most modern, and 
sophisticated network. 
By 2001, pitting the pigeon against the Internet was no longer a thought exercise: 
a group of Linux enthusiasts in Bergen, Norway put these mock proposals to test. Their 
“Carrier Pigeon Internet Protocol” (CPIP) entailed transmitting a ping command: 
packets of network data were printed on paper, rolled up, and attached to the pigeons’ 
legs. 42  When the birds arrived, the data was then scanned and uploaded to a computer 
(Shankland 2002). This process proved to be quite slow thanks in large part to the 
necessary reliance on paper, which adds extra steps to the data’s transfer. The 
                                                 
42 A ping command is a query from one computer sent to another that seeks to verify their mutual 
connection. 
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emergence of lightweight flash memory devices, by contrast, means carrier pigeons not 
only have greater storage capacities, but that the data they bear can be transferred faster 
to other computers.  
The addition of these new technological peripherals has opened up more 
possibilities for the carrier pigeon. Anthony Judge, formerly of the Union of 
International Associations, claims for example, that carrier pigeons could legitimately 
function as a viable “sneakernet.” A sneakernet is a system for transferring digital 
information from computer to computer using external physical transportation, instead 
of using the ethernet of a computer network. In light of the many recent breaches in 
Internet security perpetrated by entities like the NSA, mobilizing pigeons to physically 
carry digital data is an effective way to curb surveillance and temper the growing 
insecurity of digital networks (2013).43  
While Judge’s suggestion is speculative, it is certainly fortified by current 
deployments of the carrier pigeon. In addition to the recent pigeon races, carrier pigeons 
are being actively employed elsewhere. Rocky Mountain Adventures, an American 
adventure tourism company, for example, has been relying on carrier pigeons to 
transmit digital data for years.  In order to document the adventure experience, the 
company takes digital photos of their patrons while they are white-water rafting. 
Because Internet service in the wilderness is so poor, the company employs pigeons to 
transport the digital photos on SD cards from remote areas back to their home office so 
the pictures can be ready when their patrons return (“Pigeon Post”). But the carrier 
pigeon’s contemporary ventures do not end there. They have also been involved in an 
                                                 
43 Judge’s musings have not gone unnoticed. Harvard University’s Internet think tank, the Berkman 
Center for Internet and Society, included Judge’s proposal in its 2013 annual report (see Gasser et al. 
2013). 
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assortment of other activities including, but not limited to, environmental sensing and 
experimental cartography initiatives.44  
The carrier pigeon and the Internet make for an odd encounter, then, but 
engineers have been fooling around with the idea of transmitting digital data by carrier 
pigeon since the Internet’s early days. Clearly, this trend shows little signs of abating. 
Summoning the carrier pigeon alongside the Internet is often done for amusement, or as 
a deliberate provocation. 45 The carrier pigeon does make a compelling foil for the 
Internet. Pitting them against one another generates interesting incongruities. But this 
is only because of their perceived incompatibility, which is a based on the prevailing, 
and misleading, stereotype of the carrier pigeon as the stalwart ur-example of 
communication’s most primitive forms. It is considered a throwback to a time when 
communication was beholden to the physical entities that carried it. Old and obsolete, 
its appearance in modernity generates an absurd anachronism, one that seems to 
function as a handy benchmark to measure the technological sophistication of the new.  
This chapter hopes to show that there is nothing anachronistic about the carrier 
pigeon’s reappearance in modernity. It is not some haphazard anomaly, a curious 
discontinuity, or simply a recent trend. The presence of the carrier pigeon, I argue, is 
                                                 
44 From 2006-2008 in Southern California, Beatriz da Costa, Cina Hazegh, and Kevin Pronto enrolled 
pigeons to carry environmental sensors to measure air pollution (see: www.pigeonblog.mapyourcity.net). 
More recently, Hill Hiroki Kobayashi and Hiromi Kudo developed “The Carrier Pigeon-like Sensing 
System (CPSS). This communication network depends on data collected from pigeon-borne sensing 
devices, with “animal-to-animals internet sharing capability.” The pilot project hopes to expand the size of 
monitoring areas such as the contaminated forests around the Fukishima nuclear power plant, which are 
inaccessible to both humans and their techno-informational infrastructures (2013).  “The Brooklyn 
Pigeon Project,” developed by New York architects Aranda\Lasch, meanwhile, consists of attaching a 
small battery, a camera, and a microphone to each bird. According to the designers, since the birds’ flight 
patterns are affected by sight, sound, smell, and a sense of the earth’s magnetic field they can produce 
multi-sensory maps. Once uploaded, these maps can offer unique alternatives to the technological “grid” 
maps of modern GIS systems (Stamp 2013).  
45 In 2012 for example, the office of Olivia Chow, a Toronto MP at the time, made its own April Fools’ Day 
fun when it announced that Chow would employ carrier pigeons in an effort to lower the carbon emissions 
produced by her office’s communiqués (Judge 2013). 
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perennial. A closer examination of the carrier pigeon’s deployment in modernity reveals 
not only its enduring presence, but also its enduring co-presence with other 
technologies. Surfacing in tandem with the Internet is in fact a continuation of the bird’s 
involvement in the establishment of technological infrastructures of communication 
more generally. Exploring the bird’s entanglement with other technologies reveals a 
compelling symbiosis. New technologies and techniques have and continue to modulate 
and accentuate the carrier pigeon’s operations, and at the same time, the pigeon 
supplements and improves upon the functionalities of the technological infrastructure.  
The recent encounters between the carrier pigeon and the Internet are, then, an 
opportunity to consider the bird’s perennial entanglement with the material and 
imaginative possibilities of communication. The carrier pigeon has endured because it is 
consistently useful, not just during times of technological failure, but also when our 
technological aspirations exceed their material realities. We have, and continue to, 
automatically revert to the carrier pigeon during periods of technological instability and 
expansion. Rather than a coincidence, this chapter takes this as evidence that the carrier 
pigeon is imbricated in communication in a fundamental way. Constructing a history of 
the carrier pigeon and the reality of its deployments in modernity is significant because 
it reveals something germane to communication.  
In physically transporting digital data, the carrier pigeon appears to be doing 
something positively old-fashioned. In actuality, it is doing the exact same thing as the 
Internet. Electrical communication may indeed compress time and space, while “cloud” 
computing may render communication seemingly instantaneous and ubiquitous. But in 
reality, digital data still relies on materiality and movement. The carrier pigeon draws 
necessary attention to the fact that even today, digital data enjoys analog travels. The 
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carrier pigeon does not just materialize communication; it illuminates that 
communication is first and foremost a material process, and movement and 
coordination are always required to make material connections.  
In addition, an encounter between a carrier pigeon and the Internet should 
inspire a sense of déjà vu. For this is not the first time that the carrier pigeon has met 
with and worked alongside modern communication infrastructure. Before the pigeon 
met the Internet, it traveled by train to meet the telegraph. And yet, this noteworthy 
rendezvous has been omitted from the history of communication. This chapter would 
like to examine why this relationship has been ignored, and consider the consequences 
of its exclusion. It also aims to make space for this relationship in the history of media 
and communication to create an opportunity for the carrier pigeon to bring new insights 
to bear on our understandings of communication. 
 
II. A Black Box, With Wings 
 
  He will not mingle with the business of the world while on his way, he  
will have no intercourse with its inhabitants […] Our commissioner will 
execute our will, in spite of any attempt to seize or terrify, to deceive or to 
injure him. He is one inaccessible to bribery and temptation, and is liable to 
make no error on his route […] my humble little message will be borne 
through the sky, as true as the arrow to its mark, by a bearer whose heart is as 
pure as the down that covers it.  
— “The Carrier Pigeon,” from The American Penny 
Magazine and Family Newspaper (1845: 5). 
 
The carrier pigeon as a medium of communication might be visible in the cultural 
landscape, but it is equally invisible. To communicate by carrier pigeon is typically 
understood in terms of opportunistic humans taking advantage of the bird’s mysterious 
internal homing instinct, and nothing more.  In reality, however, to communicate by 
carrier pigeon is not so simple or automatic. Instead, it involves the complex 
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coordination of a vast assemblage of animals, humans, technologies, and techniques. 
This persistent abstraction is the result of what Bruno Latour calls “blackboxing” (1987), 
a process whereby techniques are hidden by their successful functioning.  
The reduction of the carrier pigeon to a mere instrumentality, a means whereby a 
message is ferried from one point to another, has obfuscated the real work and 
connection it actually requires to communicate in this way. As such, the carrier pigeon is 
repeatedly taken for granted as a silent, autonomously operating “intermediary,” a term 
Latour uses to mean a vehicle that transports meaning without changing it (Latour 
2005: 39). The above epigraph provides an effective illustration of this. It implies that 
the carrier pigeon does not “mingle with the business of the world”: rather it is 
completely separate from the world in which it circulates. As the following hopes to 
make clear, however, the carrier pigeon is not an intermediary, but a mediator. That is, a 
vehicle that has the potential to translate and transform whatever it transports (Latour 
1993: 81). The carrier pigeon, despite the traditional assumption otherwise, is not 
separate from “the business of the world” but deeply enmeshed in it.  
Yet it remains a perpetual outlier in the history of communication. Scan the index 
of any given book on the history or theory of communication, or peruse course syllabi on 
such topics, and you will be hard pressed to find any reference to pigeons. If they appear 
at all it is merely in passing. Sometimes they are lumped in with other archaic forms like 
beacons and torches (see for example Holtzmann and Pehrson 1995). Other times, they 
are deigned as part of a primitive postal system.46 Either way, they are considered 
emblems of an extinct technology. Any time they are deployed in a modern setting, it is 
                                                 
46 Pigeon communication is sometimes called “Pigeon Post,” as it was when it was established between 
New Zealand and the Great Barrier Reef in 1896. Many other countries did use them as a postal service; 
the last one was retired in India in 2004 (Allen 107).   
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typically explained as an act of desperation or, as the opening anecdote suggests, for 
provocative effect. No matter the context, where or when the carrier pigeon appears in 
modernity, it is inevitably deemed out of place, and out of time. It is persistently 
excluded from culture and history.  
 The carrier pigeon’s omission from culture is largely a consequence of its 
animality. As animal, it is placed in the separate ontological realm of nature, 
independent from culture. It may be acknowledged as a medium of communication, but 
it is presumed to be a natural and lesser analog, a ready-made precursor to more 
sophisticated human-made technologies. The forthcoming history hopes to address this 
mistaken assumption by demonstrating that the carrier pigeon is not something that 
already exists. Rather, a pigeon becomes a carrier pigeon. Its deployment involves much 
more than a fortuitous exploit of the bird’s mechanistic homing instinct. Instead, the 
carrier pigeon is a multi-species achievement. It is an outcome of many elements 
working together in a complex assemblage of people, animals, and things, as well as 
techniques of both communication and transportation. 
  Meanwhile, the carrier pigeon is left out of history mainly because it is 
conceptualized as a pre-telegraphic technology. As such, it is understood as a quaint 
holdover from an era before electricity when information was still stubbornly beholden 
to the movement of physical entities. Certainly, the carrier pigeon did exist well before 
the telegraph, it is in fact one of the oldest means of communication. These birds have 
been deployed sporadically throughout history; humans have regularly depended upon 
them to transport critical messages. For example, Hannibal (247-182 BC), the 
Carthaginian General, allegedly used the bird thousands of years ago to relay messages 
during his famous advance across the Alps (Allen 102). For centuries after they 
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remained the only reliable signal system suitable for short-, mid-, or long-range 
communication (Woods 355).  
 But the carrier pigeon is also one of communication’s most enduring forms. And, 
not only does it continue to appear despite the development of newer and more 
ostensibly advanced technologies, it often appears because of them. The carrier pigeon 
has long been present, at varying scales and intensities, throughout history. While it has 
retreated at times into dormancy, it eventually returns to work in conjunction with 
many of the technologies by which it has allegedly been replaced. Yet this salient fact 
remains unacknowledged in historical discussions of the carrier pigeon.  
 
III. Déja-vu: Reassessing the Reappearance of the Carrier Pigeon in 
Modernity 
 
 Because there has been no historical consideration of its relationship to other 
technologies, each time the carrier pigeon appears in modernity, it seems sudden, out of 
the ordinary, and unprecedented. The explanation for the bird’s reappearance during 
the Great Wars provides the most obvious recapitulation of this narrative. One of the 
most peculiar phenomena of WWI, an article in a 1916 edition of Popular Science reads, 
“has been the revival during its course of methods and implements used in the warfares 
of medieval times and even of antiquity” (“The Pigeon Spy” 30). The carrier pigeon is 
one such anachronism, its presence is explained using the old adage about desperate 
times calling for desperate measures. Because of the ravages of combat, so the logic 
goes, militaries were simply compelled to rely on presumably low-tech and antiquated 
alternatives. As Major General Fowler, chief of Britain’s Department of Signals and 
Communication, writes: 
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when the battle rages and everything gives way to barrage and machine 
gun fire, to say nothing of gas attacks and bombings, it is to the pigeon that 
we go for succor […] Regular methods in such cases are worthless and it is 
at just such times that we need most, messengers that we can rely on. In 
the pigeons we have them. I am glad to say they have never failed us. (qtd 
in Wynne 152-3) 
 
This alibi for the carrier pigeon’s reappearance in technological modernity, and its 
casting as both a purposeful anomaly and a technological understudy, remains 
unquestioned. Certainly, the carrier pigeon has been deployed as a provisional 
substitute for faster and more efficient media, but such cases are not exemplary. More 
often than not the carrier pigeon operates in relation to the wider technological 
landscape, not apart from it. 
The Great Wars might have marked the carrier pigeon’s most conspicuous 
reappearance in modernity. However, its resurfacing at this cultural moment was no 
discontinuous intrusion. It was a continuation of the bird’s growing involvement with 
modern communications infrastructure, an involvement that began in the early 19th 
century with the second industrial revolution. To be fair, the carrier pigeon has to some 
degree always existed in relation to other media. Given its legacy of transporting 
handwritten or printed messages, it is inextricable from the written word, paper, and 
writing implements. However, beginning in the 19th century, the carrier pigeon became 
much more substantially implicated with other media. During this time, it was an 
essential component of a much larger burgeoning technical assemblage. 
What follows, then, is an examination of the realities of the carrier pigeon’s 
deployment during key points in modernity, with close attention to its relationship to 
technologies of communication and transportation. It will sketch the history of their 
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work with merchant bankers, fledgling news agencies, French citizens in the Siege of 
Paris during the Franco-Prussian War, and military personnel in Europe and North 
American during the Great Wars and beyond. Rather than a history of how humans used 
carrier pigeons, this chapter aspires to construct a history of how carrier pigeons 
participated in the organization and coordinated action of the modern communication 
network.  
That the carrier pigeon enjoyed a particular renaissance and increased intimacy 
with the technological landscape in the 19th century is not accidental. Its re-emergence 
during this time corresponds with significant technological developments. It reappeared 
as communication and transportation infrastructures—primarily those of the telegraph 
and the train—were just coming into being. These infrastructures were not implemented 
overnight; their expansion, uneven and unstable, transpired in fits and starts. The 
carrier pigeon was an auspicious addition: it was called upon as a complement. It 
provided a stopgap, fleshing out the existing infrastructure, and supplementing and 
augmenting its functional capabilities. At the same time, this infrastructure optimized 
the carrier pigeon’s own operations, making it more efficient and effective than ever 
before. Rather than adversarial, the relationship between carrier pigeons and modern 
technology during this time proved kindred and symbiotic.   
The carrier pigeon’s relationship with the telegraph presents the most interesting 
case of symbiosis. At times, the bird was essential to its material implementation and 
optimization. Yet there is no mention of the carrier pigeon’s contributions in historical 
discussions about the telegraph. This becomes an even more striking omission given the 
telegraph’s perceived significance to the field of communications. The telegraph has, for 
example, been heralded as one of communication’s most important inventions. In his 
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seminal essay, “Technology and Ideology,” James Carey famously identifies the 
telegraph as the very archetype for modern communication media. It is so exemplary, he 
contends, that it “can stand metaphorically for all the innovations that ushered in the 
modern phase of history” (2008: 156).  
All modern communications inventions, Carolyn Marvin similarly echoes, are 
merely “elaborations on the telegraph’s original work” (3). Even the computer, she 
remarks, “is no more than an instantaneous telegraph with a prodigious memory” 
(Marvin 3). Tom Standage adds on this thesis, arguing that the Internet is but a 
continuation of the social transformations first initiated by the telegraph. Adding fodder 
to this notion is the fact that even the Internet’s infrastructure is currently mapped on 
and built in to places and pathways once used for telegraph infrastructure. The 
telegraph has clearly been incredibly influential to the history of communication; as 
such it has contributed significantly to our understanding of technological change and 
its consequences. But it has also been formative to our conceptualization of 
communication more generally.  
Even now, despite its ostensible obsolescence, the telegraph continues to haunt 
our definitions of communication. Communication is considered a fundamentally 
symbolic process. This definition of communication is, as Jonathan Sterne notes, a 
direct outcome of the way the telegraph has been historicized—especially with regards to 
its relationship to the train. It is now widely held, for example, that the telegraph was a 
unique technology that was involved in a process wholly different from the train. As 
such, it irrevocably separated communication from transportation and transformed 
communication from a mundane physical process, into a distinctively, and more 
meaningfully symbolic one. This narrative of the telegraph’s impact Sterne contends, 
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has resulted in an a priori disciplinary privileging of the symbolic over the physical 
(2006b). This under-appreciation of transportation has led to an incomplete and 
impoverished conceptualization of communication.  
The omission of the carrier pigeon’s relationship with the telegraph is glaring, but 
given the way the telegraph has been historicized, it is perhaps inevitable. Next to the 
telegraph, the alleged progenitor of true symbolic communication, the carrier pigeon 
does not appear as a form of communication at all, but of transportation. Construed as 
an instrumentality, it is reduced to a physical conduit between human beings who 
ultimately conduct the more meaningful communicative (i.e., symbolic) work of writing, 
reading, and interpreting. Being categorized as a form of transportation would not have 
such a diminishing effect, however, if transportation were not so undervalued in 
communication studies in the first place.  
To rectify the carrier pigeon’s absence in the history of communication, to 
reinstate its presence, and appreciate its value, not only requires constructing a history 
for it. It is also necessary to redress the devaluation of transportation more generally, a 
trend borne of the telegraph’s historicization. In “Transportation and Communication: 
Together as You’ve Always Wanted Them,” Sterne re-historicizes the telegraph by 
revisiting its material relationship with the train in the 19th century. What he discovers 
from this exercise is that the telegraph and the train were actually doing the same things 
at the same time. Though telegraph signals governed the movement of trains, the train 
tracks also governed the movement of telegraph signals. After all, telegraph wires, the 
circuits of telegraphy, had to follow the same paths as the train tracks (2006b: 120). 
Rather than marking a separation of communication from transportation, the 
emergence of the telegraph demonstrated a point of greater connection between these 
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processes.  
Inspired by this revelation, this chapter proposes that when we re-historicize the 
telegraph with the carrier pigeon, we illuminate another previously neglected nexus of 
interconnection between transportation and communication. Acknowledging the carrier 
pigeon’s role in materializing communication is also a way to admit the bird’s 
involvement in imagining the speculative possibilities and conceptual parameters of 
communication. In addition to being implicated in the technological landscape, then, 
the carrier pigeon also articulates something fundamental about the process of 
communication: namely that it is inseparable from transportation.  
While communication sometimes involves the symbolic, it is first and foremost a 
material process beholden to movement. Materiality and movement are not merely the 
means by which communication takes place, but constitutive components of 
communication itself. As such, this chapter offers further evidence to support Sterne’s 
claim that communication is most appropriately understood as organized movement 
and action (2006b: 118). The benefit of thinking this way, Sterne contends, is that it 
restores to communication its essential sociality (2006b: 132). By grounding it in the 
physical world, we open up communication as a vital process in which we are all 
implicated. Communication no longer needs to be reduced to an elite and intimate 
symbolic undertaking that transpires solely between human conspirators. Instead it is a 
process that embraces a sprawling and dynamic assemblage of heterogeneous but 
mutually dependent elements, enlivened at times by more-than-human participants. 
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IV. Getting Beyond Human Phenomenology 
 
To presumptively privilege communication as a symbolic form is to 
denigrate the human and nonhuman physical forces at work in our 
social world, and to treat the physical world as an inert arena where 
our symbolic forms go to work.  
—Jonathan Sterne, “Transportation and Communication: 
Together as You’ve Always Wanted Them,” from Thinking 
with James Carey: Essays on Communications, 
Transportation, History (2006: 131). 
 
History and theory are enmeshed to such a degree it is impossible to separate 
them. They affect one another and, together, create the conditions of possibility for the 
production of knowledge. The histories we tell about communication inform our 
theories. At the same time, the theories we use to make sense of communication, our 
concepts and models, also inform how we narrate communication history. To modify 
one is to modify the other. Carrier pigeons have been excluded from the history of 
communication, and therefore have been prohibited from bringing anything to bear on 
how we understand communication. Bringing the carrier pigeon into the history of 
communication is a valuable endeavor: it is an opportunity to enrich our theories of 
communication. At the same time, however, in order to create space for the carrier 
pigeon in history, it is equally important to readjust the theoretical scaffolding which 
supports our current definitions of communication.     
At present, communication is primarily understood to be an intangible process of 
signification that mediates our experience of the material world. This immateriality, 
Jeremy Packer and Stephen B. Crofts Wiley observe is the ontological presupposition 
that defines our understanding of communication. As a result, communication is 
assumed to be the domain of signs and symbols, messages and meanings, rhetorical 
strategies, ethereal transmissions and “the superstructural insubtantiality of ideology 
 231 
and culture” (Packer and Wiley 2012: 3). As much as we admit that communication has 
its physical and material dimensions, it is implied that they are less meaningful and 
socially constitutive than anything that happens at the symbolic level.  
This prevailing sense of communication as immaterial contact between human 
individuals is pervasive, but relatively new. Before the 19th century, communication was 
not an art of forging connections with symbols or seeking out mutual recognition across 
chasms of incomprehension. As John Durham Peters argues in his historicization of the 
term, communication used to involve tangibles: from the Latin communicare, it meant 
to impart and make common (7). At some point, however, communication was 
dematerialized. The alleged catalyst for this sea change was the advent of electric 
communication technologies such as wireless and wired telegraphy. It was not until 
after the telegraph, Peters contends, that communication went from being a kind of 
physical transfer or transmission, “into a new kind of quasi-physical connection across 
the obstacles of time and space” (5). Thanks to electricity, communication appeared to 
be no longer anchored to the crude materiality of the physical world.47  
The shift toward immateriality that expressly pivots on the telegraph is reiterated 
in Carey’s now foundational historical narrative. The telegraph, he posited, was a 
turning point for communication because for the first time, information could move 
independently of and faster than physical entities (2008: 215).  As a result, Carey 
maintains, the telegraph wholeheartedly separated the symbolic from the physical 
                                                 
47 In Peters’ estimation, the qualities of electric communication happened to fortuitously 
resonate with old and new ideas about immaterial mental contact in the intellectual 
traditions of Christianity, spiritualism, and British empiricism (5, 63). This intellectual 
architecture helped the modern notion of communication to take root.   
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(2008: 215). Not only did the telegraph divorce communication from physical 
movement he adds, it also enabled the former’s power over the latter (2008: 157).  To 
illustrate this, Carey points out that thanks to its accelerated informational speed, the 
telegraph was able to control the movement and direction of trains, and the distribution 
of any cargo contained therein. The telegraph’s instantaneity proved not only formative 
in the development of communications, it also became the model and mechanism for 
modern organizational control. In this capacity, the telegraph not only influenced the 
communications landscape, it also steered the developmental trajectory of modern 
western society.  
This narrative, that the telegraph freed communication from transportation, and 
then imbued the symbolic with the power to control the physical, has remained 
relatively uncontested in the field of communication studies. Sterne offers a compelling 
reason why Carey’s thesis has been so easily taken up by other scholars: because it 
appears by available evidence to be true. The conceptual separation of communication 
and transportation is validated by the fact that they seemed to be separated in reality. 
Carey’s interpretation of the telegraph was not wrong per se, Sterne posits, it was merely 
informed by the human individual’s phenomenological encounter with the technology 
(2006b: 123). Based on the subjective experience of a single human standing in one 
place, electric transmission does indeed seem faster than physical movement.  
This human phenomenological experience naturalizes the assumption that the 
telegraph forestalled the necessity of having to physically and laboriously send messages 
from one place to another. The fact is, electricity may appear instantaneous, but that 
does not mean that transportation has not taken place. There is movement: it has simply 
transpired at a rate and a scale that eludes human perceptual thresholds. Human 
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perception is limited, and cannot account for the operational magnitude of the 
telegraph’s infrastructure. Thus, if we build our histories and theories of communication 
around the human individual, and take two bodies in conversation as the basic unit for 
communication, then we inherit a very limited understanding of what is in fact a more 
expansive and complex process.  
 
V. Communication as Assemblage 
Communication is fundamental to the production of reality. But we do not 
appreciate the magnitude of this process, its grander implications, and its stakes 
because our understanding is founded on a strictly human metaphysics of presence. To 
broaden and deepen our understanding of communication it is therefore necessary to 
jettison this anthropocentric frame and speculate outside the limits of human 
phenomenology. It is impossible to know or to qualify what the experiences of 
modernity were like for homing pigeons trained to travel in communication networks. 
However, this study aims to at least acknowledge that while human beings were trying 
to come to terms with the modernity’s oft-cited “annihilation of time and space” and the 
sense of “all that is solid melting into air,” carrier pigeons were making their own 
adjustments.  
Pigeons adapted to inventive breeding, new feeding schedules, and training 
techniques. They also had to become accustomed to different rates of movement, and 
odd qualities of space-time. They were nestled in baskets in the bases of air balloons, 
thrown from airplanes, and lowered to the ground in parachutes. They grew accustomed 
to the smooth velocity of train travel, endured the rhythmic jostling of automobiles, and 
the labored gain of bicycles. They felt the slow advancements of ships, and the 
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compressed heavy air insides submarines. They habituated to peculiar living conditions, 
adjusted very well to unknown terrains, temperatures, and variations in light. They also 
endured changing travel routes and thoroughfares, and perched on newfangled 
architectures. They grew familiar with strange sights, sounds, and smells.  
Acknowledging and speculating about the carrier pigeon’s experience in 
modernity is one step toward thinking about communication as a process that is not 
limited to our human sense of it. To appreciate communication as something truly 
social, it is also necessary to look toward the materialities and movements that make 
communication possible. Shifting our focus toward infrastructures is a way to make 
communication more inclusive, instead of an exclusive process that belongs solely to the 
domain of the interpersonal. For example, by revisiting and reassessing the relationship 
between the infrastructures of the telegraph and the train in the 19th century, Sterne 
argues, pace Carey, that transportation and communication cannot be disentangled. 
Rather, he argues, they both equally create the conditions of possibility for action, while 
also being the very substance of that action (Sterne 2006b: 125). From his attention to 
infrastructure, Sterne is able to put forth his definition of communication as primarily 
organized movement and action—that is sometimes symbolic, other times not (2006b: 
118).   
What Sterne’s historical revision makes clear is that our understandings of 
communication have been compromised by an anthropocentric orientation toward 
technology. This human bias has led to a kind of purification of communication from 
transportation, which has consequently limited our appreciation of transportation as a 
constitutive process. To help repair this rift, is necessary to study points of 
interconnection between technologies we traditionally separate into nonsymbolic 
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“transportation” and symbolic “communication” (Sterne 2006b: 118). Investigating the 
carrier pigeon is one such strategy because not only does the carrier pigeon network 
itself combine the processes of communication and transportation. It also relies equally 
on two typically differentiated technologies of the telegraph and the train.  
The actualization and operation of the carrier pigeon network relies on a wide 
array of heterogeneous components. Though it is consistently treated as a handy black 
box, once we begin considering it as an assemblage, it becomes no longer tenable to 
imagine it a distinctive mode or medium unto itself. It is so much more than a mere 
instrument by which messages are transported from one point to another. In addition to 
human and animal bodies, its operation utilizes multi-species affects, sensibilities, and 
corporeal knowledges. It involves a whole host of ritualized practices, techniques, 
movements, and flight paths: comportments that are always contingent upon planned 
and unplanned environments and shifting atmospheric conditions. Additionally, it 
further relies on an eclectic collection of materials, peripherals, and technological 
supports. Upon closer examination, the carrier pigeon, then, demands that it be 
conceptualized less as a mode or medium of communication in the traditional sense, 
and more as an assemblage. 
 Assemblage, translated from the French agencement, was first introduced by 
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus. It names a dynamic gathering 
up of diverse elements, wherein one part is just as essential as any other to the 
actualization of the whole. Most importantly, assemblage does not refer to a final form, 
a configuration that is produced. Rather it designates one that is always in the process of 
being produced, producing what is, and creating the conditions for what is possible. To 
think with assemblage means not distinguishing between immaterial and material, thus 
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bypassing the communication/transportation dichotomy. Instead it provides a generous 
understanding of materiality as an emergent and distributed process conditional just as 
much on the immaterial as the physical. Thinking communication as assemblage puts 
aside questions of representation for more important questions about the processes that 
make representation possible in the first place.  
Assemblage is a sprawling, contracting, and multifaceted formation. As such it 
can be a confusing, vague, and useless as an explanatory concept. But as Jennifer Daryl 
Slack argues, it can be especially useful for understanding communication because it too 
is equally ungainly and hard to grasp. Communication is a highly complex process that 
is too often reduced to a kind of coherent and linear process of articulation into which 
technology is merely added. As Slack argues, this reduction depicts humans interacting 
with one another using coherent and chronologically occurring technological 
arrangements, called “modes,” and dominant cultural forms, called “media” (147). 
Modes and media are believed not only to facilitate and guide the encoding and 
decoding of meaning, but also define the shape of culture and the very construction of 
reality.  
This traditional approach to communication is not only deterministic and 
teleological it also mistakes a unique category of technology—communication 
technology—as primarily responsible for the shape and texture of culture (Slack 146-7). 
Slack rightly points out that new material conditions, practices, and concepts such as 
those initiated by the digital, the emergence of biotechnology, cyborgs, artificial 
intelligence, and companion species are all challenging the usefulness of this traditional 
rubric.  But as the carrier pigeon suggests these challenges are not just coming from the 
present moment, they have in fact, been here all along. As such, they may never have 
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been entirely appropriate for the study of communication. Such a realization offers yet 
another glimmer of the potential ramifications of the carrier pigeon’s exclusion from the 
field of communication.   
 
VI. A Proverbial Skeleton in the Closet of History  
Back in 1982, as David and Ann Martin were removing the contents of their old 
chimney, they found amidst a deluge of soot and cinders, a scattering of bird bones. 
Attached to one of these bones was a red metal capsule: inside, a rolled up piece of 
delicate parchment. Under the heading “Pigeon Service” was scrawled an alphanumeric 
code. The bird, it has since been confirmed, was a WWII Allied forces homing pigeon. It 
is speculated that it was probably traveling from Nazi-occupied Normandy to a nearby 
classified pigeon loft, either at Bletchley Park in Buckinghamshire or at General 
Montgomery Headquarters in Reigate, located just a short distance from the Martins’ 
home (Wilkes 2102).  It most likely ended up in their chimney inadvertently, though the 
exact cause of death remains unknown. 48  
Once the novelty of their discovery wore off, however, the pigeon’s remains 
receded into obscurity. In 2010, the Martins had donated the encrypted message to 
Bletchley Park, the original home of Britain’s intelligence centre, now a museum. The 
museum’s curators were perplexed by the message, but remained convinced of the 
significance of their unique acquisition. They finally disclosed its existence in a press 
conference in November 2012. They also appealed to the public for help decrypting it. In 
                                                 
48 It may have gotten lost as a result of inclement weather, succumbed to exhaustion, or 
even to injury after being wounded by German snipers while crossing the English 
Channel. The pigeon may have also perished from fumes after resting too long on the 
chimneystack (Cowell 2012).  
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addition, they passed the message along to the UK’s current intelligence service at 
Government Communication Headquarters (GCHQ) for further analysis (Parnell 2012). 
The message was addressed to “XO2”—now thought to be a code for bomber 
command—and was signed by a Sergeant W. Stott.49 The message is allegedly unique for 
several reasons. First, it was written in code: information sent by pigeon in the war was 
supposedly written in unencrypted longhand (Telegraph Reporters 2012). Second, the 
code was unlike anything the curators had seen before. And, the codebooks and 
computers used by Bletchley Park could not be consulted, since they were all destroyed 
after the war (Telegraph Reporters 2012). Third, it was also marked as a duplicate: 
“40TW194” carried one copy, while pigeon, “37DK76,” carried another. This suggests 
that the contents were significant enough that they warranted an additional 
transmission (Cowell 2012). Fourth, while the British numbered all of their pigeons, 
they also typically kept files on them, where they recorded their various missions. 
Neither “40TW194” nor “37DK76” were referenced anywhere in the available archive 
(Cowell 2012). It is now believed that they belonged to the British Special Operations 
Executive—a clandestine unit that conducted enemy sabotage missions throughout the 
war (Wilkes 2012).  
All of the above details are of questionable validity, but nonetheless served to 
imbue the message with alluring mystery. The Daily Mail took the opportunity to 
sensationalize the find, claiming that historians believed the message would offer new 
details and important insights into British war history (Wilkes 2012).  The message and 
                                                 
49 Stott was a 27-year-old paratrooper from the Lancashire Fusiliers. Military records 
show that he was parachuted into occupied Normandy on D-Day to assess the strength 
of the German occupation in that area, and likely sent his intelligence back via pigeon to 
Allied command (Telegraph Reporters 2012). 
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its secret contents inspired a whole host of grander questions about why and under what 
circumstances it was sent, and what imagined tragedies transpired after it was lost in 
transit. Of course, a missive lodged in limbo is irresistibly enigmatic; it inevitably 
inspires flights of the imagination. But in focusing too intently on the meaning of the 
encrypted message, we ignore the real derelict in this scenario: the pigeon itself. It may 
be dead, but it once enlivened and substantiated a complex and significant process of 
communication. Ignoring the pigeon means not only privileging content over form, but 
also separating the materials of communication from the world in which they circulate. 
The very conditions of this particular pigeon’s internment ultimately function, then, as a 
powerful metaphor for the historical obfuscation the carrier pigeon more generally. The 
hearth, the very material-semiotic support for human life becomes instead, for 
40TW194, a place of death and forgetting. The carrier pigeon and its energies were, on 
countless occasions, essential to the coordination of human activities. Once spent, it 
remains concealed in the foyer of history. And, despite its discovery it is not even invited 
in. The carrier pigeon—as a form of communication, as an embodied way of being in the 
world—is missing in action.   
 In order to consider what the carrier pigeon might offer to our understandings of 
communication, it is necessary to first make space for it in history. This involves much 
more than simply listing off the various ways these birds facilitated human activities. As 
such, this upcoming section attempts to flesh out their particular ways of being and 
doing which made communication possible.  Communicating with carrier pigeons 
involves creating and engaging an array of complex relationships, not just among 
humans and pigeons, but also among pigeons and other technologies.  Rather than 
being a separate intermediary between pre-existing links, the pigeon formed and shaped 
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these linkages. Ultimately the carrier pigeon proves deeply entangled with larger 
systems of communication and transportation in modernity. They are not inert tools by 
which humans communicate and make history, but rather makers of history themselves.  
As Wendell Levi writes, “All available evidence shows that from the time 
primitive man first domesticated animals, the pigeon was regarded as the highest of all 
speechless creatures, and was an integral part of the life of man” ([1965] 1996: 13). This 
is high praise but it is difficult to give it much credence since “all available evidence” 
does not exactly amount to much. Little authoritative, well-researched accounts have 
been written about pigeons, let alone homing pigeons as a communication medium. To 
craft a history of carrier pigeons means relying on popular trade publications, the work 
of amateur historians, cultural anecdotes, and old military records. While these do not 
necessarily make for rigorous documentation, the writing of animal history is often 
plagued by such challenges.  
History is often written with an anthropocentric orientation, in large part because 
it is informed by human documents and traces. Animals do not leave the same kinds of 
traces that humans do. Therefore, writing an animal history requires a reconsideration 
of what constitute acceptable sources. The history of animals exists in the negative space 
around human accounts. Limited glimmers of carrier pigeons themselves and their 
arrangements with things, glimpsed in the pop-cultural record, are sometimes all that 
are available. As many animal historians agree, animal history is always constructed 
sous rature, a phrase Derrida borrowed from Heidegger to mean under erasure or 
crossed out. That is, it is barely there, poorly visible, yet still legible (see Benson 4; 
Fudge 2002a: 6). Following these indistinctive trails is where a history of the carrier 
pigeon must begin.    
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VII. From Plucky to Piteous: Pigeonholed in Military History 
 
Little scrawny blue and white 
Messenger for men who fight, 
Tell me of the deep, red scar, 
There, just where no feathers are 
— “Cher Ami” Harry Webb Farrington,  
Poems from France (1920). 
 
Thanks to their deployment during wartime, military history seems to be the only 
place where the carrier pigeon’s work has been acknowledged. This is certainly where 
carrier pigeons are the most visible. However, they appear in this historical record less 
as real animals and more as figures. The realities of their involvement are abstracted in 
two ways. One way, is that they are itemized and quantified in lists: individual pigeons 
are identified alongside their achievements, which often include posthumous awards 
like Dickin medals. 50 Or they have been honoured en masse in the form of monuments. 
One in Brussels is dedicated to “Les Pigeons Soldats,” while another in Lille, France, 
commemorates the 20,000 pigeons that died in the line of duty during WWI (Gardiner 
99). These commemorative gestures appear generous, but they are superficial at best. 
After all, monuments are meant to activate cultural memory, to cultivate attention to the 
past by bringing history into the present. They can offer little for carrier pigeons, for 
there is no meaningful cultural memory to be activated. What we get instead are merely 
statistics about how many pigeons were deployed, how many messages they sent, and 
how their actions benefitted humans.51   
                                                 
50 The Dickin Medal was established in Britain in 1943 by the People’s Dispensary of Sick Animals. It was 
instituted as a version of the Victoria Cross reserved specifically for animal gallantry in military conflict. 
Overall, thirty-two pigeons were awarded this medal, which constitutes half of all the medals awarded. 
Other recipients include horses, dogs and one cat (Gardiner 129). 
51 Lt.-Col. Osman’s Pigeons in the Great War (1928) for example devotes fourteen pages of his book to an 
inventory of the British pigeons, which lists their number, colour and sex, as well as their achievements. 
Some of these are more detailed than others, but many or merely described as having done “consistently 
good work.”  
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The second way carrier pigeons are abstracted is through a process of 
anthropomorphic idealization. Stories of pigeons in the war consist of amusing or tragic 
anecdotes about exceptional individual birds. They are told with melodramatic 
flourishes and platitudes that celebrate courage, suffering, stoicism, and sacrifice. As 
Jilly Cooper confesses of her experience writing her book, Animals in War, the history 
of animals in war is “written in tears and not in ink” (qtd. in Gardiner 6). Juliet 
Gardiner’s The Animals’ War betrays a similar proclivity for sentiment over serious 
consideration. The book, a companion to the British Imperial Museum’s eminent 
exhibition of the same name, is incredibly thorough and informed by a rich archive of 
materials. But again, this archive is cobbled together to saccharine effect. This way of 
historicizing animals in war certainly generate pathos. But it does very little to deepen 
our appreciation for the animals themselves or further our understanding of the 
complex ways in which they were actually implicated in communication and the logistics 
of war. 
 The treatment of Cher Ami, the iconic war pigeon alluded to in the epigraph 
above, effectively illustrates the historical abstraction of the carrier pigeon. A British 
homing pigeon given to the U.S during WWI, he is famous for saving a couple hundred 
U.S soldiers from being killed by friendly fire (Wynne 139). Trapped behind enemy 
lines, the soldiers had been staving off attacks for days, and half of their battalion had 
been felled. Nearby, American troops began to release a massive artillery barrage, not 
knowing the harm they were unleashing on their trapped comrades. With no other way 
to alert the Americans of this fact, the “Lost Battalion” as they are now known, sent 
messages off with several pigeons. The Germans immediately shot down the first two 
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birds. Only the last bird, Cher Ami, made it to its destination. He delivered the message 
and managed to save the remaining men.  
The bird, however, was badly injured by shrapnel after takeoff. He was covered in 
blood when he arrived. One eye was hanging out of its socket, a gaping hole had been 
ripped into his breast, and his leg had been blown off. The message he carried was 
dangling from the thread of a tendon. The bird eventually succumbed to his injuries, but 
he survived long enough to get an officer’s berth on his journey back to the US, and a 
hero’s welcome upon his return. In addition, he was awarded the French Croix de 
Guerre with a palm (Blechman 24).  His maimed body has since been stuffed, and is on 
display at the Smithsonian Institution in Washington.  
Other accounts of individual pigeons follow the same template. In his book 
devoted to the topic of pigeons in the WWI, Lieutenant Colonel A. H. Osman writes of 
Crisp, a recipient of the Victoria Cross, who carried the final message of a dying skipper 
after a U-boat attack, which led to the rescue of the remaining crew (Osman 21). Pigeon 
2709 was also awarded the V.C. She was shot down upon her release only to lay out in 
the rain all night. The following morning, she recovered just enough to make it back 
with her message, but she “staggered on the floor of the loft and died before the officer 
could remove the message holder from her leg” (Osman 56). G.I. Joe meanwhile, saved 
over a thousand British soldiers when he delivered the message that called off a planned 
American attack during WWII. He was later decorated with the Dickin Medal for valor, 
and retired at the army’s Pigeon Hall of Fame (Blechman 36). 
This emphasis on individual animal loyalty and suffering is also apparent in the 
many war memorials and monuments that have been erected throughout Western 
countries over the last century. For example, the “Animals in War” memorial at Park 
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Lane, London, unveiled in 2004 is engraved with the words: “they had no choice.” As 
Cooper explains, the animals “had no idea why they were fighting or when the 
nightmare would end. They gave their service, their lives, and their love without any 
thought of reward” (qtd. in Gardiner 9).  This framing of animal participation as a 
sacrifice carried out willingly but innocently is troubling. As Burt points out, the notion 
of consent with regards to animals is completely inappropriate as it is (2006: 71). Choice 
is a particularly human concept that cannot easily be applied to animals, especially with 
regards to their participation in human conflicts.  
More to the point, this sacrificial framing suggests that animals are acting out of 
some kind of innate loyalty to human beings. They may not “choose” to engage in war, 
but the fact that they do seems to be interpreted as though they sense its importance on 
some level. This kind of thinking serves to naturalize human privilege and legitimize 
human conflicts (Kean 2013: 240-1). While the acknowledgement of animal suffering 
and their devotion appears to be about animals, it is actually more so about human 
beings. As Cary Wolfe explains, the unquestioned assumption of human superiority, 
inevitably requires the sacrifice of the animal (2003: 43). This sacrifice is literal insofar 
as animals suffer and die so that humans may live, but it is also figurative. Animals die 
so that humans may live with themselves. As Gardiner insists, looking back at animals 
in wartime can restore “humanity in warfare” (10). Animals introduce purity, innocence, 
and benevolence in war, and rescue the human from its historical legacies of needless 
barbarism and atrocity.  
A recent collection of essays entitled Animals and War: Confronting the 
Military-Animal Industrial Complex (Salter, Nocella and Bentley 2014) emerges as an 
ostensible counterpoint to these mawkish or self-serving accounts. The deployment of 
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animals in war is not inevitable, these authors claim, but rather a discursive function of 
the military-industrial complex. As Colin Salter explains in the introduction, the reality 
of animals in war is ultimately a story of exploitation. That is, animals are “tools of war 
for human ends, on human terms and at the whim of anthropocentric, speciesist and 
human chauvinist notions” (Salter 1). The contributors repeatedly enumerate the 
dangerous circumstances of war, and the various ways animals suffer as a result. 
Animals are caught in the crossfire, used as human shields, sentinels for landmines and 
gas, or attacked in the front lines of battle. Or, they are the targets of willful assaults, 
while otherwise mishandled, displaced, or abandoned when human conflicts destroy 
their homes. Furthermore, they also suffer in laboratories as part of weapons research. 
These authors take great care to illustrate that animals in war are not heroes at all, but 
unnecessary victims of untold suffering.  
This committed attentiveness to disclosing the suffering of animals is meant to 
criticize human domination, and portray the human exploitation of animals in a 
negative light. However, it ends up underestimating the animals’ actual participation in 
war and the ways in which they collaborated in the making of history. Portraying them 
as passive victims of human abuses in the end ultimately affirms once again the power 
of the human over the animal. As Erica Fudge argues, “the history of animals cannot 
merely reflect upon past cruelties,” for laying bare these atrocities does nothing to read 
history against the grain of human centrality (2002a: 12). The history of animals can 
certainly acknowledge this suffering, but it must also contextualize these losses by 
connecting them to the animals’ own ways of life, their relationships to their 
surrounding world, and recuperate their presence and connection to the larger 
narratives of an otherwise all-too-human history.  
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Carrier pigeons, for example, did indeed do their work whilst flying past shellfire, 
poison gas, German snipers, and birds of prey. And, they were often maimed and killed 
as a result of these risks. However, framing their participation as either an instinctive 
selflessness, tragic sacrifice, or appalling abuse does little to further our understanding 
of the extent of their efforts. For regardless of human attempts to maintain control over 
them, once these birds were in flight, they eluded human authority, returning to the 
human world all the same. There is room here to imagine these pigeons were not merely 
responding to a natural instinct or human demands, but responding to their training, 
improvising in and adapting to challenging situations, and pursuing their own shifting 
interests.  
Considering carrier pigeons within the context of military history has thus far 
been unsatisfying. Communication studies, however, offers a promising alternative 
space to negotiate the pigeon into history. Animals were vital to the prosecution of war. 
They figured as a kind of technē: technologies and techniques that were valuable 
because they surpassed human capabilities. They were deployed for their supra-human 
perceptual, sensory, and communicative capacities, their energies, their mobilities, and 
their affects. They may have been conscripted as vehicles, tools, or instruments for 
human use but carrier pigeons were not merely passive energetic resources that fueled 
the war. They were active collaborators, working with humans and other animals, and 
other technologies as well. The carrier pigeon was a vital node in the larger networks of 
coordination and action of war, thanks largely to their receptivity to breeding and 
rigorous training techniques, and their ability to “home” even in the most hostile of 
places.  
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VIII. The Protean and Perennial Pigeon: Mutable Forms, Mutable 
Functions 
 
 Pigeons are protean. They have lived wild, domesticated, and feral and have 
adapted to thrive everywhere except Antarctica. They show incredible genetic 
variability; this particular quality was after all what inspired Charles Darwin’s theory of 
natural selection, which he included in The Origin of Species (1859). While the 
domesticated pigeon exists in a seemingly endless diversity of forms, all pigeons 
descended from the same ancestor, the rock dove, Columba livia. To an extent, their 
variability is the result of human intervention. In the 19th century especially, pigeons 
became truly mutable, and subject to relentless genetic manipulation (Jerolmack 2007: 
77).  However, this mutability is just as much a consequence of the pigeon’s amenability 
to transformation. The successful genetic manipulation of the pigeon is likewise a 
testament to the bird’s own flexibility and resilience, qualities cultivated from its living 
history of adapting to and thriving in dangerous and unfamiliar environments.  
  In a semantic sense, pigeons are equally mutable. They have enjoyed and 
endured fluctuating cultural connotations, which are themselves contingent upon their 
changing roles in society. Pigeons for example, are also doves. While they are often 
understood as different animals, this is a baseless social construction (Jerolmack 2007: 
78). Dove is sometimes used to refer to smaller pigeons with white coloring, but 
biologically they are the same bird. Any perceived differences are purely a consequence 
of their cultural signification, which currently sees doves as symbols of love and peace, 
and pigeons as signs of pestilence and filth.  
Pigeons, thanks mainly to the feral population, are now mostly deemed non-
native pests. As a result, they have been shot, gassed, electrocuted, poisoned, trapped, 
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and fed contraceptives in order to control their numbers (Jerolmack 2008:72). 
Concerted efforts are made to make city spaces unfriendly and inhospitable to them: 
building ledges and potential perches are covered in spikes and sticky gel to deter them, 
and in many places feeding pigeons is a punishable offense (Jerolmack 2008:72). These 
animals are criticized as “rats with wings” that bear diseases, destroy property, and 
generally diminish all of the places where they are found. This pigeon hatred is a 
relatively new phenomenon; for thousands of years pigeons were humans’ invited 
guests. Feral pigeons may be unwanted, but they exist in cities as a result of early 
symbiotic relationships with human beings. As the parameters of this relationship began 
to change, pigeons started to leave of their own volition, and humans also forced them 
out, either actively or simply by neglect (Patent 1997: 13; Jerolmack 2007: 78).  
Columba livia is an old species. Pigeons have been around for at least 300,000 
years (Blechman 9). They are also one of the oldest domesticated animals—second only 
to dogs. Pigeons are old, but so too are the techniques of pigeon keeping, also called 
pigeon fancying. People have practiced the art and science of pigeon breeding and 
keeping as long as pigeons have been domesticated. This love and care for pigeons was 
partly instrumental, since the bird provided food and other material resources. The bird 
provisioned not only a means of survival, but was also a source of entertainment and 
aesthetic pleasure, a go-to for religious practices, and eventually, a manner for 
communication.  
Pigeons were the very first birds to be domesticated, well before chickens, at least 
5000 years ago in Mesopotamia (Blechman 11). However, there is some evidence that 
they lived alongside humans as early as 10 000 years ago (Blechman 10; Johnston and 
Janiga 1995: 6). They became more intimate with humans around the same time that we 
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domesticated cereals and grains in the alluvial plains of the Tigris and Euphrates from 
8000 BCE (Hansell and Hansell 39). Since wild rock doves were accustomed to feeding 
on the seeds of coastal grasses, they were efficient ground feeders and feasted on 
whatever did not make it to our granaries (Wynne 144; Blechman 10). While they 
traditionally lived on the rocky ledges of sea cliffs, the rock pigeon took favourably to the 
nooks and crannies of caves and early human homes, particularly with the added food 
incentive. As Stephen Budiansky writes, domestication is more than an outcome of 
captive breeding by humans. Rather it was equally initiated by animals and their need to 
survive by adapting to increasingly inhospitable environments ([1992] 1999). From the 
earliest of human times in any case, pigeons and humans have dwelled together. 
Regardless of who made the first gesture, humans and pigeons enjoyed a 
symbiotic relationship. Dwelling with humans, pigeons had consistent access to shelter, 
and an abundance of food. Living with pigeons, humans had access to food, medicine, 
fertilizer, and other materials (Allen 88, 91).  Pigeon meat was a staple, and their blood 
was often used for its healing properties. Pigeon feces or guano was extremely nitrogen 
rich, and therefore useful for newly emerging agriculture (Jerolmack 2007: 79). Pigeon 
feathers and down provided material for pillows, blankets, and insulation (Allen 100). 
Pigeons were also valued offerings in ritual sacrifices: as seed-eating birds, they were 
deemed clean enough to be used in religious ceremonies (Levi [1965] 1996: 13). In 
addition, they also provided bait and decoys in falconry (Hansell and Hansell 9). Not to 
mention, they were popularly used for entertainments such as pigeon racing.  
Pigeons were incredibly valuable to humans for the above reasons, but also 
because of their temperaments. Pigeons were docile and gregarious, and surrendered 
easily to capture. They were accessible and did not need to be hunted. They were also 
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plentiful. They became known for their “reproductive magic” because they could breed 
quickly and more often than many other animals (Jerolmack 2007: 79).  Their large 
numbers are also due to the fact that pigeons usually keep two nests going at the same 
time. A single pair of pigeons can produce fifty pigeons in a year (Allen 32). In addition 
to being placid and plentiful, pigeons were also highly esteemed for the particularities of 
their ways of life.  
That they were domesticated during the agricultural revolution is timely. The 
shift from hunting and gathering to farming brought about radical changes to human 
social organization. Human populations increased as did settlements and densities, 
while new hierarchies developed in tandem with the growing concern with private 
property, which not only led to anxieties about food security, but also a greater 
preoccupation with monogamy and paternity certainty (see for example Ryan and Jethà 
2010). Pigeons maintain strong relationships to their homes, are prone to monogamous 
pairing, and share parental duties like nest building, brooding, and feeding (Allen 30-2). 
As such, they became attractive models of home-making, matrimonial fidelity, and 
prosperity, and thus embodied values highly regarded by newly emerging human 
cultures. 
In the ultimate gesture of hospitality, humans eventually began to build houses 
for their pigeons, called “dovecotes.” Such structures varied from crude clay pots to 
large, ornate and often beautiful buildings, all of which are the subject of Peter and Jean 
Hansell’s comprehensive and richly illustrated Doves and Dovecotes (1988). The first 
recorded dovecotes were in Ancient Rome, but they were prolific throughout the Middle 
East, Africa, and eventually continental Europe. There, many dovecotes still stand; some 
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have become official heritage sites, while others have fallen into disrepair (Hansell and 
Hansell 40-46). 
 
 Domesticating pigeons involves a particular kind of artfulness—so writes the 18th 
Century naturalist George-Louis Leclerc, Comte de Buffon. In order to encourage 
pigeons to remain with humans, he writes,   
we must erect a lofty building, well covered without and fitted up with numerous 
cells. They really are not domestics like dogs and horses; or prisoners like fowls: 
they are rather voluntary captives, transient guests who continue to reside in the 
dwellings assigned them only because they like it and are pleased with the 
situation which affords abundance of food, and all the conveniences and comforts 
of life. (qtd. in Hansell and Hansell 39) 
 
Pigeons, as Leclerc points out, were “transient guests”: as much as they belonged to 
humans that kept them, the birds nonetheless maintained a certain level of sovereignty. 
As this excerpt illustrates, keeping pigeons required concerted techniques of seduction, 
artful gestures, and improvised modifications that tried to appeal to the pigeons’ needs, 
desires, and satisfactions. As Hansell and Hansell note, humans devised various ploys 
and enticements to appeal to the pigeons, which were “capricious creatures and liable to 
desert a new home for another” (56). They were offered food and grits, while various 
herbs and spices were also placed in the dovecotes, and on the birds themselves, as a 
means to bind them to their homes (Hansell and Hansell 56-7). Keeping pigeons in such 
close quarters eventually led to more knowledge about them and their capabilities, not 
the least of which was the bird’s peculiar ability to return home after long distances.  
 
IX. On the Uniqueness of the Homing Pigeon 
Many migratory birds can navigate, but few can “home” like the homing pigeon. 
While domestic pigeons do exhibit the ability to “home,” homing pigeons, or “homers” 
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have been selectively bred and specially trained to hone their ability to return home 
across long and unfamiliar distances. For this reason, homers are the bird often 
deployed for communication purposes. In this capacity they are called “carrier pigeons” 
or “messenger pigeons.”52 Homing pigeons are also popularly deployed in the sport of 
pigeon racing, where they are called “racing pigeons,” or “racing homers.”  
 Homing pigeons have a highly developed homing instinct; they can find their 
way home even when they seem to have little information about their relational distance 
or direction. They are somehow able to use orientation as well as navigation. They figure 
out their location in relation to their home, and then select and maintain their course 
back to it (Walcott 21).  It is still not known how exactly pigeons are able to accomplish 
this feat. It has primarily been thought to be a result of visual cues because pigeons have 
excellent eyesight—a 340-degree field of vision (Allen 25). They are also able to detect 
ultraviolet light from the sun even on the cloudiest of days, and are very sensitive to 
polarized light (Allen 26-27).  
But countless experiments have shown that even when vision is compromised, 
birds are still able to home. As of yet, researchers have not been able to locate the 
specific sensory-perceptual cue that pigeons rely on to find their way. There have been a 
wide variety of suggestions that they use the position of the sun, polarized light, 
olfactory maps, magnetic fields, visual landmarks, or infrasound (Walcott 25). Charles 
Walcott argues that the uncertainty likely means that homing pigeons use a variety of 
                                                 
52 Passenger pigeons are often confused with these pigeons, but this is a separate species, now extinct. 
They constitute one of the most infamous cases of extinction in history (and are currently being 
considered as candidates for de-extinction). A ubiquitous bird, its population plummeted at a very high 
rate not simply as a result of being overhunted, but because of the conditions that facilitated overhunting: 
the technologies and techniques of communication and transportation that enabled hunters to locate, 
catch, and kill them with unprecedented efficiency (Greenberg 2014).    
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different cues, a combination of a few or all, which are additionally contingent upon the 
particularities of their home loft, its location, and the site and circumstances of their 
release (25).  
This indeterminacy also suggests that the homing instinct might be more 
improvisational than conventionally thought. Instinct, as Brian Massumi proposes by 
way of Raymond Ruyer, is not simply a stereotyped sequence of predetermined actions 
that function solely as a reflex. If that were the case, then instinct would not be able to 
respond to spontaneous changes in the environment. Chance variations in the 
environment must be matched by behavioural variation, Massumi writes (13). Without 
variation and improvisation, instinct would be so rigid as to be maladaptive. Thus 
instinct requires “a certain creative plasticity, an improvisational margin of maneuver” 
(Massumi 13). In this way, the homing instinct can be seen as an achievement, not 
something corporeally hardwired, but something openly creative, that is enacted in 
tandem with the singularities of a given event.    
The persistent and mysterious ability to home is, however, not the bird’s only 
strong suit.  Homing pigeons can also fly with great speed and impressive endurance. 
They have strong wings and can go from 0-50 km per hour in mere seconds (Allen 25). 
They fly incredibly long distances. They are known to fly on average over 800 km in a 
day, at speeds upwards of 100 km per hour (Blechman 5). Under certain conditions, 
they can fly even longer: the longest pigeon race involved a flight of 1800 km (Walcott 
21). They can do this without stopping for rest, food, or water. They do not tire easily. 
And of course, like all birds, their avian respiratory system allow their blood to carry 
more oxygen than other mammals (Allen 25). These unique navigational abilities 
contributed to the bird’s increased domestication for instrumental ends, eventually 
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leading to their geographic proliferation, and the implementation of a variety of 
different kinds of pigeon communication networks.   
 
X. Ancient and Medieval Pigeon Communication 
Pigeons have consistently figured as messengers throughout history. In the 
biblical book of Genesis it was a pigeon that Noah released from the Ark to find land; the 
bird returned with good news in the form of an olive branch (Allen 63). The prophet 
Mohammed was said to have a personal dove, an oracle that whispered into his ear 
(Wynne 145). Meanwhile, the dove came to represent the Holy Spirit in Christian 
mythology, the divine force that acts as an agent of communication (Allen 69-70). 
Whether such imaginings were inspired by or preceded the actual use of homing pigeons 
as messengers, is not known.  
Ancient seafarers were probably the first to capitalize on the pigeon’s ability to 
home. Pigeons dislike open ocean: therefore, a bird released from a ship at sea will 
always fly inland. For this reason, pigeons became ideal for ship to shore 
communications (Blechman 11). Ancient Phoenician and Egyptian sailors for example, 
would release pigeons to deliver news of their impending arrival, and to announce their 
catch (Allen 105). Egyptians were known to release pigeons in the four cardinal 
directions carrying announcements of new pharaohs, and sent pigeons up and down the 
Nile with messages about the river’s water levels (Blechman 11). The Romans 
meanwhile, used pigeons to announce victories at the amphitheatre (Allen 103). In 
ancient Greece, poets recounted stories of lovers sending messages by pigeon, and 
pigeons delivered the names of the winners of the first Olympic games to various city-
states (Glover and Beaumont 9).   
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Pigeons were vital to early military communications; military strategies hinged 
upon the relay of signals and messages, and they often took place in extremely hostile 
conditions. While pigeons were not the only form of communication used (others 
included human runners, semaphores, and smoke signals), they were consistently used 
by all of the major historical super powers at some point or another (Blechman 12). 
Most notably, they were employed by King Solomon (970-930 BCE), Cyrus the Great 
(559-530 BCE), Alexander the Great (356-323 BCE), Hannibal (247-182 BCE), Julius 
Caesar (100-44 BCE), and Ghengis Khan (1162-1227 CE), who used a pigeon relay 
system to maintain an information network all across Asia and part of Europe (Allen 
102; Woods 355). The Persians established pigeon lofts all across their Empire, sending 
the birds back to them from roving caravans in Africa (Levi [1941] 1963:29). Pigeons 
were a popular mode of communication in the East, but only re-awakened in the West 
when it was relearned from the infidels during the siege of Jerusalem in 1099 (Wynne 
149).  
Carrier pigeons were essential during the Crusades. Knights often carried them in 
their luggage, and the birds were used to relay news such as the fall of Constantinople in 
1204 (Allen 103-4). In fact, the crusaders brought many pigeons to Europe this way, and 
deployed them in elaborate networks. In Turkey during the 14th century, a pigeon relay 
system was made using pigeon towers spaced 40 miles apart. Messages were even sent 
in duplicate two hours later to ensure success (Allen 104). Despite these deployments, 
pigeons as a medium for communication petered out in the intervening years. They were 
however, reborn in the upheavals of the industrial revolution and incorporated into 
more sophisticated systems of communication.  
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XI. Pigeons Travel by Train to Meet the Telegraph: Rothschild, 
Reuters, and the New Information Economy (1832-51) 
 
an English paper especially plumes itself and rests its reputation upon 
being well informed upon every subject of news. As soon as any event is 
announced in any quarter of the world, no matter how far distant, a 
correspondent is immediately despatched [sic] to the scene of action, well 
qualified for the duty and well paid for his services. At his disposal are 
placed steam-packets, pigeons, estafettes [mounted couriers], post-horses, 
and steam-engines, and fortunate is the journal which can manage to be 
beforehand with its rivals in the receipt of intelligence.  
—"The Wonders of the English Press," The American 
Penny Magazine and Family Newspaper (1845: 538).  
 
Beginning in the 19th century, the involvement of carrier pigeons deepened and 
became more elaborate; they became a shifting node in a complex network of 
communication and transportation. Not only did they carry messages in this network, 
they were also carried by it. At the same time, they contributed to its materialization: 
giving it structure, shape, and substance. It was no coincidence that carrier pigeons 
emerged again just as train and telegraph systems were being developed across Europe. 
This was a time of innovation and experimentation, of evaluating possibilities and 
limits. Carrier pigeons were invariably part of these excursions.  
It is worth noting that the stone edifices that comprised the optical telegraph that 
began to appear in the late 18th century, bear a canny architectural resemblance to 
dovecotes or pigeon towers (see Fig. 4.1 and 4.2). This is merely an anecdotal 
observation of course, but it hints that there may be an even a correlation or a deeper 
relationship between the arts of pigeon keeping and technological tinkering.  
Technological infrastructures, such as those belonging to the telegraph, were not 
fully established overnight: there remained many gaps in service. Those who kept 
pigeons turned to their felicitous flock. As such, pigeons were employed as an interim 
solution to these limitation, carrying information where the telegraph could not reach.  
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Apothecaries, such as Julius Neubronner’s father in Cronberg, Germany, often 
employed pigeons to facilitate better medical care.  Neubronner would provide doctors 
with pigeons so that they could send prescriptions back to him. Neubronner would have 
the medicine ready by the time they were to be picked up (“The Spy Pigeon and His 
Work in War” 30). Meanwhile, in the realm of finance, the prominent Rothschild family 
made ample use of their private homing pigeon network to relay vital information for 
their burgeoning merchant banking empire. In fact, it was a homing pigeon that 
delivered the news of Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo to the Rothschilds in London, well 
before the English government even knew about it. This information would also give 
them a competitive edge at the Exchange (Blume 2004; Read 1999; “The Spy Pigeon and 
His Work in War” 1916).  
Fig. 4.1 (L): Dovecote 
at Wroxton Abbey 
Gardens, UK, built 
1745. Source: 
wroxtonabbey.org 
 
Fig. 4.2 (R): A replica 
of Claude Chappe’s 
Semaphore Tower on 
Liter Mountain near 
Nalbach, Germany. 
Photo by Lokilech. 
Source: Wikipedia. 
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Carrier pigeons worked in conjunction with the telegraph: they were an 
important stopgap in the communication infrastructure, and were essential to the 
circulation of information. As such they contributed to the establishment and success of 
many early news agencies such as Agence France-Presse. Between 1832 and 1845 
Charles Havas, the founder of Agence France-Presse enlisted pigeons to carry news 
across the English Channel between Paris and London (Read 6). His former employee, 
Julius Reuter, also recruited pigeons to develop his Reuters news consortium, now one 
of the world’s largest (Blechman 30-1). Reuter used pigeons to supplement the 
information gap between Paris and Brussels, as well as the larger gap between Brussels 
and Aachen, Germany. His pigeons were assigned to him by an Aachen pigeon-breeder 
who initially provided 45 birds, but eventually signed over 200 of them to Reuter’s 
service (Read 11).  
The carrier pigeon was vital to the movement of information across space, but the 
telegraph was equally essential, in combination with the train. The carrier pigeon is after 
all, a one-way messaging service since the birds only fly in one direction: toward home. 
Thus for carrier pigeons to function effectively, they needed to be transported quickly 
and efficiently away from home first, in order to fly by back home with the sought after 
information. Reuter’s initial system for example, required twelve birds, which were to be 
always available at the Brussels location. This meant that all birds that were dispatched 
to Aachen had to be returned to Brussels by train every single day (Read 11).  Messages 
were put in tiny bags, and tied to the birds’ wings. The birds then left Brussels for their 
loft in Aachen. Once they arrived, the messages were taken out, put into a box and 
sealed. Then, they were carried by boy runners to Reuter’s office where the messages 
were translated into telegraphese and taken to the telegraph office for transmission to 
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Berlin (Read 11). The network was indebted just as much to the train and the telegraph 
as it was to the birds’ themselves. 
At this time, the homing pigeon operated more effectively than it had in pre-
modern periods. While pigeons increased the functionality of the telegraph and the 
train, these technologies also likewise increased the efficacy of the pigeon network. 
Eventually, however, as the infrastructures of the train and the telegraph—which often 
overlapped—developed and expanded, carrier pigeons began to be phased out. They 
were in the end a stopgap, a temporary fix for a developing network. It was not until 
their deployment during the Franco-Prussian war that they enjoyed a revival in 
popularity, again as an essential actor in an elaborate arrangement of communication 
and transportation.  
 
XII. Pigeons Travel by Air Balloon with Microfilm to Meet a Magic 
Lantern: “Les Pigeons Voyageurs” During the Siege of Paris (1870-
71) 
 
Pigeons proved indispensible to the French when Paris was under siege during 
the Franco-Prussian war (1870-1). When the Prussians annexed the city, the normal 
channels of communication into and out of Paris were interrupted immediately. 
Telegraph wires were cut, not just those overhead, but also those submerged in the 
Seine (Hayhurst 1970). Couriers attempted to carry letters back and forth, but it was 
inefficient and dangerous work (Hayhurst 1970). It was nearly impossible for Paris to 
send or receive messages outside the city. Parisians began to send letters outwards by 
balloon, but this was imprecise and communication could not be effectively returned by 
balloon either.  
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The only reliable method to deliver messages into the city was with the help of 
homing pigeons. Pigeons were placed in boxes and flown out of the city in the air 
balloons. Once the pigeons made it to Tours, France they were fed, allowed to rest, and 
then laden with messages before they were released to take their journey back to Paris. 
Tours was 200 km from Paris so to reduce the flight distance the pigeons were 
sometimes taken by train as close to Paris as was safe (Hayhurst 1970). At the beginning 
of the siege, messages were written on paper and then rolled up and tied to the pigeons’ 
tail feathers (Allen 108). However, paper messages were not ideal. They could be 
damaged, and because they could only contain so much text, their storage was limited.  
René Dagron was hired to implement the microphotographic technique as a 
space saving measure. It was successfully put into practice after a couple of months into 
the siege. Messages were eventually photographed, shrunk down, and developed onto 
microfilm, which expanded the carrying capacity of each pigeon substantially. One tiny 
piece of collodium could contain as many as 2,500 messages (Osman 14). Once received 
at their destination, the microphotographs were projected with a magic lantern onto a 
screen. Their contents were copied down by scribes and then delivered to their intended 
recipients (Wynne 151). The messaging system eventually expanded to include London 
where the British General Post Office sent the pigeons back. Pigeons relayed over one 
million messages over Prussian lines during that time (Jerolmack 2007: 83). It was 
reported that 40,000 messages were received on just one day (Jerolmack 2007: 83; 
Woods 355).53  
                                                 
53 Microphotography saved so much space, that French authorities allowed it for personal 
correspondences—for a small fee. Homing pigeons, or as they are called in French, “les pigeons 
voyageurs” could carry messages between Paris and England, but they had to be written clearly in French, 
be within a certain word limit, and sent by registered mail to Tours, where they were photographed, 
alongside hundreds of other messages that were then shrunk and sent off by pigeon (Wynne 152).  
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What is significant about the mobilization of the homing pigeon during the 
Franco-Prussian War was that the way it was embedded in an even larger technological 
constellation. Not only did it implicate the telegraph and the train, it also involved 
photographic and proto-cinematic technologies, such as the camera, microphotography, 
microfilms, magic lanterns, and by the low-tech transportation system of the hot-air 
balloon. Together, the homing pigeon and these technologies and techniques worked as 
a unique ad hoc animal-technical assemblage. On their own, these various technologies 
would have been insufficient; together they constituted a provisional, relatively 
successful but impressively coordinated communication system.  
Over three hundred pigeons were dispatched for Paris throughout the war, but 
only fifty-nine successfully made it back there. This is thought to be a result of poor 
weather conditions, for the siege of Paris took place in the winter (Wynne 152). The 
Prussians also tried to intercept the birds by deploying hawks to hunt them (Allen 109). 
However, the pigeons were also not well trained. As 20th century seasoned pigeoneer 
Lt.-Col. A. H. Osman reminds, at this time the carrier pigeon was strictly an emergency 
service wherein untrained birds were called upon unexpectedly (16). Many of the 
pigeons deployed during the 1870-1 Siege came from regional pigeon lofts outside Paris; 
their training was hasty, and limited at best. And without proper practice and continued 
training throughout the Siege, even the performance of the best pigeons would suffer. 
Still, the pigeons did good work, which did not go unnoticed.  The French dedicated a 
monument to them, designed by Frédéric-Auguste Bartholdi (the designer of the Statue 
of Liberty) at the Porte des Ternes in Neuilly in 1906 (Lawrence 2010).54  
                                                 
54 It was destroyed by the Germans in 1944 when they occupied Paris (Wynne 152). 
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But homing pigeons did not only make an impression on the French. The 
deployment of pigeons during the Franco-Prussian war attracted considerable attention 
from the world. It indicated the potential for homing pigeons to be an effective 
emergency messaging service particularly for the military. It also demonstrated the need 
for better, more systematic training. Homing pigeons performed reasonably well during 
the Franco-Prussian War, but had they been better trained they may have excelled. 
Their mobilization during this war galvanized countries all across continental Europe to 
establish working Pigeon Services (Jerolmack 2007: 83). Pigeon breeding advanced, 
while official military pigeon lofts were set up in Germany, France, Belgium, Italy, 
Portugal, Austria, Russia, Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden, and Canada (Woods 355). 
Pigeons were also used in the Second Boer War (1899-1900) during the siege of 
Ladysmith to carry important information in and out of the garrison (Gardiner 98).  
By the end of the 19th century, then, the Western world had become increasingly 
enthusiastic about the potential military applications for homing pigeons. Their homing 
abilities, speed, strength, and their endurance, in combination with their small size and 
docility made them a reliable and efficient means of communication during conflicts. 
They could be very useful in rugged terrains where ground transport was precarious or 
the laying of wires was not possible. Their generally resilient nature suggested they 
could become accustomed to even the harshest conditions on the frontlines of battle.   
Of course, the bird’s innate abilities alone, while impressive, were not enough to sustain 
a dedicated, consistently reliable network.  Rigorous training was required, in addition 
to a whole host of material and technical supports.  
As countries across Europe and North America were fortifying their pigeon 
service, Great Britain was lagging behind. In his 1899 article, “Homing Pigeons in War-
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Time,” General J. Larner observed with great anxiety the great pigeon divide. 
Remarking that while other countries across continental Europe had established pigeon 
programs (see Fig. 4.3), the British had yet to catch up. “How long must be wait until 
our pigeon system rivals those of the Continental Powers?” he complained, and called 
Britain’s neglect of the homing pigeon “manifestly foolish” (Larner 818, 815). For if 
conflicts were to ever arise, a functioning carrier pigeon network would be crucial. 
In the event of a war, Britain could borrow homers from local pigeon flyers, but 
the concern was that these birds would not be sufficiently trained (Larner 816). An 
intensive training regimen was needed as well as established techniques, and a set of 
best practices. In addition, what was also required was a proper infrastructure that 
incorporated both communication and transportation technologies, as well as additional 
pigeon-related housing and accessories. In order to use carrier pigeons optimally for 
greater dissemination of information, lofts would need to be built on different parts of 
the coast, but also at telegraphic communication headquarters (Larner 817). Thus to use 
carrier pigeons effectively involved planning and meeting important requirements, 
which were eventually strategically addressed during the following Great Wars. 
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XIII. The Great Wars: Assembling the Modern Carrier Pigeon Network    
Pigeon-based communication networks had been mostly formed ad hoc up until 
the 20th century. By WWI a more systematic approach to homing pigeons was already 
underway; it continued to develop during the war, and well into WWII. In the combined 
wars, carrier pigeons were deployed at an unprecedented scale by Great Britain, 
continental Europe as well as Canada and the US. Special military units were 
established with trained pigeon handlers, called pigeoneers. Training schedules were 
developed and material supports and accessories were devised, manuals were published 
and diligently implemented.  
Fig. 4.3 A map of 
military pigeon loft 
locations in Europe as 
of 1890  
Source: “Homing 
Pigeons in War-Time” 
(Larner 818). 
 265 
Eventually, by WWII, homing pigeons were trained to do things they had never 
done before. That is, fly at night, return to mobile lofts in changing locations, and fly 
between primary and secondary homes. The homing pigeon by this time had become a 
full-service, mobile, two-way means of communication. These are major modifications; 
up until this point communicating with pigeons had been limited to daytime, fixed 
locations, and one-way deliveries. In this way, homing pigeons can be understood as 
caught up in the imaginative possibilities of technology, and thus implicated in the 
processes of technological change.    
At the outbreak of WWI, the British were one of the only European Allied nations 
that did not have dedicated military pigeon service, as Gen. Larner had predicted back 
in 1899. But pigeons proved necessary for them once the war got underway. The 
Germans had effectively prepared their pigeon service, which was very disconcerting for 
Britain (Osman 24). As such they had to catch up as quickly as possible.  55  Efforts were 
made to procure only the best pigeon breeds, which was done through pigeon breeders. 
Local pigeon fanciers and hobbyists volunteered their birds—an estimated 100,000 
(Hansell and Hansell 20). Pigeons were trained, and employed on the home front, and 
were finally sent to the front lines by March 1916 (Allen 11). Britain bolstered their 
Pigeon Service to such an extent that by the end of the WWI, they had 22,000 pigeons in 
service and 400 pigeoneers dedicated to work with the pigeons (McCafferty 2002: 11). 
The Americans, meanwhile, did not have their own pigeon service. When entered the 
war in 1917 they realized they could not do without one. As such, they had to borrow 
birds and their accessories from the British, while also availing themselves of Britain’s 
                                                 
55 Britain actually made pigeon flying illegal, for fear of German espionage and required pigeon owners to 
clip their wings (Hansell and Hansell 20). Anyone who wished to carry homing pigeons had to have a 
special permit issued by police (Osman xiii). 
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expertise, advice, and training manuals.  Eventually they managed to get their own 
service off the ground (Osman 51-2).  
Carrier pigeons are obviously of primary importance to any pigeon service, but 
they were ineffectual without the personnel that cared, trained, and deployed them. The 
establishment of a dedicated pigeon service meant acquiring and training the necessary 
skilled personnel. They needed to be well versed in optimal breeding techniques, feeding 
regimens, and rigorous training schedules. Pigeoneers were in charge of bringing 
pigeons wherever they were needed, carrying them through trenches, barbed wire, and 
shellfire on foot, bicycle, horse, or automobile. They were equally responsible for 
maintaining and distributing the pigeons’ auxiliary equipment between combat lofts on 
the front lines to the message centres at the rear. They were in charge of delivering all 
messages received by pigeons to the message centre of the unit’s headquarters. In 
addition, they also had to train other personnel to care, utilize, and release pigeons 
(FM11-80 4).  
While pigeoneers could be taught with the help of training manuals, pamphlets 
and supervision by more experienced personnel, certain essential characteristics could 
not be taught. As the American Pigeon Service Field manual outlines, pigeoneers not 
only had to have expertise and knowledge about pigeons, it was also necessary that they 
be dependable, kind, patient, neat, and very observant in order to be excellent at their 
work (18-19). In short, pigeoneers needed to appreciate pigeons. It was enthusiasm that 
would facilitate the best sense of each pigeons’ disposition and behavior, and estimate 
how well they will fare in certain conditions in order to deploy them as effectively as 
possible. As such, often the ideal pigeoneers were those men who were already pigeon 
fanciers even before the war.  This was most certainly the case on the home front. Col. 
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Osman recognized the value of pigeon hobbyists: during WWI he set up a volunteer 
service by approaching seasoned pigeon fanciers. He requested that they keep their 
pigeons well trained on the condition that if the enemy landed they would have to put on 
their uniforms and fight (23).  
Homing pigeons as a means of communication required institutional support and 
skilled professionals, with tried and tested training techniques. But they also required 
social acceptance from the public; attempts were made to cultivate a culture of respect 
for the pigeon.  Homing pigeons are fallible and vulnerable, thus they required 
protection. Because of food scarcity during the war, there were concerns that pigeons 
would be killed and eaten. On the home front edicts were put into place to prevent 
pigeons from being shot. “Killing, wounding or molesting homing pigeons” was 
punishable by imprisonment or a hefty fine, according to the Defense of the Realm Act 
regulations during WWI (Gardiner 100).  On the front lines, this edict was also enforced. 
A newsreel released by the War Office featured a telegram message sent by Capt. H. 
Dickinson on October 31, 1917 that read, “Please do not shoot homing pigeons. They are 
performing valuable national work” (“War Office Official Topical Budget 324-1”).  
In addition to policies set in place to protect pigeons, a whole host of techniques 
and special accessories were designed and implemented to keep them safe. Pigeons, as 
mortal beings, are vulnerable to countless threats from shellfire, enemy snipers, 
predators, fog, and inclement weather, smoke, and gas. The American field manual for 
the pigeon service describes the various weapons used for the defense of pigeons, 
particularly from predators, like opportunistic rats in the trenches, or birds of prey like 
hawks or falcons (13).  
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During poisonous gas attacks, pigeons were put in uniquely designed bags to 
safeguard them from the fumes (Gardiner 100). These also allowed soldiers to affix 
messages to the pigeons while they were inside the box, without subjecting the bird to 
fumes (see Fig. 4.4). Special stabilizing harnesses were designed to immobilize the birds 
and keep them well secured inside their panniers during transport on tanks, bicycles, 
and airplanes (see Fig. 4.5). Pigeons were dispatched in variously sized containers and 
crates. These often required additional accessories such as parachutes (see Fig. 4.7) to 
ensure the safety of pigeons during landing in the event of an attack.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.5 French homing pigeons 
secured in their traveling baskets, 
ready for deployment. Source: 
Imperial War Museum, Waley A 
(Major) Collection (Q 55233).  
 
Fig. 4.4. Gas protection container for 
homing pigeons during WWI. Photo 
by 2nd Lt. David McLellan, Aug. 31, 
1918. Source: Imperial War 
Museum, Ministry of Information 
First World War Official Collection 
(Q 9288). 
 269 
 
 
 
In addition to pigeons, pigeoneers, and an array of techniques and accessories, 
the carrier pigeon also required a stable material infrastructure for circulation, one that 
also encouraged interoperability across all branches of the military–army, navy, and air 
forces—for combat and intelligence (Osman 1928). The most important components of 
this infrastructure were the home lofts. After all, homing pigeons require homes in order 
to do their work. Traditionally these lofts were stationary; pigeons were transported 
away only to return to the same place every time. These stationary lofts were primarily 
reserved for long distance birds, and were typically located near message centres that 
housed telegraphs, telephones, or wireless (Nicol 288).  
In the field, a commander would write a message, give it to an officer from the 
Royal Engineers Signal Service, who would then attach the message to the leg of a 
pigeon and toss it into the air. The pigeon would then fly back to its home loft.  When 
the pigeon landed it would activate a lever, complete the circuit, and trigger the sound of 
a bell. The Signal Service soldier would be alerted that a message had arrived. He would 
go to the loft, remove the message from the pigeon’s canister, read it, and then and pass 
it on by telegraph, telephone, or a personal messenger to whoever required the 
Fig. 4.6 Pigeon parachute 
used by British during WWI. 
Source: Imperial War 
Museum (COM 928). 
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information (Gardiner 99).  Hungry after its journey, the bird would also be fed (Osman 
27).  
Not all lofts were stationary however. Mobile lofts were a significant development 
during WWI. That is, lofts that could be moved between different locations, to 
accommodate the contingencies of warfare. Pigeons would return to them regardless of 
the shift in their geographical location. Mobile lofts did not replace stationary lofts; both 
were used but for different purposes, with different pigeons. These lofts were mounted 
onto trailers or automobiles (Wynne 153) (See Fig. 4.7). Mobile lofts were reserved for 
breeding and stock, but they were also largely used to house young pigeons deployed for 
short distance communication in the field (FM 11-80 14-16). These were reserved 
specifically designated for “mobile” pigeons. During training the lofts are moved 
frequently to prevent the crystallization of location fixation (Nicol 290). Thus unlike 
stationary pigeons, they used the lofts themselves to find their way back, regardless of 
their location or the particularities of the terrain. They were able to find their way back 
even if the loft was longer in the same place it was previously.56 
 
 
                                                 
56 Mobile lofts were also camouflaged, and sometimes physically integrated into the trenches. Mobility 
was hampered as a result of the poor ground conditions during WWI. Mobile lofts ended up being used 
much more extensively in WWII.  
 
 
Fig. 4.7. Homing pigeons housed 
in mobile loft, R. E. Signals 
Pigeon Camp, Sept. 11, 1917. 
Source: Imperial War Museum, 
Royal Engineers Collection (Q 
29539). 
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Getting a pigeon to “home” to assigned locations is not an effortless endeavor and 
involves a great deal of care, hospitality, and training. It is necessary to create an 
attractive home for the birds, one to which they will be motivated to return.  Since 
pigeons adopt a home loft by the time they are about 6 weeks of age, it is critical to 
ensure the pigeon develops a strong relationship to its home as soon as possible. This is 
cultivated through scheduled exercises, releasing pigeons and then encouraging them to 
return at particular intervals. How long a pigeon should be at its home and away from it, 
as well as when it should be fed and bathed were important considerations for ensuring 
the pigeons were as attached to their home as possible (Alter 2014).  
For home to be desirable, it needed to be associated with several key things: food, 
water, salt and grit (essential for the bird’s digestion); and it must be a place to bathe, a 
place to roost (with each bird choosing its own particular perch in the loft), and a place 
for protection (Nicol 291). Thus to imprint the home on the pigeon involves secure 
structural design to suggest safety and defense, and a comfortable place to rest with its 
mate. Pigeons bond very strongly to their mates and offspring so the presence of their 
family, or the promise of it is also a significant motivator. Behavior is thus conditioned 
using a particular reward schedule based on all of these elements.  
In addition to providing favourable lofts to which the homing pigeons would 
return, it was also necessary to have various means to transport the pigeons away from 
the lofts. Because pigeons need to be taken away from their home in order to allow 
communication to take place, they are heavily dependent upon forms of transportation, 
whether by air, ground, or water. The first Allied pigeons were sent out on ships and 
minesweepers to enable ship to shore communications, where wireless was not available 
(Nicol 288). Even when not expressly placed on ships, homing pigeons sometimes 
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ended up there. As Osman recounts, “many birds in distress take refuge for the night on 
the friendly mast or deck of a trawler and being brought to land on completion of the 
cruise in the morning, they are liberated with a message accounting for their absence” 
(21). Of course, the birds were more likely to survive if they crossed paths with those 
who were familiar with or sympathetic to pigeons.  
On the ground they traveled on the backs of soldiers either by foot, or on 
motorcycles or bicycles (see Fig. 4.8). They were also loaded into automobiles, and 
strapped to horses or dogs (see Fig.4.9). They were a common presence in tanks. During 
WWI, tanks were provisioned with pigeons, and their own dedicated pigeoneer (Alter 
2014). In the sky, they accompanied soldiers on RAF bombers and other aircrafts. They 
were taken along as a contingency, in the event of failure or distress (See Fig. 4.10). Or, 
they were launched in mid-air to report back on the progress of air missions. 
 
 
 
   
 
 
Fig. 4.8: Pigeons inside 4-chambered 
basket are strapped to the back of a 
Motorcyclist of the Royal Engineers 
(signals) to be taken to the Front line. 
Photo by 2nd Lt. David McLellan, June 2, 
1918. Source: Imperial War Museum, 
Ministry of Information First World 
War Official Collection (Q 8898).  
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WWI marked an increasingly mobile and modular carrier pigeon network with 
the development of mobile lofts. However, WWII cultivated this mobility and flexibility 
even further. First, militaries began training pigeons to fly at night. Homing pigeons are 
naturally day-flyers. Their eyesight is poor in low light conditions: as such it is 
incredibly difficult to train them to fly in the dark. Training involves the gradual release 
of pigeons into darkness at increasing distances, beginning at twilight. Other methods 
included housing the birds in a darkened loft in the day. Trainers would then rely on 
electric lights to illuminate the inside of the loft at night to acclimatize the birds to the 
time shift. Eventually when they are released at night, their loft must also be illuminated 
to help the birds see it from above on their return (Nicol 295).  This new affordance of 
carrier pigeon communication however still meant that the birds would be slower to 
return, due to their limited visibility (Nicol 295).   
Second, and most significantly, some pigeons learned to return to two homes, 
thus optimizing the pigeon service for two-way-communication (Nicol 290). This was a 
dramatic achievement at the time and it was a closely guarded secret (Teale 49). The 
training involved dividing up and distributing the rewards that the loft typically 
Fig. 4.9: Two Canadian 
soldiers strap a basket 
containing carrier pigeons 
to the back of a dog during 
a training exercise, 1940. 
Source: Imperial War 
Museum, Ministry of 
Information Second World 
War Official Collection (D 
442).  
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represents, parsing them between two locations, such as putting family in one and food 
in the other. Still, one loft was required to be primary and stationary. The secondary loft 
would be a mobile loft or basket. The bird would be brought to this secondary location 
and consistently fed there. Once the bird began to associate the basket with food, they 
are released from their lofts, and immediately fly toward the basket (Nicol 295).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 These new capabilities, while impressive, were mutually exclusive. That is, 
stationary birds would only fly back to stationary lofts, and mobile birds to mobile ones. 
One-way communication birds could not become two-way communicators and vice 
versa. Night-flyers could only fly at night and could not also fly to mobile lofts, nor could 
they be trained for two-way communication (Nicol 295). Furthermore, they could only 
travel short distances, and were also considerably slower than other birds. Thus these 
new proficiencies typically came at the cost of other affordances. As much as the pigeon 
is malleable, it nevertheless resists certain modifications. 
 
Fig. 4.10 Royal Air Force 
crewmen handling containers of 
carrier pigeons at St. Eval, 
Cornwall, after a patrol over the 
Bay of Biscay. Source: Imperial 
War Museum, Air Ministry 
Second World War Official 
Collection (CH 12364). 
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XIV. The Pigeon-Shape of Communication 
Carrier pigeons were not just a means of communication but a kind of 
communication. They were not appropriate for every situation, and when they were 
used, they did not merely establish a neutral link between people and places, it gave 
meaning to that link. Communication by carrier pigeon, for example, was situational; 
pigeoneers had to recognize when it was appropriate. The “Carrier Pigeons in War” 
pamphlet distributed to soldiers in WWI, instructs that when deciding whether or not to 
send a pigeon, it is necessary to consider: (a) the importance of the message; (b) the 
number of birds available at the time; (c) how soon the dispatched birds could be 
replaced; and (d) whether the message can be sent by any other means (Alter 2014). If a 
message was especially important, two copies were to be sent, but only when sufficient 
birds were available (Alter 2014). Duplicate messages were carried by different birds, 
often one male and one female, and released at different intervals to ensure they did not 
fly together and get waylaid (Gardiner 100). Pigeons were precious. There was nothing 
cavalier or effortless about launching a pigeon into the air. To do so was not only to risk 
squandering the bird’s life, but the huge investment of labour and energy that 
accompanied each bird.  
Whatever the pigeons were entrusted with was integral to the communication 
between the front lines of battle and the rear. Such sensitive information was essential 
to the coordinated movement of soldiers, and had a direct bearing on military strategies. 
As such, communications sent by carrier pigeons were to be done with the utmost care. 
The pamphlet further emphasizes this: “Messages should be legible: should be written in 
a clear hand, care being taken to fill in all the particulars as required by the form” 
(1918). Such messages included everything from map overlays, reports from 
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reconnaissance units, staff reports, airplane pilot status updates, and navy unit updates 
(FM11-80: 2-3). Any content that arrived by carrier pigeon was very important. Thus, 
the very sight of an air borne carrier pigeon advancing was meaningful in and of itself, 
well before the message has been opened and read.  
In this way, the carrier pigeon did not simply facilitate connections, it also gave 
meaningful shape to those connections. They defined the messages they carried but they 
were also significant even when they did not carry any messages at all.   Planes were 
encouraged to always be equipped with a dedicated homing pigeon in the event of a 
disaster. Pigeons accompanied most airplane pilots in the aerodrome (Osman 31).  Thus, 
a pigeon arriving on its own without a message—bearing just its numbered leg tag, was 
recognized as a signal of distress sent out by that particular plane (Alter 2014).  
  To reiterate, homing pigeons did not simply carry the content of human 
communication. Rather than simply supporting links between people and information 
across space, they also qualified the nature of that link. That is, they gave it form, 
texture, and meaning. They constituted communication. They highlighted the 
physicality that energizes the process of communication, drawing attention not just 
inward to the messages it carried, but also outwards to the singularly situated conditions 
in which it was deployed. They made use of pre-existing dimensions of communication, 
but they also brought into being novel dimensions of communication, making new 
aspects of communication thinkable and possible. 
Carrier pigeons were not always used to send intelligence; they also opened up 
additional possibilities for gathering information. Pigeons were dropped from planes 
into friendly areas on the off chance of getting otherwise unanticipated information 
from Allied soldiers below (Allen 110). Other times they were let go over enemy-
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occupied areas in an effort to establish connections with potential sympathizers and 
resistance movements (Hansell and Hansell 21; Jerolmack 2007: 84). Pigeons were 
placed individually in containers that were affixed with tiny parachutes. Inside each 
container was also a bag of corn, propaganda, as well as messages requesting 
information about the Germans, and promises of rewards (Hansell and Hansell 21). 
These missions were of great risk to the pigeons because their lives depended on 
someone finding them. If they landed unnoticed, they would die in the confines of their 
parachutes. It is speculated that only ten percent of them were ever returned (Hansell 
and Hansell 21).   
Such instances could easily be construed as wasteful, given just how valuable 
pigeons were. At the time, however, the potential benefits must have appeared to 
outweigh the risks. After all, the Germans did treat these infiltrations as a serious threat.  
They were so alarmed by the success of this program, Osman alleges, that they 
proclaimed that any German found opening such baskets would be severely punished. 
The Germans set traps to catch any traitors who might have been tempted to avail of the 
Allied pigeons, by removing the pigeon and replacing it with one of their own (Osman 
47). In addition, pigeons were sometimes used as a means of counterintelligence by both 
sides with Germans sending bogus messages back to the Allies and vice versa (Osman 
50).   
In the early 20th century, carrier pigeons were also being deployed for 
topographic reconnaissance. Some pigeons were fitted with special miniature cameras 
to take automated aerial photographs of enemy or occupied territory (Gardiner 99). This 
was largely a German practice inspired in part by Julius Neubronner, the son of the 
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famous German pharmacist, who invented the pigeon-camera and patented it in 1903.57  
In 1909, Popular Mechanics predicted that such an invention would be very valuable 
during wartime, reporting that Germany was conducting a number of experiments 
wherein “the pigeon-photographers are carried in a portable loft which also contains a 
dark room in which the photographs are developed” (“Pigeons as Aerial Photographers” 
211). By 1916, reports surfaced of felled or stunned pigeons that were found behind 
Allied lines, with tiny cameras strapped to their chests (“The Spy Pigeon and His Work 
in War” 31). In 1932, the Germans were training and fitting their birds with tiny 
automated cameras, capable of taking two hundred photos in one flight (“Carrier 
Pigeons Take Photos Automatically” 216). While soldiers in planes were also used for 
aerial photography, pigeons could fly closer to the ground, and do so more 
surreptitiously than planes. 
Seeing the carrier pigeon with a camera flying alongside an airplane makes for a 
“strange medley,” an article in the January 1916 edition of Popular Science remarks. 
How odd it is to imagine, the article continues,  
 
the air-ship, the last and most daring invention of man’s brain, rising in 
the early dawn to search and photograph the foe’s movements, and the 
graceful pigeon, so frequently mentioned in in the stories of early days, 
soaring perhaps at the same moment, to act as an aerial scout. (“The Spy 
Pigeon” 30) 
 
The pigeon’s new role is borne of “modern ingenuity” it explains, claiming that it is the 
human imagination that has “added something to the older roles of the carrier pigeon—
and has turned him into a photographer” (“The Spy Pigeon” 30). However, to the 
                                                 
57 Neubronner was allegedly inspired to design the device after one of his pigeons was missing for a whole 
month, and he wondered if there might be a way to record where his pigeons went when they are not at 
home (“The Spy Pigeon and His Work in War” 30). 
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contrary, this new affordance was not simply added to the homing pigeon, but a 
possibility made thinkable thanks to the carrier pigeon. The knowledge about its 
capabilities made it viable to expand the process of communication to include aerial 
reconnaissance. No longer limited to the delivery of message from one point to another, 
communication came to be more broadly a dynamic process of attunement, and creative 
arrangements between bodies, materials, and environments.  
The carrier pigeon’s more-than-human capabilities inspired new kinds of 
deployments, and novel pigeon-technology combinations. For example, pigeons were 
being trained to guide missiles as a part of a classified initiative called “Project Pigeon.” 
Beginning in 1940, the behavioural psychologist B.F. Skinner, prompted by pigeons’ 
excellent vision and maneuverability, used operant conditioning to train them how to 
control the movement of missiles. He attempted this by encouraging them to peck at 
images projected on screens. Skinner worked on the project on his own, but eventually 
enlisted the help of engineers at General Mills Inc. 
It was not until June 1943 that the work was validated by the Office of Scientific 
Research and Development at the Department of National Defense (Skinner 1960). They 
offered Skinner’s team a modest contract for $ 25,000 to develop the homing beacon in 
earnest (Lehman 2013). It was mobilized as an extension of the naval research 
laboratory ORCAN (Organic Control). Though Skinner spent years perfecting the 
system, it was never actually implemented (Wynne 155). These kinds of modifications to 
the pigeon’s work, and the creation of new tasks and responsibilities for them are not 
simply feats of human ingenuity. Rather they are suggestive of the ways in which the 
carrier pigeon itself, as a way of being and getting on in the world, is implicated in the 
imaginative possibilities and the eventual material realities of communication.   
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XV. The Persistence of the Carrier Pigeon and the Myth of 
Obsolescence  
 
Many militaries gradually phased out carrier pigeons following WWII. The US 
Army closed its pigeon program as early as 1957 (Blechman 38). The Swiss kept theirs 
going until 1994, when due to budget cuts they forced 30,000 pigeons into retirement 
(Kroon 1994).  Keeping pigeons was simply too expensive; food, grit, housing, and hired 
personnel were not cheap, and the high cost of the pigeon’s railroad fares during 
military training exercises did not help matters (Kroon 1994). Discontinuing the 
program was nevertheless met with consternation. Hans-Rudolf Fehrlin, a Swiss Army’s 
Division Commander, argued that carrier pigeons remain useful to many modern 
military communications, which are vulnerable to interception or can be jammed by 
electronic countermeasures (qtd. in Kroon 1994). Their persistent post-war military use 
elsewhere certain testifies to this. 
In France, the country’s Defense Ministry continues to operate Europe’s last 
military dovecote, in Suresnes just west of Paris. One hundred and fifty birds make up 
their 8th regiment. The birds however, are not ranked as a strategic asset, which Jean-
Pierre Decool, a member of France’s National Assembly, sees as a major oversight. He 
advocates for developing the pigeon program since carrier pigeons, he maintains, are 
one of the country’s “mightiest weapons” (Parussini 2012). Meanwhile, China still 
maintains a platoon of 50,000 birds with 1,100 trainers as a means of communication in 
border and coastal areas (Parussini 2012). In 2007, China also revealed it was 
implanting microelectrodes in the brains of pigeons to control the birds’ movements for 
strategic purposes (Shachtman 2007). While carrier pigeons do not occupy centre stage 
in current military operations, they nonetheless remain at the ready in the sidelines. 
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Carrier pigeons have also persisted past WWII in non-military capacities. In the 
1970s, the department of Haematology at the Freedom Fields Hospital in Plymouth, 
Devon used pigeons to ferry over blood samples from outlying areas to a central 
laboratory for testing (Allen 90). As of 2004, many remote regions in France were still 
using this method to carry blood samples (Blume 2004). Pigeons were also trained in a 
short-lived search-and-rescue operation in the US called “Project Sea Hunt,” which 
ended in 1983 due to financial limitations (U.S. Coast Guard).  In the 1980s, the 
Lockheed Missile and Space Company enlisted the help of homing pigeons to deliver 
microfilm copies of graphic design projects to workers 30 miles away. Pigeons were 
deemed more efficient because they could bypass the circuitous mountain roads at a 
much faster rate than human courier. At the time, they were also much more efficient 
and affordable than Internet transmission (“Carrier Pigeons Ferrying Lockheed 
Microfilm” 1982).  
Homing pigeons have also been embroiled in the illegal drug trade, espionage, 
prison smuggling, and political insurgency. In 2003 they were employed to carry heroin 
from Afghanistan to Pakistan (“Drug traffickers Use Carrier Pigeons” 2003). In 2008, 
Iranian officials arrested two homing pigeons wearing digital modifications near a 
uranium enrichment facility in the city of Kashan after suspecting them of spying (“Iran 
Arrests Pigeons ‘Spying’ on Nuclear Site” 2008). And it was discovered in 2009 that 
inmates at the Brazilian prison Danilio Pinheiro were depending on homing pigeons to 
help them smuggle in cell phones, and cell phone chargers (Lehman 2009). In 2012, 
homing pigeons assisted Syrian insurgents to communicate securely with other activists 
outside the city of Homs, which was under siege by the government of Bashar al-Assad. 
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Telecommunications were down, and many were without electricity (“Syrians Send 
Messages Via Carrier Pigeon in Homs 2012).  
“The swan song of the carrier pigeon … has just been sung by the U.S. navy,” an 
article announced in the February 1930 edition of Popular Mechanics (Miller 194). 
Surely at the time, in the wake of new technological developments, it was difficult to 
imagine the continued relevance of the pigeon. However, as this brief sketch suggests, 
the carrier pigeon has persisted in spite of and often largely because of emerging 
technologies. And yet, as the race between the carrier pigeon against the Internet that 
opened this chapter indicates, the bird’s obsolescence is still treated as an established 
fact. As this discussion has hopefully made clear, carrier pigeon is by no means a 
rudimentary form of communication. To assume it has been replaced by more advanced 
technologies is to fail to appreciate that the pigeon has been and continues to be deeply 
enmeshed in not just in the imaginary terrain of communication, but also in the 
complex physical and technological networks of communication and transportation.  
 
XVI. Conclusion: Communication’s Feathered Edges 
The encounter between the carrier pigeon and the Internet from which this 
chapter began has provided an opportunity to examine more closely the carrier pigeon’s 
long relationship with modern communication infrastructure. I have tried to show that 
it has been, since the 19th century especially, a perennial participant in the 
communication landscape. It has persisted as a symbol and a technological analog, but 
more importantly, as an essential material and mobile support for communication. It 
was a valuable stopgap, and a means of circumventing communicative challenges. The 
carrier pigeon not only physically matters to communication, but it is also bound up 
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with how we imagine communication’s possibilities. The carrier pigeon is not just a 
pigeon, nor is it just a vehicle. It is a way, a creative process, and a generative technique 
that is materially situated within a larger context of relationships. Attending to the 
carrier pigeon as a means of communication therefore encourages an acknowledgement 
of communication as a material process and an artful form that requires variable 
movements to fill in shifting gaps in that materiality.  
On this note, thinking about the carrier pigeon and its involvement in 
communication has provided an occasion to defer questions of internalities and content, 
of encoding and decoding meaning, to examine externalities instead. That is, 
communication’s material forms and surfaces, its spatial arrangements, the movements 
in between, and the kinds of encounters and relationships such choreographies create 
and make possible. Acknowledging the fundamental materiality and movement of 
communication has also illustrated that communication is not something that merely 
happens; it is not effortless. Forging connections involves substantial effort and 
considerable organization and coordination. The human fantasy of faithful messengers 
that stoically bear the burden of our biddings is just that, a fantasy. In reality, 
communication is a sprawling process, it takes an assemblage, and it takes work.  
The reappearance of the carrier pigeon in modernity—that it is even identified as 
a reappearance at all—testifies to the fact that what the carrier pigeon does remain 
pressingly unacknowledged. The truth of the matter is we should be well acquainted 
with the carrier pigeon by now. Its presence is hardly an intrusion from the past, but 
instead a persistence of what remains eternally present: the stubborn physicality, the 
lively energy, and movement of communication. No matter how attractive our cloudy 
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immaterial metaphors for communication are, the physical supports and their labours 
cannot be done away with.  
 Modernity, Marshall Berman claims, makes the world a volatile place, one where 
“all that is solid melts into air” (13). It makes sense that we would turn to the pigeon at 
this time, a bird that segues with impressive equanimity between solid and air, earth 
and sky, home and universe. Though the process of modernity makes the world 
increasingly tumultuous, unrecognizable, and often inhospitable, the pigeon still 
manages to find a place to belong. In this way, the carrier pigeon is inarguably modern. 
To be modern, Berman claims, is to become a subject and object of transformation; it is 
to struggle not only to make sense and meaning of these transformations, but also to 
make oneself at home among them. His definition, Berman admits, is deliberately broad 
in order to be as inclusive as possible. He hoped that the concept of modernity might 
encapsulate a vital shared experience. That is, an “experience of space and time, of the 
self and others, of life’s possibilities and perils—that is shared by men and women all 
over the world today” (Berman 15). But to be truly inclusive and open, we need to make 
space for non-humans in this crucible we call modernity as well.  
The carrier pigeon presents a compelling case for this. As Anthony Judge notes, 
the bird constitutes one of the few species that can be understood as sticking with us 
despite all of our disruptions to its environment (2013). It is resilient, thanks in large 
part to its attunement to the world, and its ability to adapt accordingly. But by including 
the carrier pigeon in this “vital” experience of modernity, what becomes even clearer is 
that modernity is just another term for the essential instability of life. No living thing 
has the luxury of living in a world made wholly of their own design: life is conditional on 
the techniques used to make the world livable anyway. Bruno Latour argues that we 
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have never been modern; but by opening up Berman’s definition, we might equally 
proclaim that we have always been modern. And more importantly, this proverbial “we” 
is not limited to the human.   
Examining the carrier pigeon as a means of communication, then, illuminates 
that what communication ultimately involves is not a privileged process that transpires 
between human beings. Rather it involves a fundamental, materially situated 
relationship between bodies and worlds, and the movements that unfold in the middle 
of these encounters. More than an exemplar of human artfulness and ingenuity, the 
carrier pigeon is a testament to artfulness and ingenuity as a distributed, vital, 
structuring force that is not reduced to human form. As the world constantly unmakes 
itself, bodies, materials, and their techniques struggle to remake it. The moves with 
which we confront and become attuned to the world’s changes, and the techniques we 
use to fashion accommodations for our possible lives: these are the ways of doing that 
define communication.   
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Conclusion 
 
Ending in the Middle of Things:  
Animal Moorings in the Digital Sublime 
 
the ‘communication sublime,’ an awe-inspiring and 
immensely tantalising vision of a final and universally accessible 
communication space where the accumulation and dissemination of 
information stands for the most important condition of human 
progress, and where there can be no misunderstanding. 
—Imar de Vries, from Tantalisingly Close: An 
Archaeology of Communication Desires in Discourses 
of Mobile Wireless Media (17-18). 
 
the oceanic feeling […] is a feeling, then,  
of being indissolubly bound up with and belonging  
to the whole of the world outside oneself […]  
The role of the oceanic feeling [is] to restore unlimited narcissism.  
—Sigmund Freud, from Civilization and Its 
Discontents (4, 10). 
 
 
I. Flotsam and Jetsam: The Materiality of Liquid Modernity  
 
  This dissertation would not have been possible without the unique landscape of 
the new media environment, and the network that holds it all together.  Without the 
Internet, these animal encounters would likely have never come to my attention. As 
Florian Leitner notes, there is a paradigm of fluidity governing the organization of the 
global digital network (275). This fluidity is auspicious: it allows for unlikely 
phenomenon to be lapped up together and strewn haphazardly and unexpectedly onto 
the foreshores of perception. Fluidity characterizes the outward dynamics of the new 
media environment: the ebb and flow of different elements arranging and rearranging 
around contingencies and strange dynamics.  
The peculiar convergences between animals and media that comprise this 
floating cultural debris certainly excite curiosity. However, they are interesting not so 
much because of what they are, but rather where they have come from and how exactly 
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they came to be. These digital, and especially visual artifacts, Leitner remarks, “arouse 
our interest because of a movement that does not take place onscreen.” They are 
suggestive of a more substantial movement; one characterized by a travelling through 
the Internet (274-5). Fleitner traces this movement in “Turtle Finds Lost Camera” (Paul 
Schultz, USA, 2010) an accidental animal video made under even more curious 
circumstances than “octopus steals my video camera,” discussed in Chapter 2.   
The visual pleasure of this particular video—and its kin—he suggests, is not 
limited to the moving images it presents onscreen. It emerges much more powerfully 
from the way its singular images allow us to move with them. Not only as they are 
carried by ocean currents or by the gestural inelegance of an animal, but especially as 
they materialize in and circulate widely throughout the Internet.  
This video’s images and their meanings are as intangible and fluid as the ocean in 
which animal and camera are suspended. He insists, however, that the movement they 
offer is also an illusion: “because in fact nothing is being moved—there is only a 
transmittal of information” (269; 275). But, as it should be clear by now, the 
transmission of information is indeed a moving, material, and tangible process. The 
aesthetic surface of the web might emphasize an alluring structuring motif of fluidity, of 
distributed creation, of unpredictable dynamics, but this a human phenomenological 
experience, and a psychological inclination toward the sublime.58  
For there is, despite this felt fluidity, an irrevocable dimension of solidity: to the 
ocean, to the images, and the network in which they circulate. Such free-floating images 
                                                 
58 See for example discussions of the digital communication sublime in Imar de Vries’s Tantalisingly 
Close: An Archaeology of Communication Desires in Discourses of Mobile Wireless Media (2012), 
Vincent Mosco’s Digital Sublime: Myth, Power, and Cyberspace, or the electrical sublime in David Nye’s 
American Technological Sublime (1994) and Leo Marx’s The Machine in the Garden: Technology and the 
Pastoral Ideal in America (1964 [2000]). 
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are in reality anchored to an elaborate material topology, one that includes the millions 
of microbes that thicken the sea, and the complex undersea network of fiber-optic cables 
(Starosielski 2015).59 While this very important fact often eludes our everyday 
awareness, it is just another condition of existence for the barnacles, sponges, and other 
marine life that connect and cling to these cables or the sharks that gnaw on them.60 
“octopus steals my video camera,” borne of a pelagic pas-de-deux between an octopus 
and a camera, seems to have left the ocean in order to get on the Internet. However, in 
order to get on the Internet, it had to go back to the ocean—likely by way of the Southern 
Cross cable network nestled in a seabed near Auckland, New Zealand.  
Our experiences of media are different than the reality of media. This dissertation 
has attempted to include animals and their speculative experiences as a way to highlight 
aspects of media that we neglect. Materiality is one of these more salient dimensions. 
Animal-media encounters are a way of emphasizing the mutual implication of fluidity 
and solidity, of materiality and immateriality. Indeed, the Internet is teeming with 
animals: from image macros, memes, videos, animated gifs, to offbeat news items and 
personal blog entries. Rather than solely an outcome of human interest in animals, this 
is the state of things, because in fact, the world is teeming with animals. The Internet is 
part of that world, not a virtual media space that rests on top of it. In the throes of 
animal-media encounters, media—hardware, software, or infrastructure—become 
reflexive sites where that material implication is persistently and actively addressed. 
                                                 
59 See also Stefan Helmreich’s Alien Ocean: Anthropological Voyages in Microbial Seas (2009) for an 
original and highly compelling reconceptualization of the ocean as less an empty space inhabited by 
organisms, but a near solid slurry thick with microbial life.    
60 Google recently reported that sharks were attacking their undersea fiber-optic cables, which forced 
them to modify their design (Butler 2014). Reports of sharks attacking undersea cables, while rare, date 
back to 1987 after the shift from coaxial cables (Lewis 1987). 
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They are also occasions where we can not only learn about individual animals, the 
particularities of media, and the realities they both make, but the realities they have in 
fact been making for quite some time.  
 
II. The Beginnings in the End 
In the end, this project has attempted to make a formal acknowledgement of 
animal-media encounters, to show that they have been informally meeting and mingling 
for much longer than we care to admit. Accidental animal videos, the “Apps for Apes” 
project, and carrier pigeon races against the Internet all appear to be unique scenarios 
that potentially mark the beginning of new trends. However, they are in actuality 
continuations of much more extensive and involved relationships, with significant 
historical precedence.     
An octopus absconding with a camera in mid-record and inadvertently making a 
movie announces the growing proximity between animals and cameras in the new 
media environment that has been escalating for some time. By emphasizing animal-
camera confrontations as a requirement for the very production of animal imagery, 
these videos also elucidate the relationship between moving images and the worldly 
conditions that make them possible. Rather than demarcating a post-human, post-
modern, post-cinematic sensibility, I argued, with the help of André Bazin’s realist 
ontology of cinema, that accidental animal videos offer something distinctly cinematic. 
They are a more consummate iteration of the world making itself in its own image. 
Accentuating the camera’s automatism, they are important reminders of the valuable 
more-than-human operations germane to cinema.  
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The staged encounters in the “Apps for Apes” project, meanwhile, are part of a 
long tradition. Not only of non-human ape enculturation, but also of humans attempting 
to communicate with non-human apes in captivity—using visual-gestural interfaces 
such as touchscreens especially. These interventions are invariably vexed; endemic to 
the development of modern western primatology, they are too difficult to disentangle 
from human epistemology. In addition, they are also tied to the troubling modern 
dream of communication as perfect, lossless exchange. In its effort to exteriorize 
interiors, this fantasy liquidates the other, and reduces all encounters to a transactional 
dialogue.  
As a result, “Apps for Apes” mobilizes orangutans as insipient human subjects 
that bear important information about humans that can only be accessed through 
technology. The lack of success in these interventions, however, has led to additional 
considerations and developments of new and more appropriate designs.  The 
orangutans’ own resistances illuminate that what is at stake in these interventions is not 
better communication, but more appropriate accommodation for invited non-human 
guests. Because they take place in captivity they make apparent the burden of 
responsibility, the necessary relational duties of care, and the significant role that 
technology and techniques play in this relationship. 
Pitting carrier pigeons against the Internet, finally, is part of a long-running joke 
among Internet engineers and enthusiasts. Such stunts rely heavily on a significant 
misunderstanding and underestimation of the carrier pigeon. It is mistaken as merely 
an outcome of humans exploiting the bird’s mysterious homing ability, when in fact it 
involves a much more complex and dynamic assemblage of actors, technologies, and 
techniques.  Likewise, its role in the larger history of communications has also been 
 291 
ignored. Carrier pigeons have been remarkably involved in technological infrastructures 
of both communication and transportation not only since the Great Wars but at least as 
far back as the early 19th century. By acknowledging the importance of the carrier pigeon 
to the imagination and materialization of modern communications infrastructure, the 
bird becomes central to communication.  It effectively illuminates that communication 
and transportation were never separate, that communication is irreversibly beholden to 
materiality and movement. And, that rather than an activity that transpires between 
human partners, is a more extensive process involving many actors.  
These scenes involving non-human strangers are the outcome of a complex 
concatenation of events: by the time the Internet brought them to my attention, they 
had already transpired. In this discussion I have, then, tried to use their aesthetic 
particularities as the basis for more in depth speculations about their ontologies. That is, 
as an occasion to acknowledge the dynamic spatial and temporal relationships that 
contributed to their conditions of existence. Moving between the aesthetics and 
ontologies of animal-media encounters has been a tactic to produce animal histories and 
animal epistemologies of media.  
Tending to precursors and antecedents is not meant to suggest that recent 
animal-media encounters are simply the inevitable outcome of previous contact. Rather 
it is a helpful way to re-emphasize and re-affirm that animals and media have been and 
continue to be substantially entangled. Animals are fundamentally implicated in the 
material and imaginative possibilities of media and communication. And media in the 
broadest sense of the term are constitutive of the multi-species processes of 
communication and world-making that are essential to accommodating life on earth.  
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III. The Goat Gets the Last Word  
 
We got them 
out of the house, established some sense 
 
of order, or at least what we thought 
was hierarchy. Outside, the goats 
nuzzled each other, gently opening 
doorways to another life. 
-Allan Johnston, “Goats” (2009). 
 
Closing by return is an effective rhetorical device; it is a chance, after 
considerable discussion, to look back at the beginning in a new way. With this in mind, I 
want to return to the birth of YouTube, to the first video ever uploaded there. Titled “Me 
at the Zoo” (Jawed Karim, USA, 2005), it is itself a return to another beginning: that of 
film-based motion pictures. It features company co-founder Jawed Karim addressing 
the camera, framed in a medium shot, while standing in front of an elephant enclosure 
at the San Diego Zoo. The video is brief, clocking in at a mere 18-seconds, and its 
content blasé and banal, significant only by virtue of being the first of its kind. “So here 
we are with the elephants,” Karim announces, motioning behind him, while two 
trundling pachyderms stand in the background, eating hay, and throwing it around. 
“The cool thing about these guys,” he continues, “is that they have really, really, really 
long trunks. And that’s cool,” before finishing matter-of-factly with, “And that’s pretty 
much all there is to say.” 
As James L. Cahill points out, the video is a throwback to the birth of filmic 
motion pictures, which likewise developed in tandem with animal imagery and 
experiments in animal locomotion (266). Elephants, he also notes, are “avatars of 
memory” and make evocative symbols for YouTube’s archival aspirations (266).  At the 
same time, “Me at the Zoo” hearkens back to another memory of another captive 
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elephant from another film from motion pictures past: Edison’s Electrocuting an 
Elephant (1903). In that film, Edison made a much more tragic pronouncement about 
elephant physiology. There was nothing cool about Topsy as she staggered under the 
fiery heat of alternating electrical current.  Putting her to death onscreen, Edison also 
managed to push the representational limits of the emerging motion picture medium. 
 In this way, “Me at the Zoo” hardly seems to offer a paradigm shift from early 
film. In his remarks about the video, Dominic Pettman notes, “the anthropos continues 
to assert its privileged role” by speaking and gesturing over the animal, and over the 
image (207). But while Electrocuting an Elephant is steeped in a kind of animal 
melancholy and a discourse of morbidity, “Me at the Zoo” by contrast, bears signs of life, 
or Burt’s “aesthetics of livingness” (2006). Such aesthetics, and tending to them, are 
central to the reinstatement of the animal and its exuberant presence in animal imagery. 
The elephants in “Me at the Zoo” introduce this aesthetic dimension, but it is an unseen 
goat that truly carries it to fruition. 
 Before Karim makes his closing statement, a goat quickly interjects from 
somewhere off screen, with a faint but discernible bleat that can be heard over the din of 
the zoo. Thanks to the opportune timing of this creaturely aside, it seems as though 
Karim’s final utterance, “And that’s pretty much all there is to say” is in reference to the 
goat’s vocalization. The interruption is low and understated; it could easily be missed 
unless one is paying close attention. That split-second moment creates an opportunity 
to shift our attention away from the human speaker, and toward the animal. It is a way 
to give deference to the goat and let it have final “say” in the matter. What it says is, of 
course, unintelligible. However, it is not meaningless. That meaning is inaccessible to 
us, but it is not wholly inaccessible. Understanding is simply something that takes work; 
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it is sometimes achieved among familiars, but rarely among strangers. What matters in 
this instance, then, is not what the goat has said, but acknowledging that it has said 
anything at all.  
Animal sounds, as Michel Chion notes, are often used in cinema as synonyms for 
silence (1994: 58). That is, they are reduced to mere markers of the absence of the 
human voice. In acknowledging the goat’s presence as it is manifested in the sound of its 
“voice,” it becomes acousmatic, a sound where the source is unseen. More so, it operates 
as a kind of acousmêtre, an acousmatic sound that becomes a character unto itself. 
Enigmatic, it is what Chion describes as “the voice that speaks over the image but is also 
forever on the verge of appearing in it” (1994: 129). Its relationship to the image is not 
simply as an off-screen observer but “a relationship of possible inclusion” (1999: 23; 
original emphasis). Identifying the goat as the acousmêtre grants it a position of 
plenitude, which allows its bleat to announce the pervasive, inevitable, and imminent 
presence of the animal. It is that call from the non-human other, daring us to count it in 
our world viewed, the world considered, because it is irrevocably part of the world lived. 
Karim’s insistence “that’s all there is to say” is a way to shut down further inquiry, 
but the goat’s bleat stands to challenge this closure. It insinuates a gap, an opening that 
leads outward, outside the frame of the screen and the frame of human perception, 
beyond the enclosure of the zoo, and even the enclosure of the human. The goat creates 
a passage toward other sensibilities and ways of articulating presence in the world, a 
passage made possible by the new medium of compressed digital video.  
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IV. Listening for and Looking at other Opportunities for Research 
Incidentally, in the years since “Me at the Zoo,” bleating goats have become a 
popular Internet meme. Videos of goats vocalizing loudly, often in the likeness of 
humans, abound. YouTube is full of video mash-ups of popular music videos that have 
been edited and intercut with scenes of goats yelling. This phenomenon of goats 
vocalizing like humans is more than simply a human predilection to hear itself in the 
call of a goat. More importantly, it points to the fact that in the modality of sound, the 
differentiation between species becomes especially blurred.61 Likewise the difference 
between animal and machine can become equally indistinct. This is certainly the case 
with the lyrebird, which has been documented successfully mimicking the sounds of 
camera shutters, car alarms, chainsaws, and cell phone ringtones (BBC Earth, UK, 
2009).  
While this dissertation has primarily focused on animals and animal-media 
encounters in the visual field, animals and their relationships with media in the aural 
register offer a rich territory for future study. As a case in point, there are incidents 
where domesticated birds have served as primordial music playback and recording 
devices, well before the phonograph. In the 18th century, for example, music manuals 
under the rubric of “The Bird Fancyer’s Delight” circulated with species-specific sheet 
music to be taught to particular birds. The manuals instructed bird keepers how to 
                                                 
61 For example, on Friday, September 4th at 7:15 pm in Brockville, Ontario, the police were dispatched to 
investigate a complaint they received about a woman crying out for help behind a restaurant in the city’s 
north-end (“Female Yelling” 2015). When they arrived, what they discovered inside the shed just rear of 
the building was not a woman in distress, but a bird. A restaurant employee had temporarily locked up a 
loquacious parrot while he went to work. Its vocalizations bore an uncanny similarity to human sounds. 
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encourage birds such as canaries and bullfinches to learn human songs. They would 
then be able to sing the songs inside the home (Angliss 2011).  
From the enduring image of Nipper listening to “His Master’s Voice” over the 
phonograph, to the practice of playing music for cows either for their pleasure or for 
their productivity, performing music for domestic animals is a surprisingly popular 
practice (Godoy 2014). At present, there are also instance of animals that play their own 
music, such as Nora the piano cat, a grey tabby that freely plays the piano. She has even 
been a featured soloist with the Klaipeda Chamber Orchestra (Barnett 2009). 
Meanwhile, elephants at a sanctuary in Thailand readily participate in the Thai Elephant 
Orchestra by playing mostly percussion instruments. The ensemble has released 3 
albums to date (“The Biggest Thing Out of Thailand” 2013). More than occasions for 
anthropomorphism, these are also opportunities to share common, mutually 
pleasurable sensory experience across species.  
 Animal-media encounters remain significant sites of reflexivity where we can 
learn about animals and media, and the worlds in which they live and operate. While the 
acoustic ecologies of such encounters are a potentially rich topic of study, the visual field 
also continues to be an accessible and productive place to examine these encounters. It 
is especially so because there is still much work to be done in the dismantling the 
animal-human divide. This ontological distinction is actively maintained in the 
aesthetics of the visual field.  
As an offshoot of accidental animal videos, for example, there are an increasing 
number of altercations between animals and aerial drones with cameras. Accidental 
animal videos offer occasions where the camera slips temporarily out of human control. 
They create potent discorrelated or non-subjective images that offer not only correctives 
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to human entitlement, but also illuminate that cinema is always constituted to a certain 
extent by a more-than-human perspective. Now, the growing prevalence of animal, 
vehicle, or drone mounted with cameras that are unattended or “unmanned” are 
exploring the limits and potentials of this more-than-human perspective. They likewise 
have their precursors. The matter of Neubronner’s homing pigeons saddled with 
cameras (as mentioned in Chapter 4), for example, raises an interesting question about 
the extent of avian involvement in the development of the aerial perspective or “bird’s 
eye view.” And while there is tremendous value in seeing from another point of view, at 
the same time, seeing with camera-mounted drones generates nascent ethical questions.  
Not only about the freedom to look without limits, but also the human responsibility for 
images, and the practices involved in making them.  
 This project examined sites where animals and media meet, but there are 
occasions worth examining where they do not just meet, but overlap in more intimate 
ways. The deployment of animals as media is one such example. Canaries are no longer 
used to test air quality in coalmines; they have since been replaced by digital sensors. 
However, animals are still currently involved in biosensing projects, or acting as 
sentinels for multi-species and environmental health.62 These projects and their 
historical contexts have been neglected, and would benefit from further attention 
beyond seeing these animals as mere tools for humans. This history seems especially 
pertinent, now that media are becoming increasingly animal-like.  The designs and 
                                                 
62 Pigeon Air Patrol for example, a current co-project developed and maintained by Plume Labs and 
DigitasLBi, involves carrier pigeons affixed with tiny backpacks containing environmental sensors that 
measure air pollution in the city of London (Dillet 2016). Rats are also involved in similar sensing 
initiatives such as HeroRATS who are helping to detect the presence of abandoned landmines as well the 
Tuberculosis bacteria in humans, where other diagnostic tools are unavailable (Crew 2014). 
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functions of robots and drones are inspired by animals and animal locomotion, for 
example. Meanwhile, there is the matter of the growing sensitivity of everyday mobile 
devices like smartphones. These companion devices are increasingly sentient: location 
aware, and responsive to temperature, sound, light, and movement.  
Besides “Apps for Apes” and its emerging app design, there are a flourishing 
number of examples of interventions taking place with animals around art, gameplay, 
and as mentioned above, music. It is a relatively unexplored area, and a wider historical 
context of accommodative designs meant to cultivate reciprocity between humans and 
animals would certainly help historically and theoretically situate projects like Hannah 
Wirman’s TOUCH Orangutan Gameplay Project, Clemens Driessen’s “Playing With 
Pigs,” and Natalie Jeremijenko’s OOZ projects. However, a more in depth study would 
also yield a better appreciation for the possibilities and limits of deploying technology 
for cross-species reciprocity.     
And while pigeons are a perennial stopgap in communication infrastructure, 
there are other overlooked histories of animals as integral participants in infrastructure, 
like horses—such as The Pony Express in the U.S—as well as elephants and camels in 
non-Western nations.  On a related note, thinking about animals and infrastructure is 
also an occasion to consider the issue of animals and mobility in other ways. The most 
obvious example is the emerging phenomenon of animal commuters. That is, where 
animals, domestic and feral, such as pigeons, dogs, coyotes and goats, are actively or 
inadvertently availing themselves of public transit. They are riding on subways, buses, 
and trains. These are valuable occasions to think animals not simply as passive road kill 
and victims of transportation infrastructure, but as potential users. This research might 
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contribute to more conscientious infrastructure designs that factor in animal mobilities, 
such as animal crossings, wildlife corridors like overpasses and underpasses. 
 
V. The Return of the Human  
Lastly, this dissertation has actively tried to exclude the human, to render it, at 
least for a time, peripheral. The purpose of such an exercise was not to diminish or 
devalue the human, but to mitigate the all too comfortable tendency we have toward 
anthropocentricism. Frequently the study of animals becomes the study of human-
animal relationships. While these relationships are important and must be addressed, 
they are also characterized by such a pronounced asymmetry that the unchecked 
privilege and unquestioned entitlement of the human undermines our ability to consider 
the animal in an appropriate or generous way.  
This exclusion of the human was meant to be temporary; it leaves the door open 
for it to come back in after it has had some distance and time to reflect and recalibrate. 
Upon our return it is important that we reconsider our place in these feral ecologies. We 
must take stock of what our responsibilities are to ourselves and to the worlds we make, 
but also to animals. However, not just to animals in general as a vague ontological 
category, but to animals in the particular, as they present themselves to our attention in 
the situated spaces that condition our encounters.  
In the meantime, the rift between nature and culture, the animal and human still 
needs mending. These continued distinctions maintain a sacrificial logic, where the 
exploitation of nature and the animal are taken for granted as the inevitable outcome of 
human becoming. This mending does not entail only a dissolution of boundaries—which 
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often means extending the human estate—but establishing provisional touchstones. I 
have tried to show that media can provide such shared surfaces.  
Considering animal encounters with media is one way to acknowledge that 
animal and human share a kindred artfulness, an artfulness of living. The techniques 
and technologies of animals may be prosaic, marvelous, or strange. But they share in 
likeness the ways and means that all of us employ to make a place for our possible lives. 
Living is not effortless; no one lives only in the world as it is found, not protozoa, 
earthworms, jellyfish, dolphins, or gorillas. Existence is always tasked with making a 
way, an errant movement outward to meet the inhospitable world. Together these 
movements constitute a creaturely catalog of different ways of world-making. Looking 
awry, we can catch glimpses of their traces as they are left behind on the surfaces we 
travail and traverse, impressed by the careful force of curious touch.    
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